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JUAN LEETS 



UNITED STATES 



AND 



LATIN AMERICA 



DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 



NEW ORLEANS, DECEMBER, 1912 



UNITED STATES 



AND 



LATIN AMERICA 



DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 



JUAN LEETS 



New Orleans, December, 1912. 



NEW ORLEANS 

The L. Graham Co., Ltd., Printers 

1912 



FOREWORD. 

To the Honorable, the United States Senate, Members of the House 
of Representatives and the American Public: 

Inspired by that profound sense of justice, which has permeated 
the citizenship of the great American Kepublic since its founda- 
tion, and with an abiding confidence in the integrity of the repre- 
sentatives of these people in the United States Congress, I beg to 
present the humble memorial of citizens of the republics of Central 
America, who have suffered from the consequences of the coercive 
and iniquitous policies of the Department of State, under the direc- 
tion of Philander C. Knox. 

The purpose of this feeble memorial is two-fold: 1. To acquaint 
the American public and the members of the Senate and of the 
House of Eepresentatives with some of the details of Mr. Knox's 
so-called "Dollar Diplomacy," as applied to the Central American 
republics; 2. To exert what influence our facts may possess in 
making for a restoration of the bonds of true friendship between 
the peoples of Latin-America and the United States, which the 
ruinous and selfish policies of Mr. Knox have sundered. 

In this work I have been aided by some of the most brilliant 
statesmen of Central America, all laboring with a patriotic impulse 
end an earnest, sincere desire to establish justice where iniquity 
and false pretense have wrought naught but ruin and devastation, 
misunderstanding, discord and bitterness. In this memorial, as 
well as in personal testimony before the senate committee charged 
with the investigation of matters relating to the Mcaraguan revo- 
lution, I have sought to substantiate all of my charges with docu- 
ments; and, in not a single instance, have I inscribed a statement 
which I believed to be less than the truth. 

Although the facts which I herewith present show that the great 
foundation principles of liberty and justice of the mother of re- 
publics have been ignored and hidden in the intricacies of the false 
doctrines emanating from the Department of State, the citizens 
of the smaller republics to the south have yet a firm faith in the 



people of this great country and place this earnest appeal before* 
their representatives in the hope of arousing an interest in Mr. 
Knox's dealings, which will result in a searching investigation and 
eventual justice. 

While the result of the recent presidential and congressional elec- 
tions in the United States assures an early change in the personnel 
of the State Department, with perhaps a marked change in the 
policies which this government will pursue in its foreign relations, 
the injustice inflicted upon Central America, through the pernicious 
''Dollar Diplomacy," has been too great to be ignored by people 
of patriotic impulses. For that reason we are unwilling to forget 
the past and leave the people of the United Stales in ignorance 
of the noxious schemes and wrongful nets which have been per- 
petrated under the cloak of "diplomacy." 

In this memorial we have striven to present in detail a inie 
picture of the interference of the State Department in Central 
American affairs and the results of the Knox policy. Summarized, 
briefly, we attempt to show: 

1. Under the pretext of giving aid to the small Central Amer- 
ican republics, the State Department has used what it is pleased 
to term "Dollar Diplomacy" to force upon these peoples loan con- 
tracts which would give to a coterie of Wall Street- bankers not 
only millions <>f dollars tainted with illegitimacy, opportunity for 
immense graft, but an absolute license to exploit the vasl re-ourccs 
of the countries and even administer their governmental affairs. 

2. The terms of the loan contracts which Secretary Knox has 
bo assiduously sought to fasten upon "Nicaragua ami Eondurae are 
vicipus, ami. when truthfully revealed to the American public, will 
produce expressions of abhorenee ami indignation. 

3. The Knox policy of dealing with Central America has in- 
stilled a pronounced anti-American feeling, where before naught 
lmt feelings of friendship toward the people of this great republic 
existed; turmoil ami strife, revolution ami poverty have been the 
baneful results. 

l. lu one instance Mi'. Knox has given active support to a 
revolution in Nicaragua, in another instance he ha- opposed a 

revolution ami sacrificed the lives of American Boldiers that he 
might keep in power a usurper and traitor, the poop t,, () l ,.f the 



Secretary in his scheme to deliver the country over to New York 
bankers. 

5. Mr. Knox adjudged Zelaya a dictator in Nicaragua and 
drove him from power, setting up a government which has brought 
poverty in the stead of prosperity; discord in the stead of har- 
mony; despotism in the stead of liberty ; on the other hand, Mr. Knox 
has insistently supported the worst tyrant and dictator that Latin- 
America ever knew in President Estrada Cabrera, of Guatmala. 

6. With the full knowledge of the State Department filibuster-. 
ing expeditions have been permitted to leave Gulf ports for Central 
America, and in one instance the knowledge of the departure of 
such an expedition was used as a bludgeon in a desperate effort 
to force the President of Honduras to approve a Morgan loan 
contract, which, it was well known, was distasteful alike to the 
president, the congress and the people of Honduras. 

7. Designing American financiers desired American intervention 
in the recent Nicaraguan imbroglio, on the other hand, they were 
wont to have the United States Government adhere to a policy of 
non-intervention in Mexico. In Nicaragua, except for the killing 
of two American members of the Nicaraguan' army, in actual 
battle, American life was never endangered, nor was American 
property destroyed; in Mexico a number of Americans have been 
wantonly killed, scores of others have been wounded, some have 
been held for ransom, and millions of dollars of American property 
have been destroyed. In Nicaragua Mr. Knox intervened ; in Mexico 
he has adhered to the policy of non-intervention. These are facts : 
the inference is of something un-American. 

8. Pacts concerning acts of the State Department in its rela- 
tions with Central America frequently have been concealed from 
the American public, or else distorted or exaggerated. Sometimes 
semi-official statements given the press in Washington for American 
consumption have been totally at variance with the true facts and 
not infrequently there has been apparent a desire to prejudice 
public opinion in favor of the attitude of Mr. Knox and his co- 
workers through such distortion. 

Among many of the documents which I present here, and among 
those which I have already laid before the senate committee, some 
of the more important were entrusted to me by Senora Hortencia 



C. de Madriz, widow of the former President of Nicaragua, Dr. 
Jose Madriz. At the time of Dr. Madriz's untimely death, in 
May, 1911, he was engaged in preparing a history of the State 
Department's relations to the 1909 revolution in Nicaragua, and 
Senora Madriz desires that the documents and facts which he col- 
lected be now given to the American Congress and public, not 
only in vindication of the memory of this great statesman, but for 
the benefit which may accrue to the American people, through 
knowledge of the pernicious acts committed by certain officials of 
the American Government. 

In my testimony before the senate sub-committee, presided over 
by Senator A. B. Fall, at El Paso, in October, I found the com- 
mittee anxious to secure light on the conduct of Mr. Knox and his 
agents in the Central American republics. I placed in Senator 
Fall's hands many of the most important documents which I 
brought to this country, satisfied that the cause of a weak nation, 
my adopted country, was in good hands. On my trip to El Paso 
I was accompanied by the well-known Honduranian counsellor, Dr. 
Angel Ugarte, as my legal adviser. 

Although born in Eussia, I am, with all my heart a Central 
American and have been honored in my adopted country with 
important governmental positions. It is the cradle of my wife 
and of my children and it is my earnest desire to do all within my 
power toward building up its prosperity and making of it a country 
wherein we may enjoy liberty and the blessings of a stable Eepub- 
iican Government. I have dedicated all of my efforts and endeavors 
to this cause, which, always, will remain sacred.. 

Juan Leets. 

New Orleans, December, 1912. 



DOLLAR DIPLOMACY. 

The policy applied by the Secretary of State, Mr. Philander C 
Knox, to Latin America during the presidency of Mr. Taft, was 
termed by its originators, "Dollar Diplomacy." 

We propose in this essay to analize this particular policy, and 
show its disastrous consequences to those countries to which it was 
applied, namely, "Latin America." Before going into details, we 
wish to recall to memory the policy of the United States toward the 
other republics on the American continent as it was pursued prior 
to the advent of this so-called /'Dollar Diplomacy." 

During most of the time of the existence of this great nation, its- 
public men have been animated by a desire to maintain an attitude 
of "NONINTEFEKENCE" in the internal affairs of the other 
countries, and this attitude has been supported by the opinion of 
the masses in general. This, beyond doubt, is one of the reasons, 
for the astounding growth and rapid progress of the United States 
of America, whose government, for more than a century, was, rela- 
tively, the most economically administered of any in the world. 
In pursuing, for so long, this admirable policy the succeeding ad- 
ministrations fulfilled the high ideals of the country's father,. 
George Washington, who, with divine forethought, realized the 
great destiny in store for his country, provided his contemporaries, 
as well as future generations, followed and obeyed his wise counsel.. 

"The Monroe Doctrine." 

James Monroe, one of the many distinguished statesmen pro- 
duced by the American nation, in full accord and sympathy with 
the high ideals and doctrines of General Washington, realized that 
in order to assure the permanency of the sacred principles upon 
which this great republic was founded, it was absolutely essential 
that none of the European powers should be permitted to establish 
large colonial governments on the American continent. 

When the Latin- American colonies freed themselves from Spain, 
a "sacred alliance" was entered into* in Europe, the monarch's then 
reigning in absolutism binding themselves to send their armies to 
reconquer for Spain those Latin-American countries which had 
just ceased to be dependencies of Spain. 

The establishment of monarchial regimes on the American con- 
tinent, upheld by some of the great Powers of Europe, would have 



8 

been a constant source of anxiety, and a never ceasing menace, to 
the United States of America, and would have resulted, ultimately, 
in making a republican form of government on this continent im- 
possible. 

It would have impeded the consummation of Washington's policy, 
as outlined by him for the future, as this country would have had 
to maintain a large and costly army and navy in consequence of 
the advent of monarchical powers on this continent, thus fastening 
upon the United States the same cancer that has been sapping the 
life of old Europe. 

Monroe, great statesman and patriot that he was, understood and 
foresaw all this, which resulted in his giving to the world his fa- 
mous doctrine, "AMERICA FOE THE AMERICANS," a doctrine 
at that time perfectly well understood, though later on subjected 
to many varying interpretations, and, therefore, very much dis- 
cussed. 

Monroe, beyond any doubt, purposed to insure for his own coun- 
try, and for all the other republics on the American continent, 
the blessings of independence and the tranquility of peace. Nobody 
at that time, much less the noble author of that Doctrine himself, 
imagined that at some future day, this very same doctrine might be 
construed into a menace of the autonomy of those very same Latin- 
American countries which it was precisely the intention of Monroe 
to protect against such a contingency. That this doctrine, designed 
to be a protection, has been twisted into a menace to the integrity 
of the Latin-American countries, is precisely what we propose to 
demonstrate in this essay. 

"Pan- Americanism." 

To perpetuate the*Monroe Doctrine, and in a spirit to facilitate 
its operation, Mr. James G. Blaine, Secretary of State in the Har- 
rison administration, and originator of the "Pan-Americanism" 
idea, advocated the first Conference of Delegates of the American 
Nations, which Conference was held in Washington, in 1889. 

As- a result of this firsi Conference, the International Bureau of 
American Republics was created and entrusted with the organiza- 
tion of future conferences, which have been held periodically, with 
a view of bringing together the peoples of the differeni races and, 
thereby, the nations thus represented. 



9 

Another great statesman, Mr. Elihu Eoot, while Secretary of 
State, under the Eoosevelt administration, fostered "Pan-Ameri- 
canism" and became one of its most enthusiastic propagandists. 
He was personally present at a Conference which was held in Eio 
de Janeiro in 1906, later visiting the Argentine Eepublic, Chili, and 
other countries, and still later, in 1907, visiting Mexico, where he 
delivered several speeches, now famous because they made such a 
favorable impression in all Latin-America, and created such strong 
sympathy between those countries and the United States. There 
Mr. Eoot, on his own behalf, as well as in his capacity as Secretary 
of State, guaranteed that the policy of his government toward the 
peoples and the governments of all Latin-American countries was 
a policy of fraternity and good will, and that the smallest, as well 
as the greatest, of these countries could rest assured of their inde- 
pendence and autonomy, and the integrity of their territory. These 
same declarations were ratified by him before the "Central Ameri- 
can Peace Conference," assembled in Washington in the fall of 
1907*. 

*After having nearly concluded, we have received some newspapers 
from Central America, in which there is a speech of Mr. Root's repro- 
duced in Spanish, and which speech is supposed to have been made in 
the United States. The tendencies displayed in this speech lead us 
to believe that it is apocryphal. 

A free translation shows: 

In this speech Mr. Root declared that the United States is the 
"Modern Rome," chosen by God to arbitrate not only thei destinies of 
all America, but of Europe and Asia as well. He said that his coun- 
try is destined to control all of the American Continent and that it is 
necessary only to determine the means to accomplish this. He declares 
the natural Frontier of the United States Territory the Panama Canal, 
and that it will cause surprise in the latter half of the Twentieth Cen- 
tury that in the Map of the United States to-day was not comprised 
Mexico, Central America and all the Antilles and that it is only a 
question of time when the Flag of the United States will be seen float- 
ing- over all these territories, at the same time, pronouncing- all Latin- 
Americans as unfit for a Republican form of Government and unfit for 
the Yankee Citizenship (as if they should be destined to be the Helots 
of their compatriots), because the two races are antithetical, un- 
amalganmble and separated by a deep abysm. He said that there is 
sufficient justification for the annexation and that all that is necessary 
for its consummation is a joint Resolution on the part of Congress, and 
he predicts that it will be carried out no matter which of the three 
contending parties was successful in the presidential election. 

We cannot conceive that a man who has captured for himself the 
sympathies of all the American Continent, because of his professed 
ideals in regard to Pan -Americanism could be the author of such utter- 
ances, less can we believe that this great Statesman should so impru- 
dently offer a challenge, not only to the American Continent, but to 
all Nations of the world, threatening some with taking away from 
them their possessions in the Caribbean Sea. 

We trust that when Mr. Root reads these lines, written by one who 
has always had none but sentiments of the highest admiration for him, 
he will hasten to reassure Latin-America, and principally, to protest 
against the authenticity of this speech, which the press attributes to 
him, or to give the authentic version of his speech, should his speech 
have been misconstrued. 

As we have not seen this country's press publish such an important 
speech, nor discuss it, we are justified in belielving that it is not 
authentic. 



10 

If this policy, so firmly maintained by Mr. Boot, had been con- 
tinned, the confidence of the Latin- American countries in the gov- 
ernment of the United States would have increased, whereas, to- 
day, it is an absolute fact that the former feeling of respect and 
good will, as expressed by these Latin- American countries, has been 
converted into a constant feeling of alarm and distrust, and in some 
cases the love felt for all that was Anglo- American has been changed 
into a deep-seated hatred — nevertheless, we Latin- Americans recog- 
nize the fact that the fault rests not with the people of the United 
States, but with its recent Government. 

Instead of upholding the sane policy of Mr. Boot, which had, 
as its basic principle the harmony, the well-being and the prosperity 
of the whole American Continent, there has been substituted a 
policy full of deceit, falsehood and schemes to give protection to 
privileged financial speculations. Mexico, Santo Domingo and 
Central America are at the present moment the victims of the course 
steered by the State Department of the United States; and while 
it is our aim to demonstrate principally where Central America has 
been wronged, and more especially Nicaragua, for the reason that; 
all are in the same position, we shall make a short enumeration of 
what has happened to the other countries named in respect to their 
dealings with the State Department. 

Eevolutioxs in Mexico. 

This country, during the long regime of General Porflrio Diaz, 
enjoyed an era of progress and elevated itself to a condition of 
notable prosperity, made possible by a peace of more than thirty 
years' duration. It is true Mexico did not improve so far as the 
education of its masses is concerned, nor did the masses improve 
in the enjoyment of political liberties, and this is the only serious 
fault to be found with Porfirio Diaz. He did not educate the 
Mexicans to appreciate, nor prepare them for the task of maintain- 
in-- hie highly fruitful endeavors, which crumbled in the first on- 
slaught of a revolutionary hurricane, which swept the country, and 
is tearing ai the vitals of that country even now. 

Until 1909 the Government of the United States had naught but 
laudable comments for General Diaz and his way of governing 
his country, setting him up as a model for other southern republics, 
for which reason it is easily assumed that if he became "persona 



11 

Don grata" with the State Department shortly afterwards, this 
change in affection should not be attributed to the State Depart- 
ment's remorse for not having caused Diaz to grant his people a 
more pronounced form of democratic government. We do not 
know the real cause for this change of affection, but we can "put 
things together." Toward the end of 1909 a revolution broke out 
in Nicaragua against President Jose Santos Zelaya, toward whom 
Secretary Knox had shown a great deal of aversion, and which aver- 
sion culminated in Zelaya having to resign the presidency and leave 
his country. President Diaz, of Mexico, came to Zelaya's assistance 
by conveying him to Mexico aboard one of the Mexican war vessels, 
and this act of Diaz's brought about a diplomatic encounter between 
the two countries, and although this incident was satisfactorily 
terminated, apparently, we are justified in believing that Mr. 
Knox thereafter felt a deep hatred for General Diaz, when we tak-3 
into consideration what happened afterwards. 

In 1910 a revolution broke out in Mexico, first localized, but 
later spreading all over the country rapidly. This movement was 
well supplied with the sinews of war, money and arms; the Ameri- 
can frontier was practically kept open for the introduction of arms 
into Mexico, and American capital was coming abundantly to the 
support of . the revolution. Then the American government sent 
to the Mexican frontier thousands of soldiers and mobilized a power- 
ful squadron of war vessels with the avowed purpose of sending 
same to Mexican ports, which naturally was taken as the announce- 
ment of an intended intervention, giving for a reason the pretext 
of having to protect the lives and property of American citizens; 
and in order to preserve a pretext for intervention, perhaps, indis- 
putable aid was given the revolution. 

Perhaps, due to the stand taken by Congress, or, perhaps, for 
the reason that the State Department convinced itself of the fact 
that an armed intervention in Mpvsrim would mpa.n an immediate 
cessation of all inner strife and a union of all Mexicans, who then 
would have taken up arms against the invader, no intervention irj 
that country took place. The Government of General Diaz fell, but, 
unfortunately, this has not terminated the revolutionary spirit. 
Out of the rank and file of the victors against Diaz there arose 
malcontents, who have continued the strife .with varying success to, 
the present day, to the great misfortune of that unhappy country. 



12 

In this second epoch of the revolution the conduct of the State 
Department has been entirely different. There are to-day along the 
frontier but some hundreds of soldiers, and these have been suffi- 
cient to maintain the neutrality of American territory. The pres- 
ent revolution has been deprived of the necessary elements of war, 
and denied other resources of United States, because any violations 
of the neutrality laws are now severely punished, in accordance with 
a proclamation of Mr. Taft, intended to stop such violations. 
Further, federal troops of the Mexican Government were allowed 
to cross into American territory, in order that they might give 
battle to rebel forces, which otherwise would have been out of their 
reach. 

This change in the attitude of the State Department during the 
two distinct revolutions, the one against Diaz by Madero, and now, 
the one against Madero in turn, invites the suspicion that the pres- 
ent government of this country has had no determined policy to- 
ward parties or persons in Mexico, but hopes for a prolonged strife 
in order to satisfy ulterior ambitions or desires, which, fortunately, 
will never materialize, now that there is reason to expect a radical 
change in the policy to be observed toward the Latin-American 
countries during the approaching probable change of ad ministra- 
tion. 

In relating what has taken place in Mexico, we would emphasize 
the fact that we are in no way allied to either one of the facl ions en- 
gaged in that disastrous strife. It is rather our purpose to expose 
the attitude of the present American administration and the criss- 
crossings resorted to in its policy, in this particular cast' toward 
Mexico, and in general toward all Latin-America. 

"Doctrine Knox." 

The Monroe Doctrine, as we have related before, was willingly 
accepted by the peoples of all Latin- America ; but when later on 
an amplification was invented to signify the righl of tutelage of 
the United States of North' America over the oilier republics of the 
continent, this interpretation, odious, arbitrary and pernicious to 
all Latin-America, met with vigorous protest in all Latin-America, 
where public opinion was unanimous in expressing itself as follows: 

"The good we saw in the Monroe Doctrine was the guaranty of 
our right to an autonomous political life, hut if this doctrine is 



now to be construed into meaning that the United States will pro- 
tect us against Europe for the purpose of dominating us, arid dictat- 
ing to us at pleasure, we cannot see where we are benefitted any 
longer; in fact, it wovdd mean that we may 'jump from the frying 
pan. into the fire.' 

Eecently, under the Taft administration, the Secretary of State, 
Mr. Knox, has seen fit to add to the supopsed right of tutelage over 
the Latin- American Eepublics, an assumption even more pernicious 
and objectionable, that of policing these countries, and, further, has 
sought to impose, especially on Central America, a financial pro- 
tectorate which would deprive these countries of the administration 
of their own fiscal affairs. 

During his first year as .Secretary of State, it seems that Mr. 
Knox saw a vision of himself as the savior of Central America, in- 
suring for these countries peace and prosperity by his efforts to 
bring about the resurrection of a nation that had once been known 
as "Republic of Central America," and composed of the states of 
Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Eica. How- 
ever, these altruistic thoughts were shortly afterwards vanquished 
by his instincts of commercialism, and it was then that he conceived 
the idea of carrying out his plans of imposing a financial tutelage 
on those countries by delivering them into the hands of syndicates 
of financiers in Wall Street, formed for that special purpose, and 
who were thus privileged to exploit those countries, while the people 
of the United States derived no benefit whatsoever. 

A close examination of the financial impositions on these ocun- 
tries, brought about by, and a result of, the "Dollar Diplomacy/' 
justifies us in making the statement that they were the cause of 
the last revolutions in several of the countries bordering on tha 
Caribbean Sea. 

Now let us see how the originators and defenders of the "Knox 
Doctrine" represent the same to the masses, and how they try to 
defend and justify it. President Taft himself, in his speeches and 
messages, and Mr. Knox, in lecturing before universities and in 
addressing voters, have emphasized always the assertion that this 
policy would lead to an assurance of peace and progress in the 
Latin-American countries, would bring about prosperity, and that 
dollars would take the place of the rifle bullets that had been flying 
about there. They also asserted that since Americans, as agents 



14 

of the United States Government, would take charge of the Custom 
Houses in these countries, the principal inducement for revolutions 
would disappear, asserting that these revolutions originated only be- 
cause those who start revolutions hope thereby to make themselves 
rich: That this policy had proved a success in Santo Domingo, 
where it has been enforced for several years: That the proposed 
loans to these countries would result in the utmost benefit to them, 
and secure their protection ; and, in general, they have endorsed the 
plans of a few bankers, favored by the State Department, who 
would derive benefits by exploiting these countries. 

Santo Domingo. 

As the present Government has always pointed to Santo Domingo 
for a justification of its policy, let us see what has really taken 
place in that country since a financial protectorate was imposed on 
it by the American Government. More than fifteen years ago, a 
group of American financiers undertook the settlement of Santo 
Domingo's foreign debt, a condition being that the administration 
of the Custom Houses should be exercised by American employes 
of the American syndicate, which was formed for that purpose. 
This transaction would have resulted in a complete failure for these 
speculating bankers, had it not been that they succeeded in obtain- 
ing the support of the United States Government, which forced a 
treaty on the government of that island, in which it was stipulated 
that the President of the United States should in future appoint 
ihe collectors of customs on the island, that these collectors should 
have the power to use their own discretion in the management of the 
same, and leaving to the Collector General the supervision of the 
foreign debt and its settlement. It is plainly seen that from then 
on the privileged bankers derived all the benefit while running no 
risk whatsoever, as they were guaranteed by the Government of the 
United States. 

Now, if this financial imposition had borne good results, there 
would have been some excuse for this policy, considering the cir- 
cumstances, particularly, that at that time it actually prevented 
various European nations from taking action against Santo Do- 
mingo, through the use of war vessels, which' had been sent to en- 
force the collection of debts of the government due their subjects. 
But this object could have been accomplished by simply putting 



15 

forward the Monroe Doctrine, as was asserted by distinguished 
public men of South America. The whole undertaking proved a 
failure, and has never done for the country what its originator? 
claimed for it, although it is tc be admitted that, due to an efficient 
management, the income derived from the customs increased ma- 
terially during the first years, while in later years the revenues have 
remained" stationary. 

As to the honesty and integrity of those officials appointed by 
the President of the United States, may it suffice to refer to the 
scandal in which the Collector General of Santo Domingo was in- 
volved, and which was aired by the press of this country. That none 
of the purposes of the enforced financial tutelage over Santo Do- 
mingo materialized^ viz: the settlement of the foreign debt and 
''maintenance of peace," is history. In proof of our assertion 
relative to the foreign debt, we shall quote the more authoritative 
report of a meeting of bondholders of the foreign loan of Santo 
Domingo, which took place in London in 1910. This report says: 

"The Council regret to report that no steps have yet been taken 
to remedy the injustice to the British holders of Santo Domingo 
bonds, under the settlement of 1908. At the time the Honduras 
proposals were brought forward in 1909, the Council were given 
to understand that the matter would have prompt attention; but 
beyond further vague assurances that the subject was not being 
lost sight of, nothing has apparently been 'done." 

In consequence, the foreign credit of Santo Domingo has not im- 
proved, and is really worse than' before the advent of the American 
officials, for the very good reason that now it is not given to the 
government to promote the betterment of the credit of its own 
country. 

As to the maintenance of peace in that country, thefailure could 
not be more marked, for in the course of fifteen years of v. the North 
American supervision of the finances of that country, two presi- 
dents have been assassinated, and a series of revolutions have taken 
place, all due to the unrest created amongst the masses, who sus- 
pected their executives to- be tools in the hands of a foreign power. 
Especially, during the last two years, we are justified in asserting 
that this unfortunate country has not enjoyed a single moment of 
true and perfect peace, in spite of (or, perhaps, because of) the 
fact that all these insurrections were suffocated by the pressure 



16 

brought to bear in the presence of American war vessels. Very re- 
cently this pressure proved inadequate, and it was found necessary 
to despatch to that country formidable expedition of marines, with- 
out it being known whether this expedition went in support of the 
government or of the revolutionists.* 

Why, then, do President Taft and Secretary Knox insist in laud- 
ing their scheme of intervention in Santo Domingo, and why do 
they continue representing this intervention as something that ought 
to be practiced in the other Latin American countries ? 

They themselves cannot be bona fide believers in what they ac- 
claim, for do not the facts, and facts known to the world at large, 
belie them. 



Let us pass to a study of the results of this "benevolent and 
fraternal policy" in those countries of Latin- America, where it was 
imposed, or where ■ efforts were made to impose it. 

Costa Eica. 

About four years ago an agreement was entered into by the 
Costa Eican Government and a syndicate of bankers of New York, 
with a view to obtaining a settlement of the foreign debt and a new 
loan; the principal condition being the delivery of the Custom 
Houses to collectors to be named by the President of the United 
States. The conditions were very similar to those imposed on Santo 
Domingo, but with the difference that the Government of the United 
States was not named one of the contracting parties. 

The Costa Eican Congress did not approve this contract, seeing 
in it a menace to its national sovereignty. Afterwards a. very simi- 
lar contract was entered into with Mr. Minor C. Keith, in substance, 
in fact, identical with' the other contract proposed as far as the 
financial part of it was concerned, but no mention was made of any 
intervention by a foreign government. 

The Revolution in Santo Domingo lias been put to an end, through 
the intervention of the United States Government, whose Delegate 
declared himself in favor of the Revolution, resulting in the down-fall 
of President Victoria; and the elevation to the Presidency of the Bishop 
of the Diocese. 

It is curious to see that the Diplomacy of a country, most of its 
people being Protestant, should favor as chief of the government of a 
foreign country the head of the Catholic Church, the most intolerant 
of all sects, and which will deprive of religious liberty not only the 
natives, bul the foreigners as well. This must be another one of the 
so-called benefits of "Dollar Diplomacy." 

i I . l 



IT 

This latter contract was ratified by Congress and is in force at 
this present moment. We do not propose to applaud this contract, 
which might have been arranged with greater advantage to the 
country, but, for the fact that there was nothing contained in that 
agreement that could possibly endanger the sovereignty of Costa 
Eica, it did not cause any ill feeling among the masses and did not 
irritate public opinion. Otherwise, it might have caused riots, even 
in this peaceful country. 

Guatemala. 

Similar propositions of financial support were made to the Gov- 
ernment of Guatemala at abotit the same time that the Costa Eican 
Congress vetoed the offer made that country, and this offer to 
Guatemala, was recommended, although rather informally, by the 
State Department. Guatemala's executive would not assume the 
responsibility of accepting or rejecting the proposition, and referred 
it to the Congress, which body returned it without commenting on 
it except to recommend to the President to use his own judgment. 

Well known as is the despotic form of government in Guatemala, 
in justice to the President, we must say that when he turned over 
to the Congress this loan proposition he clearly proved that he did 
not favor such negotiations and merely desired to delay a decision 
and, at the same time, maintain himself in the good graces of the 
State Department and of Mr. Knox. With his recognized astute- 
ness, President Cabrera has succeeded in continuing his system of 
delay and has prevented any action by the Congress of Guatemala 
up to this time. This conduct proves that, if he lacks strength of 
character, the president certainly manifests a good deal of prudence 
by which he maintains himself in power and in favor with the State 
Department, whose plans relative to the other Central American 
countries he has always aide'd and abetted, as we shall prove later 
on. 

Hondukas. 

Simultaneously with the propositions made the other two coun- 
tries named, the State Department approached Honduras, through 
the American Minister at Tegucigalpa, intimating to the Honduran 
Government the advisability of sending a representative to Wash- 
ington with a view to taking advantage of the offer of a syndicate 



20 

Paredes. He still instructed his representative, however, not to 
submit to any clause which could possibly endanger the sovereignty 
of Honduras. In order to break President Davila's resistance, the 
extreme was reached in having the press of this country publish 
hints that should President Davilla not accept the Loan Proposi- 
tion in toto pretty soon, it would be accepted anyway by Honduras, 
as a revolution in that country was unavoidable, and that the head 
£>nd leader of the revolution had beforehand pledged himself to ac- 
cept the proposition. When President Davila shortty thereafter re- 
quested the United States to prevent the sailing of that much 
heralded revolutionary expedition, at the same time accusing the 
President of Guatemala of having given this intended expedition 
his support, the premptory answer he received from "Washing-ton 
was "Sign the proposed Financial Project first." 

Finally Davila gave orders to sign the Loan Treaty, which in- 
struction the Honduran representative at first refused to obey, but 
finally complied with, after having filed a protest, on the tenth of 
January, and after the announced revolution had already been 
started and two ports had been taken. However, the Honduran 
representative irrevocably refused to sign the contract with the 
bankers. The truth of this incident has been repeatedly vouched 
for by Mr. Paredes in various pamphlets which he has published in 
the United States. Copies of some of the most important docu- 
ments we attach, Addenda "B." 

When this revolutionary expedition, which started from the At- 
lantic Coast of the United States, reached the Coast of Honduras, 
after having taken aboard their vessel, somewhere along the coast 
of Guatemala, some war supplies that had been offered by the Presi- 
dent of that country, there were two American war vessels in these 
waters, but they took no action to detain the expedition. The 
American cruiser, Taooma, went alongside the Hornet, the leading 
vessel of the expedition, to ascertain if this vessel had violated the 
neutrality laws of the United States, but the Tacoma's commander 
declared that lie found nothing suspicious aboard. After Davila 
had signed the Loan Treaty, the same Tacoma was ordered to cap* 
ture the Hornet; but the Hornet had had time to land the war sup- 
plies Bhe had had aboard. 

This Loan Treaty was almost unanimously vetoed and declined 



21 



by the Honduran Congress on the last day of January, the State 
Department, however, insisting right along that the agreement with 
the banking syndicate should also be accepted and signed. The 
signature was affixed to the agreement in February, not, however, by 
the same Envoy, who had been recalled, but by the permanent Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary. It is worth relating that when the Honduran 
Congress refused to ratify the Loan Treaty the American navy 
showed once more, - and openly, a marked partiality for the revo- 
lutionists. 

When the State Department offered its good offices with a view 
to bringing about peace, a note was addressed to the American 
Minister at Tegucigalpa, to the commander of the American Squad- 
ron and to the two warring factions, containing the basis upon 
which the United States would undertake to mediate, one of the 
terms being that Puerto Cortez should be declared a neutral zone, 
whereupon the commander of the Tacoma insisted that the garri- 
son of the constitutional government should vacate the port, which 
•demand was complied with, the port remaining under the protection 
ipf the foreign consuls and the men-of-war, but chiefly under the 
protection of the declaration of neutrality which had been issued 
hy the State Departments 

Therefore, when President Davila was informed by the American 
Minister in person, who stated that he had come in representation 
of the Commander of the Tacoma, that h'e, Davila, was to authorize 
the delivery of Porto Cortez into the hands of the revolutionists, 
his surprise can be imagined. Of course, Davila refused, stating 
that his refusal was based upon the assurance of the State Depart- 
ment that Porto Cortez should be a neutral zone, etc., as related by 
us, but the American Minister became insistent the following day, 
and after a few hours of discussion of his demand, when he, no 
doubt, became annoyed, he said to Davila: "It is useless to lose 
any more time. The port has been in the hands of the revolutionists 
since yesterday, and if you care to be assured of the American offer 
of mediation, you had better consider the delivery of Puerto Cortez 
to your opponents as a "fait accompli." The truth is that the port 
had been delivered to the revolutionists even before President Da- 
vila had been asked for his authorization. 

Mr. Knox, in his offer of mediation, stated as another clause of 



22 



his stipulations, that President Davila. should deposit the executive 
power in a third person, so as to bring about a termination of the 
inner strife, and that this third party should be entirely impartial, 
so as to give guarantees to all Hondurans, of all factions, alike. 
Kegardless of this, and obeying explicit instructions from Mr. 
Knox himself, his emissary, Mr. Dawson — to whose decision the- 
delegates to the Peace Conference held at Puerto Cortez pledged 
themselves, appointed Dr. Francisco Bertran as the person in whom 
President Davila should deposit the executive power. 

We do not care to discuss the personal merits of Dr. Bertran,. 
but the fact remains that he was affiliated with the revolution, and 
actively engaged in the ranks of the revolutionists, and was be- 
sides known as one of the most intimate friends of the revolutionary 
leader. This is one of the reasons why an understanding and a 
peaceable settlement of their differences could not be arrived at 
among the Honduranians, because the ruler, in fact, being the 
victorious revolutionist, all the promise of a guaranty to all Hon- 
durans of other affiliations have proved an illusion up to this date, 
contravening the assurances given by the State Department in its 
offer of mediation. 

However, this two-faced policy of the State Department resulted 
in a benefit to Honduras. The victorious opponent of President 
Davila, favored by the State Department, also remained unsatisfied, 
and as public opinion in Honduras had always been manifestly in 
opposition to the proposed loan negotiations, the new President has 
not ratified that Loan Project up to the present day, thus frustrating 
the hopes of the banking syndicate, who had placed full confidence 
in him, and who have since made him new propositions more ad- 
vantageous than the old ones. 

The new President was greatly assisted by the adverse stand taken 
against this loan policy by the American Senate, which attitude 
was greatly admired and applauded in all Latin-America. The 
action of tbe United States Senate in declining to approve this loan 
convention was principally due to the energetic efforts of a few 
Central Americans, particularly Dr. Policarpo Bonilla, former 
President of Honduras, who presented astounding revelations to 
the Senate regarding the vicious terms of the proposed contracts 
and the insincerity of the State Department's attitude. Had the- 



23 

Senate approved the treaty, the State Department would, no doubt, 
have dared to press energetically the new President into yielding 
to its demand, and he, knowing from personal experience to what 
extremes the State Department might go in order to accomplish its 
purposes, might probably have imitated his predecessor in order to 
remain in the executive chair. 

We believe that we have succeeded in clearly demonstrating that 
the last two revolutions in Honduras were, if not actual creations 
of the State Department, at least, well known beforehand and 
tolerated by the same as a necessary consequence of its coercive 
Dollar Diplomacy. 

In continuing we shall proceed to prove the guilt of the State 
Department in connection with the two last revolutions in Nicara- 
gua, all of which will lead us to the conclusion that Knox's policy 
in Central America, and in general, in all Latin- America, must 
necessarily be unanimously condemned. 

Nicaragua. 

Simultaneously with' the Loan Propositions made the- other Cen- 
tral American countries, President General Jose Santos Zelaya, of 
Nicaragua, was approached. He, however, would not even agree to 
discuss the proposition, and proceeded to arrange a loan in Europe, 
one of the main objects of this loan being the settlement of the 
American debt. Considering the especial zeal which Secretary Knox 
has sought to bring about an acceptance of these loan propositions, 
it seems that this loan policy had become with him a personal hobby, 
and a matter of personal pride, and it can be easily deduced that 
Zelaya' s refusal meant that from that very moment Ins govern- 
ment was condemned to disappear. Enormous claims against Nica- 
ragua were initiated or resurrected and vigorously pushed, some 
of these claims being nothing short of monstrous, biit Zelaya never 
gave cause for the breaking off of diplomatic relations, because he 
offered such favorable settlements with the claimants that neither 
they nor the State Department could find a pretext to refuse these 
offers. 

But Mr. Knox was determined to punish Zelaya, as he might 
have expresed himself, for his stubbornness and a revolution was 
not long in forthcoming. 

The Military Chief on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, Juan J. 



24 



Estrada, brought up by Zelaya, and a man in whom Zeleya had 
confidence, declared himself in rebellion against Zeleya, making 
common cause with the other malcontents in the country. • From 
the very beginning of this revolution, it could be seen that it had 
merited the benevolent consideration of the State Department, and 
that American Consul Moffat, in Bluefields, was notoriously an 
accomplice. The revolutionists were allowed 'to openly acquire 
war supplies and ammunitions of all kinds in the United States, 
and were amply supplied with funds by American capitalists. All 
of this was done openly, and with the benevolent and even com- 
placent consent of the American authorities. 

As one of the best proofs of our assertions, we shall submit also 
the report given to the New York Times recently by former Presi- 
dent of Nicaragua, Juan J. Estrada, leader of that revolution. 
(Addenda C.) 

But in order to take action against Zelaya openly and with a free 
hand, Mr. Knox had to avail himself of some pretext to open 
hostilities. If such a pretext had not happened to present itself, 
surely Knox would have fabricated one, but it so happened that it 
presented itself in the execution of Groce and Cannon, the two 
American adventurers who had been actively engaged in the ranks 
of the Estrada revolution, and who had been taken prisoner when 
in the act of blowing up with dynamite some government river 
boats, and who had been condemned to death by a court martial. 

We do not want to discuss the legality of this sentence, because 
it is of no importance in the case, and we can admit, if necessary, 
that it was not legal, although the fact that they were, when taken 
prisoner, in arms against the government and engaged in dynamit- 
ing government transport steamers, forfeited them their right to 
protection of the American Government, in accordance with uni- 
versal precedence. This was recognized recently by President Taft 
Limself, when cautioning all American citizens residing in Mexico 
to abstain from siding one way or the other in the political strife, 
and that a contravention would cause the loss of right to protection 
by the United States Government. Had Cannon and Groce been 
in the rank and file of the revolution for the sake of the gain that 
there was in it for them, they should have been left to the conse- 
quences of such' a hazardous venture. If enthusiasm and belief in 
the justice of the cause had led them to join the revolution to com- 



25 

bat a despot, they had to take the chances and risks that all 
patriots take of falling into the hands of such despots. Besides, 
nobody who violates the International Law can afterwards claim 
immunity from it. 

The most the State Department should have done, and there ia 
precedent for such action, was to intervene in a friendly spirit in 
behalf of the accused in order to spare them capital punishment. 
Mr. Knox had ample time to do this, if he had really wished to 
save the victims, but he did not intend to do so, nor did he ever 
try to do so; and in his memorable note addressed to the Charge 
d' Affairs of Nicaragua, which note was dated December 1st, 1909, 
and which he claimed was caused by the execution of Cannon and 
G-roce, he ignored all the principles of international law, annulled 
all precedence, and returned to the civilization of the Middle Ages, 
when brute force was the only source of justice. 

In this note, Knox, in his selfsufficiency, pronounced the sen- 
tence imposed upon Cannon and Groce unjust, declared Zalaya's 
government tyrannical and despised by public opinion, and asserted 
that all Nicaragua had risen in arms. This was not the truth, it 
being well known that the revolution was at that time localized on 
part of the Atlantic Coast. He declared Zelaya the perturber of 
peace in Central America and a violator of the Washington con- 
ventions, who had merited the complaints from the other govern- 
ments of Central America, who considered his stay in power a 
constant menace. This latter assertion of Knox's was based, pro- 
bably, upon representations made to the State Department by the 
President of Guatemala, who has been a tool in the hands of Knox 
and a willing helpmate in his policy of intervention in the other 
Central American countries. 

With this act Knox constituted himself judge over an inde- 
pendent nation, and resolved to disavow the legitimacy of the gov- 
ernment presided over by Ze\aja, breaking off the customary diplo- 
matic intercourse with him, and declaring Zeleya's government a 
defacto government, which would merit the same consideration as 
the defacto government of the revolution. 

We do not believe that there is another incident -in the diplomatic 
h'i story of the civilized world that may be compared with the act 
we have just related. 



26 

The proceeding of the State Department would have been much 
less scandalous had it lived up to its much heralded resolutions. 
However, it did not do so. It sided openly and without regard for 
appearance with the revolution, which it assisted with its moral 
and material power to become victorious over Zelaya, as shall be 
proven later on. (Addenda D.) 

Zelaya, stunned by the violent attitude of the State Department, 
committed the grave error of depositing the executive power in 
the man who was the choice of Congress, according to the Con- 
stitution, when he should have used his best endeavors to gain a 
decisive victory over the revolutionists, thereby compelling the 
revolutionists to consider his separation from the executive power 
as the best solution of the conflict; and then, should the State 
Department not have been satisfied. Zelaya would have compelled 
Knox to support the revolution with armed force to enable them 
to gain the victory. Zelaya's premature move of separating him- 
self from the country's executive power, just at the moment when 
the forces of both warring factions were lined up for a decisive 
battle, naturally produced a state of demoralization in the rank and 
file of the government troops, bringing about, in consequence, tho 
defeat at Eecreo, which served to inspire the revolutionary forces 
with new vigor and confidence, and encouraged them to continue 
the revolt against Zelaya's successor, Dr. Jose Madriz. This in 
spite of the fact that it was well known that Dr. Madriz had been 
a political exile during the Zelaya regime for more than eleven 
years, and was, therefore, far from being responsible for the acts 
attributed to Zelaya. But what tended more than anything else to 
prolong this strife against Madriz was the stand taken by the State . 
Department, in refusing to recognize the government of Dr. Madriz, I 
in spite of its having been legally constituted, within the prescrip- 
tions of the Washington Treaty, and regardless, as well, of the fact 
that the Madriz government had been recognized by all the other 
civilized nations, excepting Guatemala and Salvador. These two 
countries had been influenced by the State Department to withhold 
their recognition, in violation of the said treaty, the attitude of 
the State Department being based on its stand that it would pursue 
toward the Madriz government the same policy it had outlined to 
Zelaya's Minister in Washington. 



27 

The struggle then continued even more sanguinary than before, 
hut surmounting all these unfavorable influences,, the forces of the 
Madriz government routed the revolutionary troops in the interior 
of the country, thus leaving the revolutionists reduced to one strong- 
hold in Kama, and its base of supplies, Bluefields, on the Atlantic 
Coast. To accomplish this, the army of the government made 
superhuman efforts and sacrifices, and only after a march through 
morasses and never ending swamps, where hundreds of men, horses 
and conveyances were left buried in the mire, did the loyal troops- 
succeed in reaching the aforenamed two strongholds of the rebels 
en the Coast, Kama and Bluefields, precisely simultaneously with 
maritime government expeditions, who were then occupying the 
ports and all the river outlets along the Coast. After a combined 
attack, they captured the bluff, the key to the port and town of 
Bluefields. When preparing to attack Bluefields by land and sea,. 
American marines were landed, and the commander of the squadron 
gave official notice that he would not permit any hostile acts against 
tbe town of Bluefields; that he would not allow the detention of 
any mercantile vessel, not even to be searched for contraband of 
war, and that he would not allow the collection of import duties 
by tbe Madriz government at the Bluff Custom House, which hadi 
always been the legal custom house for the port of Bluefields ; thai 
the revolutionists were to levy custom duties at a new Custom 
House, which had been established when they lost the Bluff Fort, 
in front of which, and covered by its artillery, all vessels were 
obliged to pass in going to and coming from the so-called new 
Custom House. A logical consequence of the proceedings of the 
American commander was that the revolutionists, being guaranteed 
the safety of Bluefields by the presence of American marines, 
massed all their forces for the defense of Rama, and being assurer! 
of Bluefields as a base of supplies, as the marines were there with 
the avowed purpose of defending the town against an attack by 
tbe Madriz forces, that the demoralization which had been notice- 
able in the ranks of the revolutionists was replaced by a firm con- 
fidence in an ultimate victory; and that the lack of munitions of 
war which had been noticeable in the revolutionary headquarters 
was replaced by an abundance of everything necessary for a cam- 
paign, for American marines, covered by the American flag, were 



28 



sent aboard all incoming vessels, neutral, American or revolutionary, 
thus rendering the importation of all war material safe and sure for 
• the carrying on of the revolution. The American commander 
would previously notify the commander of the fort at the Bluff, 
and the chief of the Nicaraguan navy, that should an attempt be 
made to detain these vessels, or should a shot be fired at them, it 
would be considered a declaration of war against the United States, 
and that then the American war vessels would bombard the fort and 
sink the Nicaraguan war vessels. 

Upon representations made by the Madriz government to Nor- 
way's, by whom Madriz had been recognized as the legitimate Presi- 
dent of Nicaragua, the Norwegian Government prohibited all ves- 
sels flying the Norwegian flag from transporting contraband of war 
to the revolutionists, or disobeying in any manner the orders of the 
legitimate government of Madriz ; but the commander of the Ameri- 
can squadron, supported expressly by the State Department, in- 
stigated the masters of these Norwegian steamers to disobey the 
•orders of the government, and putting American marines aboard 
their vessels, guaranteed them an unmolested entry into the port. 
The Norwegian Vice-Consul at Bluefields, Mr. Clancy, who had 
apprised his government what had taken place, was dismissed from 
his position of Vice-Consul of the United States, which office he 
was holding also. 

The ultimate result of all this was that the Madriz forces realized 
that it would be useless to continue fighting against such odds, and 
as it was not possible for the land force to maintain their position 
any longer, a general retreat was ordered, under the circumstance? 
equal to a defeat. When these disheartened troops arrived back in 
the interior, they contaminated the balance of the army, and before 
long every man in the ranks was convinced that they had been 
fighting a hopeless battle, not against the revolutionists, but against 
the power, gigantic in comparison, of the Government of the United 
States. Dr. Madriz realized that to continue the strife would mean 
useless spilling of more blood, and he deposited the executive power 
in a deputy named by Congress, who, in' turn, turned it over soon 
afterwards, to the lea'der of the revolutionists. We publish attached 
(he proofs of what we have related, and especially the proofs of the 
eomplicity of the State Department. We furthermore attach a 



29 



publication written by Dr. Madriz relative to these facts, which he 
had written with the intention of submitting same to the Nica- 
raguan Congress, which, however, he was not given the time to do. 
(Addendas E y F.) 

To anybody who personally knew Dr. Madriz, who was a highly 
civil man, cultured, learned and highly patriotic and honest, it 
must have been surprising to witness Mr. Knox's unben'ding efforts 
in continuing to give battle to Dr. Madriz, when he should have 
given him his moral support in order that he might have succeeded 
in reorganizing and pacifying his country, which would have pre- 
vented the sacrifice of more than 4,000 Nicaraguan lives and 
millions worth of property; the more so when Dr. Madriz showed 
plainly through his propositions made with a view to establishing 
peace, that his personal ambition would not stand in the way of 
peace, and that if the adversaries insisted, he would renounce his 
candidacy when a definite government would be agreed upon. 

It is of no use that Mr. Knox offers the excuse that he did not 
know Dr. Madriz, for we are sure that he had sufficient information 
from one who should merit his confidence, Admiral Kimball, the 
Commander of the American Squadron in Pacific waters of Nica- 
ragua, who was in personal contact with President Madriz, and 
who formed the same opinion of esteem of Dr. Madriz that we 
have expressed. It is, perhaps, because of Admiral Kimball's 
sincerity when addressing the State Department in favor of Dr. 
Madriz that he was withdrawn from his post before the termination 
of the controversy. And, as it had become a matter of self-love 
with Mr. Knox to push ahead his Dollar Diplomacy at all costs, 
Dr. Maldriz was objectionable to him, just on account of his sterling 
qualities, which made Knox sure that Dr. Madriz would never be- 
come a tool in his hands, to execute schemes involving in truth 
treason to his country, and its complete ruin. Knox needed un-' 
scrupulous men, who would profess to political creeds like this one, 
"So long as we succeed in keeping the Liberals out of power, we 
will willingly submit to the tutelage of any foreign power, if neces- 
sary, even to that of China." 

Being intimately aware of the men he had at his bidding in 
Nicaragua, the Dawson Convention was the necessary consequence 
and result, the Convention which has been kept secret in Nicaragua 



30 



by the Executive to such an extent that he has refused to show it 
■even to the Nicaraguan Congressmen wlio asked for it. 

Here in the United States, to our knowledge, the complete text 
of the Dawson Treaty has never been published ; neither in Nicara- 
gua, nor here in the United States, has this treaty ever been ap- 
proved by the respective legislative bodies, and it can never be 
ratified for the very good reason that it was not a pact between two 
governments, but between an agent of the State Department on one 
side, and, on the other, some of the chieftains of the revolution, 
who, with the criminal complacency of the traitor, were demonstrat- 
ing their gratitude for the support given them in coming into 
power. 

However, the State Department has elevated this Dawson Con- 
vention to the height of a venerable, sacred treaty, far superior to 
the laws and the constitution not only of Nicaragua, but of the 
United States as well, since a pretended violation of this conven- 
tion caused, and made even more sanguinary, the last war in tbat 
unhappy country. 

From what has filtered out to the public of this Dawson Treaty. 
we know the following: That the treaty was entered into between 
Mr. Dawson and five men who represented themselves as conspicuous 
personages of the Conservative Party, namely, Adolfo Diaz, Luis 
Mena, Juan J. Estrada, Emiliano Chamorro and Fernando Solar- 
zano, none of whom could represent Nicaragua legally, or be placed 
in charge of such engagements, which have later been fulfilled, and 
of which the scope cannot yet be foreseen. Among Mr. Dawson 
and the men named, it was covenanted that Mr. Estrada should 
continue in the Presidency for two years, and that during this time 
Adolfo Diaz should be Vice-President, and that when elections 
were to take place, the five men nominated (who had been converted 
by themselves and by the grace of Mr. Dawson into "Great Electors" 
of Nicagarua), would select from their midst the President and 
Vice-President for the next term, thus annulling the popular vote, 
or, more properly speaking, making of it a repugnanLfarce. 

Tlicii a disagreemenl occurred between two of the "G-real Elec- 
tors," President Estrada and the Minister of War. Luis Mena. in 
consequence of which the latter was imprisoned, hut the American 
Minister, Nortbcott, intervened, and compelled the President to 



31 

reinstate Mena in his position and status, whereupon Estrada, who 
resented the interference of the American Minister, notified him 
that it should make impossible his permanency in his office. When 
the American Minister insisted, Estrada turned the presidency over 
to Adolfo Diaz. 

A short time before that, as Estrada and Mena were not satis- 
fie*d with the constitution, as dictated by the National Assembly, 
or rather, with the political tendencies of this Assembly, it having 
been elected by the partisans of Emiliano Chamorro, they dissolved 
the Assembly, and called together a new one, which was satisfactory 
to Mena, but which in the matter of principles and as a legitimate 
representation of public opinion, did not differ much from the 
previous one. 

This Assembly being in session, the "Knox-Castrillo" treaty was 
convened upon as a basis for a loan, which contract was signed by 
Castrillo and a group of bankers of New York. Both 
the proposed treaty and contract were made known to 
the National Assembly, but as this Assembly was under 
Mena's thumb, and as Mena was opposed to this negotia- 
tion, he was allowed, in order to overcome his opposition, to have 
himself elected President by this very same Assembly for the next 
Presidential term, without anybody recalling the Dawson pact, of 
which, afterwards, this election was denounced as a violation. 
Mena's election having taken place without a protest from the 
Electors constituted by the Dawson pact, nor from the American 
Minister, the way was smoothed for the ratification of the Castrillo 
agreements. The Assembly was not given time to discuss the nego- 
tiations, an immediate decision being declared imperative in a single 
session, and they were approved by a majority of the Assembly, this 
majority having been carefully prepared beforehand. The voices 
of six patriotic members, who protested in vain, were unheeded, as 
was a protest from two of the Secretaries of the Executive, who 
consequently resigned their posts in order not to be accomplices in 
the sale of their country. 

The conduct of the State Department appears throughout this 
incident as phenominally curious, or more than that, absurd. In 
this great country, where free institutions are a fact, and where 
the Eepublican form of government has always been considered a 



32 

model worth}- of copying, and a stimulus to the Latin-American 
countries, the government, it seems, is determined to encourage the 
Government of Nicaragua, not only to break its own laws, but all 
the principles of a true democracy. Unfortunately this has been 
the tendency of the State Department right along in its relations 
with its neighbors to the south, for during the last few years it 
has regularly been the policy of Mr. Knox to intervene in favor 
of the tyrannical factions in those countries, and against the legiti- 
mate interests of the masses. Whenever the State Department has 
given its support to revolutions, it has never taken an interest in 
making sure that the revolution thus supported would guarantee 
later on a sane and responsible government, to justify, or at least, 
explain, the intervention. This phenomena is explained by the fact 
that the policy of the State Department was not inspired by a de- 
sire to further the mutual interests of the countries, but rather, for 
transitory personal interests, or with a view to furthering the plans 
of and assisting those privileged financial speculators. Had the 
motive been a different one, and had the interventions resulted in 
the establishing of true liberal regime, with law and order and 
honesty in the administrations, on account of the assistance re- 
ceived, the interferences in these countries might have been par- 
doned, and would have been appreciated finally, even if the na- 
tional pride of these countries had been hurt and resentment aroused 
in the beginning. 

The Castrillo agreements are built up on the same basis as the 
propositions made Honduras and -other countries named, but con- 
tain some terms and conditions which are even more aggravating 
to Nicaragua. As Nicaragua had but an insignificant, and rela- 
tively well taken care of, foreign debt, Dollar Diplomacy had to 
resort to the plan of amortization of the internal debt of Nicara- 
gua, represented by depreciated paper money in actual circulation, 
to find a pretext for seizing the custom houses of the country; and 
in order to secure the absolute control of financial conditions in 
the country, a mixed Commission of Claims was created in which 
United States citizens form a majority, these Americans haviDg 
been appointed by the State Department or its representatives. It 
is left, in fact, to this Commission's discretion to raise the figures 
of this internal debt to the height they may deem convenient, or 



33 

to favor claims of friends of theirs as they may see fit. The eon- 
tract loan is Fifteen Million Dollars at 90% emission, beside other 
expenses and costs, with 5% interest per annum, and 1% amortiza- 
tion. 

We do not intend to examine the details of this negotiation, be- 
cause it has been amply discussed by two political exiles from 
Nicaragua, Drs. Espinoza and Irias. Suffice it to say that it is 
the most ruinous negotiation ever carried out in any country at any 
time, as everybody who goes to the trouble of reading this Contract 
will have to affirm. 

These Castrillo Contracts contain the clause that their validity 
depends on a ratification by the Senate of the United States, this 
being, in fact, the basis for all these understandings, excepting an 
advance loan of a million and a half to be made on the condition of 
delivery of the custom houses to American collectors. 

We Central Americans were confident that this transaction would 
never take place and be carried out, because we were sure that the 
American Senate would never sanction such a monstrous proposi- 
tion; but, undoubtedly with a view to compelling this high legis- 
lative body into a ratification, his "anticipated loan" clause was 
inserted, which permitted Secretary Knox to begin trying out his 
system in Central America. But something more scandalous was 
committed. Knox, no doubt, thinking that Nicaragua might still 
escape him, and that too many resources were still left the country 
to make an escape good, forced an additional loan contract on this 
country to the amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars, 
taking in guaranty the National Eailroad and river and lake steam- 
ers, on conditions which make these national properties appear to 
have been almost given away. It is but natural to suppose that with 
the ingress of such large sums of money, the Nicaraguan Govern- 
ment should, at least in the beginning, have been in comfortable 
monetary circumstances, and the country in a favorable economic 
condition, but the truth is that never in the history of that country 
has the treasury been emptier than then, nor has the poverty of the 
masses ever been so noticeable, and the stagnation of commerce 
and progress more pronounced. The reason for this is clear; of all 
tbese sums that were apparently being loaned nothing reached the 
public treasuries of Nicaragua, and of the resources derived from 



34 

'the Custom Houses of the country, but a very small percentage has 
been turned over by the American collectors to the government. 

"When the "Knox-Castrillo" Convention was submitted to a Com- 
mittee of the Senate, although a final decision was not possible on 
account of lack of majority, it was very evident that the Commit- 
tee was not in favor of this proposition, and it could plainly be 
seen that the Senate would never ratify the treaty, notwithstanding 
the new American interests created ad hoc, and in such an unjust 
and arbitrary way. 

No doubt, the group of financiers received assurances from the 
State Department that their interests would be protected at all 
costs, whereupon the bankers resolved to retain in its totality the 
;sum collected through the various fiscal agents, thus openly violat- 
ing the agreement, and reducing the Niearaguan Government to 
the most miserable existence. In spite of this, or, perhaps, for this 
very reason, the government delivered into the hands of the banking 
syndicate the National Eailroad and steamers, in the hope that for 
this consideration, some part of the money collected might be 
turned into the empty treasury of the country, begging for a gift, 
and this will have to be repeated, or the government will not be 
able to exist, depending as it does on the mercy of its 'protectors. 

Knox's avowed purpose, the rehabilitation of Nicaragua's foreign 
credit, has not materialized either. Formerly Nicaragua had al- 
ways succeeded in paying strict attention, and with relative regu- 
larity, to its foreign loan; but since this new financial protectorate 
has been imposed on Nicaragua, no attention whatever has been 
paid to living up to its obligations with the foreign creditors of the 
country, who are numerous, and among whom there are some 
Americans who are not enjoying the special favor of the State De- 
partment, and who. therefore, are deploring the change that has 
•taken place. 

The question arises "Has peace been assured that country in ex- 
change for all the evils it has suffered?" We shall look into this. 

It was easily to be seen, in Nicaragua as -well as abroad, that 
the election of General Mena, brought about by the National As- 
sembly, was not looked upon with favor by the Stale Department, 
the reason given being that tin's election was not in conformity with 
'the Dawson pad. and at the same time letting it he understood that 



35 



the favorite of the State Department was the actual President, 
. Adolf o Diaz, who, it is believed (which supposition was justified 
by the events which later took place), was encouraged by the Ameri- 
can Minister to relieve General Mena from his post as Minister of 
War, which position Mena had secured for himself through the 
favoritism of a previous American minister. ISTo doubt, this minis- 
ter assured Diaz of the support of the American Government in 
case difficulties should arise, which caused, or was at least the 
occasion, of the last revolution in Nicaragua. 

Mena had the support of the armed forces in the country. The 
greater part of all the officers in the army were his creations, and 
it was notoriously known that Mena was the real power in .the 
government. 

It is to be presumed that Knox was convinced that his favored 
candidate could not succeed himself through the vote of a public 
election, and in order that Mena's advantage of the control of the 
army might be counterbalanced, and to ignore public opinion as rep- 
resented by the Liberal Party, a civil war was necessary, in which 
Diaz was to be victorious, aided by outside support. Had the State 
Department wished to avoid the loss of life in Nicaragua of the 
last two revolutions, it could easily have done so by disembarking 
armed forces and by the military occupation of the most important 
strategic points throughout the country, as it has done lately. 

However, the State Department proceeded in a directly opposite 
way. The removal of General Mena from the Ministry of War, 
advised by the American Minister, was a step which had to bring 
the results which were presently realized. Mena, having in his 
possession most of the armament in the country, placed all that he 
could in the hands of his followers, and then, securing the help 
of the Liberals from the eastern part of the country, he succeeded in 
bringing an army of volunteers together, superior in numbers and 
quality to the forces Diaz could muster against him. Mena suc- 
ceeded in a very short time in seriously menacing the capital, and 
In taking a good many important towns. 

Public sentiment was from the very beginning in favor of the 
uprising, because the government of Diaz, which never had enjoyed 
popular favor, became positively hated, and unpopular from the very 
moment it entered upon the loan negotiations, which meant the sell- 



36 

ing of the county. But the uprising against Diaz's government did 
not spread over the country until the Diaz forces became reduced to 
Managua, and, no doubt, the capital would have fallen into the 
hands of the revolution, had it not been for the defense for the 
presidential palace by American marines. It was then that the 
masses in Leon, who had up to -then remained passive, rose up in 
arms as one man, and attacked the government garrison, which was 
annihilated. They also decimated the armed expedition sent to 
subjugate them, and recalled to the country some of the exiled lead- 
ers, whose orders for an uprising they had not expected. Only a 
few days elapsed before the government troops were concentrated 
at, and reduced to the capital, Managua, and to parts of the De- 
partments Rivas and Chontales, and those ports which had been 
occupied and held for the government by American marines. 

The material support thus given the Diaz cause by the one hun- 
dred marines was not so great as the moral prestige it gave it, and 
naturally it caused a great deal of demoralization among the ranks 
of the assailants. Even in those moments, the State Department 
could have avoided further bloodshed by declaring itself openly, and 
announcing irrevocably th'at'the Government of the United States 
had resolved to use, if necessary, armed force to put down the 
revolution, as it did later on, but this course was not pursued, and 
it was given out that armed intervention had been resorted to solely 
for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of American 
citizens comprising in the property interests the Nicaragu.an Na- 
tional Eailroad lines and steamers, which were undisputed Nicara- 
guan property, but which had been delivered into the hands of the 
American speculators a few days previously an'd in a great hurry, 
very likely in anticipation of the revolutionary movement to be pro- 
voked. 

Admiral Sutherland declared expressly that if the railroad and 
steamship lines were returned to him by the revolutionists, ho 
would observe a strict neutrality, and that he would abstain from 
transporting either troops or war supplies of either belligerents, 
thus obtaining control of both railroad and steamers, without any 
resistance having been offered. However, once in possession of the 
railroa'd lines and stations, and the American forces having estab- 
lished themselves firmly in protected positions along these lines,, 



37 

: Sutherland invented the pretext of having to go to the rescue of a 
.French school for girls who were perishing from hunger. All of 
this was pure fabrication, as there were no pupils at that school 
except native children, who had the protection and support of their 
parents or guardians, and who were suffering no greater hardship? 
than any of the other residents of Granada, xl considerable force 
entrained in Managua for Granada and when this force was deemed 
sufficient in the stronghold of Mena, the latter was asked to sur- 
render, having been told that in case of his noncompliance, armed 
force would be used against him, and that no. quarter would be 
given the vanquished, whereupon Mena surrendered without having 
offered resistance. 

Admiral Sutherland tried these tactics with General (Doctor) 
Benjamin Zeledon, but this leader, being young and a valiant 
patriot, although convinced that he would be routed, and perhaps 
lose his life, resolved to defend the honor of Nicaragua, and refused 
to surrender. 

The American forces, after the fortifications protecting Masaya 
had been attacked ineffectively by the Diaz forces for three days, 
started to shell the Barranca Forts, and, having silenced the revo- 
lutionary fire, took the positions by storm. A simultaneous attack 
was made by the so-called Diaz Government forces upon the town 
of Masaya, nearby, which was captured a few hours later than 
Barranca. Zeledon, although wounded, succeeded in escaping, but 
was overtaken and put to death the same day. This military action 
of the American landing forces cost the lives of four marines and 
one hundred Nicaraguan government dead, besides a proportionate 
number of wounded, it being unknown to us, up to the present, 
what losses the revolutionists suffered. 

Leon and some other towns in the North were still in the hands 
of the revolutionists, although suffering for lack of war supplies. 
Admiral Sutherland then demanded the surrender of all the revo- 
lutionary leaders, and these, convinced of the impossibility of 
success against the American invading forces, and in order to avoid 
further bloodshed, surrendered; but the masses, highly inflamed 
by the injustice committed against their country, tried to offer 
resistance. Unorganized as they were, the machine guns of the 
American marines were turned upon them. A similar incident 



38 

had taken place in Chichigalpa. From the American engagements 
resulted a total loss of eleven marines killed and a larger number 
of these wounded, while, as published in the press of the country, 
there were hundreds of Nicaraguan victims, killed and wounded, 
many of them non-combatants. 

It seems that the State Department has tried to make the Senate 
appear responsible for its actions. This is indicated by certain 
press articles inspired by the State Department, and by a declara- 
tion made by Mr. Taft in a speech at Beverly, in which he asserted 
that the responsibility for the occurrence in Nicaragua rests with 
the Senate, and that the Senate alone is responsible for the fact 
that dollars have not substituted rifle bullets, because the Senate 
had not ratified the Loan Treaty which would have given the 
custom houses of the country into the hands of American collectors, 
thus doing away with the inducement and object of revolution. 
This declaration made by President Taft gives reason to suspect 
that he is not aware of a good many of the acts of his Secretary 
of State, for the fact is that the Nicaraguan custom houses had 
been under the administration of American collectors for many 
months before the revolution started, and it can be safely asserted 
that, instead of promoting peace in this country, as was claimed 
for "Dollar Diplomacy," this delivery of the country's resources 
to the American banking syndicate actually was the cause of the 
war. 

Another attempted justification of armed intervention in Nica- 
ragua was that the President de facto of Nicaragua himself had 
asked for it. Just as good a justification would be the claim that 
the Secretary of the State Department himself had asked for this 
intervention, for the President of Nicaragua was but a creature of 
Secretary Knox's, and a docile instrument in his hands. 

We must recognize that, in the minds of those men who com- 
posed the government at Managua, there remained a sense of 
shame, demonstrated by the fact that, when reports were s^nt out 
to the other Central American countries relative to the victory won 
over the revolutionists at Masaya, no mention was made of the fact 
that this victory was gained through the co-operation of the Amer- 
ican marines. It is evident that the government officials at 
.Managua must have been assured of the consent of the American 
Minister to ignore the part of the American marines in the 



39 

"glorious triumph,"or else they would not have dared to do so. 
But even this false sense of shame was lost when the Secretary of 
Foreign Eelations at Managua expressed officially the regrets of 
the Nicaraguan nation to the government and people of the United'. 
States for the loss of the marines whose lives were sacrificed in' 
engagements against the insurgents, not having, indeed, a single 
word to say in honor of, or in sympathy with, the hundreds of' 
Nicaraguans who lost their lives in these same engagements. 

Another excuse the State Department gave for its intervention 
in Nicaragua was that the city of Managua had been bombarded 
by the revolutionists, in spite of the fact that Managua was a 
defenseless place, and that the lives of many non-combatants had 
been lost in consequence. The truth is that Managua is not a 
defenseless town, since it is protected by the fortifications on 
Tiscapa Hill, which, by the way, constitute the strongest fortifica- 
tion in all Nicaragua. Moreover, the government had at this time 
almost all the troops at its disposition concentrated here. 

If the State Department thought that, according to International 
law, it had i a right to prevent the bombardment of the town,, 
it should have compelled the Nicaraguan government to have its 
forces meet the revolutionists on a distant battlefield, where it 
then would have been decided who was entitled to the occupation 
of the capital, instead of ostentatiously pretending (for which there- 
is no precedent in known history) that it was because of the risk 
to non-combatants that they had determined to prevent one of the 
contending armies from a decisive victory through the capture of' 
the best stronghold of the enemy. Had the State Department taken 
this just and impartial, though arbitrary-, stand, it might have- 
meant an immediate settlement of all differences, and a termina- 
tion of the war right there and then. However, in such a proceed- 
ing, there was the danger that the State Department would have- 
to resign itself to seeing the revolution victorious, a victory which 
nobody could question for a moment, and would have had to con- 
tent itself with seeing the people of the country overthrow a treach- 
erous government that had been the protege of the State Depart- 
ment, and the edifice of "Dollar Diplomacy," erected at so high a 
cost, crumble down into nothingness. If the State Department 
intended to uphold its policy toward Nicaragua, it could not act: 



40 

otherwise than it did, and to show clearly its partiality, it went 
so far as to order the American forces to co-operate in the bom- 
bardment of Masaya, and threatened the towns of Granada and 
Leon with a similar fate, none of them so well protected as Managua, 
without taking into consideration the danger to the non-combatants. 

Another pretext of the State Department for its intervention 
was the excesses said to have been committed by the revolutionists. 
Whenever the stories of such excesses were related in the press, 
emanating frequently from official sources in Washington, in most 
cases such accounts were fabrications or intentional misrepresenta- 
tions in order to. predispose public opinion in the United States 
toward armed intervention in Nicaragua, long beforehand decided 
upon by the State Department. It is undeniable that some abuses 
may have been committed by the revolutionary forces, but it is 
notoriously ' known that the conduct of the so-called government 
troops was far more to be condemned. We have before us proofs 
which entitle us to the assertion that, during no civil war, the 
United States not excepted, was there ever less harm done to lives 
and property of non-combatants, with especial reference to the 
foreigners in Nicaragua, than in this last revolution. 

If the excesses committed in Nicaragua by revolutionists had been 
a justification for intervention, and not a simple pretext, the State 
Department should have, long ago, and with much more right, used 
force to intervene in Mexico, as has been pointed out repeatedly by 
the press of the United States. But Mexico is not, like Nicaragua, 
a poor and feeble country, nor are there at the head of the govern- 
ment or of the revolution in Mexico men who would ask for inter- 
vention, and thus become traitors to their own country. An inter- 
vention in Mexico would mean an international affair of very grave 
consequences to the United States, and a war that would cost the 
United States tens of thousands of soldiers and very likely hundreds 
of millions of dollars. It would mean a war of conquest, and, to 
retain the territory acquired, a powerful army of occupation for 
more than two generations. 

If all the governments of Central America had lived up to their 
duty, proving Central American solidarity, by at least voicing a 
word of protest to satisfy public opinion, so clearly manifested 
against any foreign invasion, perhaps this attitude of Central Amer- 
ica would have caused Mr. Knox to pursue the same prudent policy 



41 

with Nicaragua as that pursued with Mexico. But no doubt the 
Presidents were counseled to refrain from making demonstrations 
by the fear with which Mr. Knox has succeeded in inspiring them. 
It is this fear of Mr. Knox which caused some of these Presidents 
to repress public demonstrations, as well as the press, and to im- 
prison the writers who had assumed the duty of giving voice to 
the indignation felt by the masses; and, what is more curious yet, 
in some cases it was even forbidden to reproduce manifestations of 
protest originated and published in the United States by patriotic 
Central Americans, as well as Anglo-Americans, lovers of justice. 

After all that has happened, to explain its inconsequence, the State 
Department insists that it has not fomented war in Nicaragua, and 
that the American forces were sent to Nicaragua solely for the 
purpose of protecting the lives and interests of Americans, although 
the State Department cannot now, nor can it ever, prove that there 
was a single instance where a foreigner had suffered in person or 
property, and it is evident that the State Department, on the pre- 
tense of an imaginary clanger, has sacrificed the lives of those 
marines who were killed in Nicaragua to "Dollar Diplomacy." 

The State Department's intervention in this last revolution in 
Nicaragua has caused death and suffering to thousands, for, without 
this intervention, the revolution would have been victorious in a 
few days and the civil strife would have come to an end ; but worse 
than that for the United States, it has resulted in the depreciation 
of the American army in the estimation of all Latin x4.merica, who 
saw these American soldiers, considered to be in their own country 
the defenders of law and liberty, converted into tools of tyranny 
and oppression in Nicaragua. 

Does, perhaps, Mr. Knox think that the success of the American 
arms in Nicaragua so easily obtained, is a matter of glory, in- 
stead of disgrace, to the American army ? Mr. Knox must be satis- 
fied with his labors, otherwise h% would not have gone to the ex- 
treme that he did. He has kept the army of occupation in Nica- 
ragua, not for the purpose of guaranteeing the free election of a 
President for the next term, but for the guaranty of the election 
of his protege, Adolf o Diaz, and he has accomplished his aim, for, 
on the 2nd of November, under the reign of martial law, with the 
citizens terrorized by the bayonets of the American marines, the 
traitor Diaz was elected, supposedly without any opposition. 



42 

On the same day; the people were called to elect deputies, because 
Diaz, assuming dictatorial power in the country, and supported 
by the American government, had dissolved the National Assembly, 
which was the very same Assembly to which he owed that faint 
shadow of legality of his executive power, and also the same 
Assembly that declared Diaz' presidency ended when the last revo- 
lution broke out because of his treasonable attitude. 

To give an idea of the electoral liberties enjoyed by the citizens of 
Nicaragua during the last election, we insert a copy of the message 
sent out by the Commander-in-General of the Nicaraguan Army, 
Emiliano Chamorro, which message was addressed to all military 
and civil authorities in the country, and in which all functionaries 
were incited to make certain the election of those candidates named 
by Chamorro, for the reason that these were the candidates chosen 
in conformity with the famous "Dawson Pact" : 

"Administrative Offices, 
"Managua, October 25, 1:15 p. m. 
"Commandants of Posts and District Prefects: 

"I beg to advise you that we, the principal leaders of the Bevolu- 
tion of October, met, and in order to comply with the Dawson Pact 
have in common accord designated as the candidates of the Con- 
servative Party for the first constitutional period : 
"Adolf o Diaz for President; 
"Fernando Zolorzano for Vice-President. 

"I take pleasure in acquainting you with this fact so that you 
may urge our friends and religious fellow-believers to exert the 
necessary efforts at the polls to accomplish the triumph of the before 
mentioned candidates. 

"With all consideration, I am 

"Affectionately, 
• "Emiliano Chamorro.'" 

This same Chamorro addressed a telegram to the President of 
Honduras, of which we herewith insert a copy. This telegram was 
intercepted at Leon, as stated in "The Daily News" of Salvador, 
under date of September 4th, which is our source of information 
in this particular instance. This telegram says: 



43 

"We have to trust in the final outcome. We are counting on the 
support of the United States, who will not delay in making their 
power felt by the Liberals and the other enemies of our cause." 

Therefore, if we were lacking other proofs of the criminal con- 
spiracy between those in power in Nicaragua and the foreign 
invaders, this telegram would be sufficient proof; but there is a 
document existent which will pass into the history of American 
diplomacy as one of the most scandalous proofs of the abuse of a 
weak country by the powerful government of the United States, 
equalled only by that Note of Mr. .Knox's to which we have already 
referred. 

The document we allude to is a note addressed by the American 
Minister in Nicaragua, Mr. Weitzel, to the Secretary of the Ministry 
of Foreign delations in Managua, a copy of which we attach. (See 
Addenda "Qt») 

We make mention of this document here, because it demonstrates 
that the last election in Nicaragua was a farce, and might be called 
ridiculous were it not that the sanguinary events preceding it com- 
mand seriousness. This has been a farce in which the State Depart- 
ment participated directly, in spite of the fact that it pretends to 
be desirous of showing Latin America what true republicanism is. 
Mr. Weitzel say, among other things : "By repudiating Zelaya, 
whose regime of barbarism and corruption was put at an end by the 
Nicaraguans themselves, after a sanguinary war, the United States 
government condemned, not only the individual, but the whole 
system, and it could not possibly tolerate any movement in Nica- 
ragua that has in view a re-establishment of this destructive regime. 
The government of the United States will, therefore, oppose any 
attempt at the restoration of Zalayism, and will give its efficient 
moral support to the cause of good government in Nicaragua, legally 
constituted, and resulting in benefit to the Nicaraguan people, 
whom it has long been the aim of the United States government to 
aid in its endeavors for peace and prosperity, under a benevolent 
constitutional government of law and order/' 

As what Weitzel terms Zelayism, or more accurately speaking, 
not Diazism, would have re-established itself in Nicaragua, beyond 
all doubt, through a FEEE election, — it was to the interests of the 
invading government, or, rather, the State Department, that no 
President should be elected except its accomplice, Diaz. 



44 

This assertion of Mr. Weitzel has been precisely the hobby horse 
.of Mr. Knox's for the last couple of years to provoke disturbances 
in Central America. To prove the correctness of our opinion we 
propose to go into details. 

The State, Department has stated that it not only condemned 
Ze'laya as an individual, but his system of government as well. 
We shall not discuss whether the State Department had a right 
to judge the executive of an independent country, as we have 
already expressed our views on this question, but since it claims 
to have condemned the "system" it was but natural to expect that 
the State Department would use every endeavor to secure in the 
new government in Nicaragua, its own creation, a "model re- 
publican government," a government of administrative honesty, and 
of marked patriotism; nobody could have expected to see the 
State Department encouraging with its protection this new r govern- 
ment in Nicaragua in committing outrages against the persons and 
property of its citizen — in systematic robbery, and the vilest of 
treasons. 

However, it is plainly to be seen that this kind of a government 
had to be the choice of the State Department, if it wanted to see 
its financial policy in Nicaragua succeed, for no honest lawabiding 
and patriotic government would have lent itself to further the 
intentions of Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua. Strange to say, 
the State Department was very explicit in denouncing the despotism 
of Zelaya in Nicaragua, but has shown a marked indifference to 
such rule in other countries, as for instance, Guatemala, where 
Estrada Cabrera has been reigning supreme for the last fourteen 
) ears, a brutal despot and the scourge of his people, a blot on 
civilization, who lias caused not only his own country to suffer 
\mder his tyrannical rule, but other Central American countries 
as well. We have made the statement already that it was Estrada 
Cabrera who furnished the sinews of war for the last two revolu- 
tions in Honduras, and he did likewise for the Estrada revolution 
in Nicaragua, and although the State Department has denounced 
Xclnvn as the perturber of peace in Central America, and as a 
violator of the Washington Convention, it has never taken action 
against Cabrera, or tried to check his plans, as it was quick to do 
when Zelava was concerned. 



45 

Mr. Weitzel expressed and repeated declarations made by the 
State Department and by the President, Mr. Taft himself, to the 
effect that the United States government would not tolerate a 
restoration of the Zelaya regime in Nicaragua, which they term 
"Zelayism." What does Mr. Weitzel, the State Department, or 
Mr. Taft really mean ? Either one would find it difficult to explain, 
lor none of them know the history of Nicaragua, the actual state 
of affairs there, the character of the masses and its leaders and 
politicians, sufficiently well to set up a criterion and it is this 
ignorance that explains the many mistakes and abuses committed 
l:y the State Department. 

Zelaya, like all despotic rulers, never succeeded in forming a 
distinctive political party. All the employes of his government were 
subject to cha*nges dictated solely by circumstances or by his caprice. 
When Zelaya abandoned his executive position, he would have been 
deprived by this act of all prestige had not the intervention of 
the United States contributed to make Zelaya a martjn* to the 
autonomy of his country in the eyes of some people, which opinion 
would have been far more general had Zelaya chosen to fall fighting 
as a hero. 

To stamp this last revolution in Nicaragua, "Zelayism" shows 
profound ignorance and bad faith. This last revolution was headed 
by Mena, one of the conspicuous leaders in the revolution against 
Zelaya and one of the five candidates of the Dawson Treaty, sup- 
ported by a faction of the Conservative Party. Without any foreign 
(American) intervention, it is sure that the Liberal Party would 
have remained passive in its desire to see the factions of the op- 
posite party fight it out among l themselves, and to pursue, when 
the fight should be ended, the most advantageous course for them- 
selves. But the intervention of the United States inflamed the 
masses among the Liberals, and without waiting for orders from 
their leaders, they crushed the forces of the Diaz government. 
This occurred principally in the departments of Leon and Chinan- 
dega, the same having always opposed Zelaya since 1896. Where, 
therefore, is the Zelayism of this last revolution? 

It is a matter of surprise that a dignified government should 
embody in an official document utterances of the Secretary of State ■ 
showing personal resentment and rage because of the opposition 
shown toward his Dollar Diplomacy. 



46 

And, we ask again, after all these abuses, after so many scandals, 
has peace been assured Nicaragua? Any foreigner who goes to the 
trouble of reading this article can answer this question just as well 
as Central Americans can. If such a thing is possible as that the 
government of the United States should intend to persist in its 
policy in Nicaragua, it would necessarily have to maintain there an 
"''army of occupation/' as is necessary in any conquered country, 
and which would be the only means of saving those traitors who 
sold Nicaragua from the just punishment, which the people will, 
no doubt, some day meet out to them. 

*To assist us in proving our assertions Periodical Publications 
reached us from Nicaragua, which bring the following: 

PRECAUTION BEATS OSTENTATION. 

Special to The American: • 

Managua, Nov. 13. — To-day at 7 a. m. the presidential train, com- 
posed of three cars, left here for Corinto. In the center car rode Presi- 
dent Adolfo Diaz, Gen. Emiliano Chamorro, Minister Diego M. Chamorro, 
Dr. Carlos Cuadra Pasos and other friends of the administration. In 
front and rear were two cars carrying 100 American marines. The band 
was not taken, nor was the Guard of Honor, President Diaz being against 
amy ostentation. 



GUARD OF HONOR ABOLISHED. 

Special to The American: 

Managua, Nov. 13. — In accordance with the decree of the 9th instant, 
the Guard of Honor to the President of the Republic was, for the time 
being, abolished. 



ONLY 400 MARINES REMAIN. 

Special to The American: 

Managua, Nov. 12. — On Friday, the fifteenth instant, Admiral South- 
erland will leave for Panama with the American forces, leaving only 
four hundred marines, 300 of whom will be stationed at Campo de Marte 
and 100 at Leon. 

Nov. 17, 1912. 



What a* sorrowful cast for the American Marines! We see them 
converted into Body Guards of a tyrannical usurper, kept there for the 
purpose of insuring for this man an immunity from the wrath and 
justified indignation of the masses of his country. Never, perhaps, have 
the taxpayers of the United States even dreamt of the possibility that 
their money should be put to the use of keeping this man in power 
and to impose a Dictatorship on the people of a free country and to 
oppress a now free sister Republic. 

Those of the Nicaraguan citizens who were able to do so, have 
protested against the Coup d'Etat— against the Dictatorship and Usurpa- 
tion of the Executive Power by a traitor, abstaining from giving 
tloir vote all those who had the valor to challenge the soldiers of the 
Despot, (converted into Electors and Agents'), and who had refused to 
be accomplices in an Electoral Farce, which can justly be termed a 
Farce, even if there were no more reasons than the fact that the 
People were convened to cast their vote on the I8tb of October, and that 
the real Election took place on the 2nd of Novemiber, or a lapse of 
time of only a fortnight, which was Insufficient to even carry the news 
of the Decree to some of the Departments of the Republic 

We attach a fragment of the Protest which was published in Blue-< 
fields and another one with the Decree of Dictatorship. ( Addenda 1. ) 



47 

We believe that a peaceful solution is possible, but we do not 
think thai the moment and the circumstances are opportune for a 
■suggestion on our part. 

El Salvadok. 

We do not know whether any loan propositions were ever made 
to this country, but most likely not for the reason that the foreign 
debt is relatively small as compared with the natural resources of 
this country. 

This foreign debt, caused, the same as the enormous internal debt, 
by the corruptness and inability of previous presidents, has not 
affected in any way that could not be remedied the country's sources 
of wealth, and, no doubt, Salvador will be able to work out its own 
salvation by the means o£ securing for itself a series of honest 
executives. But this does not necessarily mean that Salvador 
would not have to feel the weight of Dollar Diplomacy, should this 
come to be the fixed system of the United States toward the Central 
American countries. Salvador would be the last one to suffer this 
evil, but could not escape it, as some pretext, however weak, would 
be found for compelling the Salvadorian government to make the 
sacrifice of the country's autonomy. 

The people of Salvador have realized the danger and their 
patriotism found expression in protests against the latest armed 
intervention in Nicaragua. Salvador's government, presided over 
by Dr. Manuel E. Aran jo, knew its duty, as proven by documents 
that we have before us, seconding the public clamor of its masses. 
We cannot resist the desire to publish cables which were exchanged 
between President Taft and President Araujo, and we attach same 
hereto. (Addenda "H.") 

The cable clearly demonstrates : 

1. Mr. Araujo was sure that peace could be brought about if 
President Diaz, of Nicaragua, would deposit the executive power 
in Mr. Salvador Caledron, to which proposition President Diaz had 
already given his approval, but which, without doubt, President 
Taft did not permit to be consummated, as is to be deducted from 
the answer he sent Mr. Araujo. 

2. Mr. Arajuo was anxious to bring about peace in Nicaragua 
through the mediation of the other Central American republics, it 



48 

being understood that should this mediation prove fruitless, an 
armed intervention by these Central American republics was to be 
resorted to in order to avoid such an action on the part of the 
United States. This would have been to the advantage of all the 
Central American countries, because this coming together for a 
common purpose would have offered opportunity for further steps 
towards a union of all the Central American republics into one 
"Federation," the best means of protection against the common 
clanger. 

Mr. Taft objected to this proposition on the ground that his gov- 
ernment, being neutral, and, therefore, better fitted, should try to 
bring about the termination of the civil war in Nicaragua. (How 
this impartiality or neutrality was afterwards demonstrated we 
have already related.) He supported this opinion of his by call- 
ing attention to the Washington Contention, which, by the way, 
prohibits all interventions in civil wars, and which Convention 
Taft said it was his duty to see respected, at the same time, re- 
serving for himself the right to violate it. 

3. The State Department had explained to representatives ot 
Salvador at Washington and Managua that the landing of marines 
m Nicaragua was solely due to the desire of the State Department 
in Washington to protect the American Legation, Consulates and 
other American interests, but that no intervention in the internal 
strife was intended. These assurances were not lived up to, as we 
have previously related, which caused Mr. Araujo to formulate 
representations which, although couched in very suave and civil 
terms, might still have prevented foreign armed forces from spill- 
ing the blood of Xicaraguans on their own soil. 

4. That Mr. Taft still pretends to have proved his impartiality 
is shown in his opinion of the revolution, which he declared a 
revolt without a principle and comparable to Zelaya's regime, which 
he denounced in very bitter terms, also attacking the revolution 
most passionately, at the same time, proclaiming the legality of 
the Diaz government, although this government is a defacto gov- 
ernment only, having no more shadow of legality than the Assembly 
appointment, which he received from the very same Assembly that 
declared Diaz deposed from his executive position. 

It afforded ns much pleasure to see an official pamphlet published 



49 

recently in proof of the correct and patriotic stand taken by the 
President of El Salvador, who, with the President of Honduras, 
had been accused of sending to the Diaz government arms and 
munitions at a time when these were most needed, so as to enable 
the government to offer some resistance, if feeble, to the formidable 
onslaught of the revolution, all of which would have resulted in 
prolonging the strife, and in making Araujo an accomplice in the 
treachery to Central America. 

These publications prove that Mr. Araujo saw from the very 
beginning the perilous position of Central America, and that he 
endeavored to arrest the danger, which does not coincide with the 
grave accusations made against him; and we shall be still more 
pleased when Mr. Araujo, as soon as he is informed of these ac- 
cusations, shall offer direct and conclusive proofs of their fallacy 
in order that nothing but the truth shall be handed down in the 
history of the country. 

The Washington" Treaties and Conventions. 

The Central American Peace Conference took place in Wash- 
ington, November, 1907, its objects being the termination of dif- 
ferences between several of the states of Central America, and the 
establishment of a firm basis for the assurance of interstate peace. 
To obtain these noble ends, President Roosevelt generously offered 
the hospitality of his country, and with Mexico, the good and dis- 
interested offices of his government as far as this should be pos- 
sible. That this Conference did not give any practical results was 
not the fault of the mediating governments, but rather due to. 
the narrowmindedness of the presidents there represented. The 
delegates of Honduras and Nicaragua proposed, as a remedy for all 
troubles in Central America, the re-establishment of the Union of 
the five nations in one, declaring at the same time, that they did 
not have any confidence in any other means so • far proposed or 
that could be thereafter proposed. This proposition was rejected 
by the majority, the other three delegations, as were other pro- 
positions with a tendency to restrict the absolute power with which 
the Central American presidents have ruled their countries. 

As some of the articles agreed upon in the Washington Peace 
Conference are of importance in reference to our purpose, we shall 
copy some of these. 



50 



Article II of the General Treaty says : 

"Desiring to secure in the Kepublics of Central America the- 
benefits which are derived from the maintenance of their institu- 
tions, and to contribute at the same time in strengthening their 
stability and the prestige with which they ought to be surrounded,. 
it is declared that every disposition or measure which may tend 
to alter the constitutional organzation in any of them is to be 
deemed a menace to the peace of said Republics:" 

The additional Convention is composed of three articles which 
say: 

Article I. "The Governments of the High Contracting Parties 
shall not recognize any other Government which may come into- 
power in any of the five Kepublics as a consequence of a COUP 
D'ETAT, or of a revolution against the recognized Government,, 
so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof, 
have not constitutionally reorganized the country." 

Article II. "No Government of Central America shall, in case 
of civil war, intervene in favor of or against the Government of' 
the country where the struggle takes place." 

Article III. "The Governments of Central America, in the firsf 
place, are recommended to endeavor to bring about, by the means 
at their command, a constitutional reform in the sense of prohibit- 
ing the re-election of the President of a Republic, where such 
probibition does not exist; secondly, to adopt all measures necessary 
to effect a complete guarantee of the principles of alteration in 
power." 

In a convention for the establishment of a Central American 
Court of Justice is contained an "Annexed Article," which says: 

"Annexed Article. The Central American Court of Justice shall 
also have jurisdiction over the conflicts which may arise between 
the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers, and when, as a 
matter of fact, the judicial decisions and resolutions of the National 
Congress are not respected." 

Although we have read and reread the Treaty and the Conven- 
tions referred to, we do not find a single article, a single word. 
thai justifies the ostentatious pretensions of the State Department 
and of President Tal't himself. (We refer to the cablegram ad- 
dressed to the President of Salvador, dated September 5th. t9t2) 4 



51 



that the United States Government has the right, by these same 
Conventions, to compel the contracting parties to live up to their 
obligations. 

The preliminary protocol, which was the origin of the Confer- 
ence, contains Article II, which says : 

"Their excellencies, the Presidents of the Central American 
Republics, will invite their excellencies, the Presidents of the- 
United States of America, and of the United States of Mexico, 
if it may please them, to appoint their respective representatives,, 
in order that these representatives, in a purely amicable capacity, 
may render their good and impartial offices in furtherance of the 
results aimed at by this Conference." 

From what we have related it is clearly deducted that no right 
to intervene was granted the United States nor Mexico (who, by 
the way, has never pretended to have such right) but, quite to the 
contrary, the General Treaty we have related expressly annuls all 
previous Central American Conventions, including the one which 
took place aboard the "Marblehead," and which was ratified by the- 
Convention of San Jose, Costa Rica, between Guatemala, Salvador 
and Honduras. Those annulled conventions gave the Presidents 
of the United States and Mexico the right to officiate as permanent 
arbitrators in all differences between Central%^merican countries, 
and in those days they could have pretended to intervene in order 
to prevent a. resort to arms on the ground that they had a. right , 
to prevent wars before any harm could be done that might prove 
beyond reparation. 

Under the present Treaty all that the mediating governments- 
conld and ought to do is to continue tendering their good offices 
in order that the conventions providing for their same good offices 
and amicable assistance are obeyed and lived up to. 

Let us examine whether the government in Washington has in 
one way or another with or without a right, ever attempted to 
influence the Central American presidents so that they might 
comply with the Treaties, as is claimed by the State Department. 

Article III, preinserted in the Additional Convention, declares- 
one of the principles of International Law for Central America 
to be the alternability of the executive power. This principle, al- 
though a simple recommendation resulting from this Conference^ 



52 

"was accepted by the presidents, and ratified by the congresses of 
all Central American countries. After this Convention had been 
made valid, Mr. Estrada Cabrera had himself re-elecited in Guate- 
mala, and we are not aware that the State Department has ever 
even reminded Estrada Cabrera of his obligation to deliver to a 
successor who might be elected in a free election the Presidency 
held by him. On the contrary, Estrada Cabrera has always en- 
joyed the favor of the State Department, while Zelaya, who was 
re-elected previous to the Convention, was denounced and pursued 
in the manner already related. 

In some of the Central American countries despotism and 
tyranny have reigned supreme, but never have we heard that the 
State Department undertook to improve conditions in '.order to 
prevent popular uprisings, which invariably have had their source 
in the lack of guaranty of public safety, or even of those rights 
necessary for the preservation of life. The State Department 
might have intervened on the ground that Article II of the General 
Treaty, already cited by us, gave it a right to declare infringements 
on the Constitutional Laws a menace to Central American peace 
and well being. But with the exception of Zelaya, unquestionably 
the most despotic Presidents of Central America were the ones to 
enjoy the confidence and protection of the State Department. 

The State Department might, based upon Article II of the Ad- 
ditional Convention (which article we have cited herein before), 
have cautioned the other Central American governments not to 
recognize the ISTicaraguan government created by the revolution of 
1910 (which government is in existence to-day), for the reason 
that said government had not been reorganized constitutionally and 
that no elections had taken place (until the one which was effected 
November 2nd, and which we have demonstrated already did not 
merit the title of an election.) But far from doing so, the State 
Department hastened to recognize this illegal government and to 
give it the support of the United States government to the extent 
of protecting it by armed forces against an uprising of its own 
masses ; while it refused to recognize the government of Dr. Madriz, 
which was legally constituted, influencing Guatemala and Salvador 
tb refuse their recognition also. 

AH the efforts of the Central American Court of Justice during 



53 



the last two revolutions in Nicaragua to re-establish peace by means 
of mediation were unsuccessful, principally because one of the- 
factions was assured of the support of the State Department car- 
ried to the extremes we have already criticised. 

Had it been the desire of the State Department to preserve the- 
dignity of this Court, instead of being the direct cause of its 
complete failure, it would have assisted this Court in its efforts to- 
bring about peace; the more so because an annexed article of the- 
Convention, which provides for the establishment of this Court, 
gives this Court the right to intervene in differences arising among 
the High Departments of the government, and the American gov- 
ernment might have used its good offices in having the election of' 
Mena, since this election was considered illegal, or the dismissal 
of President Diaz by the same Assembly that elected Mena, sub- 
mitted to this Court, thereby terminating all civil strife in Nicara- 
gua at once. 

Although Article II of the Additional Convention prohibits the- 
Central American governments from intervening for or against 
any Central American government in case of a revolution or civil 
war, the American Government has placidly allowed, if it did not 
instigate, the government of Guatemala to take side with and 
assist the revolutions in Honduras and Nicaragua. The State 
Department has done even worse than this. Claiming for itself a 
right that was denied all contracting parties in the Washington 
Conventions, the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for or 
against, in revolutions in Central America, the State Department 
went so far as to use armed force in putting down the last revolu- 
tion and used these armed forces, not only against combatants, 
but even against unarmed citizens, all of which was committed" 
with the Washington Treaties as a pretext, in scandalous violation 
of these very same treaties which the State Department has claimed' 
to be defending. 

We consider it very opportune to publish a communication sent 
by President Araujo to the Central American Court of Justice- 
relative to the last revolution in Nicaragua and his true inter- 
pretation of the Washington Conventions, which opinion is all 
the more interesting, because it voices the authorized idea of an 
Executive of one of the Central American republics. His com- 
munication reads as follows : 



54 

"Five independent nations, none having relinquished their rights 
to an autonomous government, convened upon treaties which tend 
to promote effective relations of peace, commerce and good will, and 
■the governments of the United States and Mexico, having been rep- 
resented at this Conference through notable representatives, were 
parties to the deliberations which preceded the final conclusions 
arrived at in these Intrenational treaties ratified at Washington, 
thanks to a generous and disinterested offer of hospitality of the 
Ex-President of the United States. However, it is noteworthy that 
neither in the textof these documents, the preliminary Protocol^ nor 
in the records of the Conference, are these great governments of the 
United States of America, and Mexico, conceded any rights or 
obligations that could be traced to these Treaties convened upon by 
the Central American contracting parties. There is nothing in 
either the spirit nor the wording of these treaties that could be 
construed into a restriction of their rights of sovereignty, when 
these contain nothing but expressions of mutual admiration, respect 
and good will, obligating the contracting countries to submit their 
differences to the verdict of the Central American Court of Justice, 
which is purely Central American, and of which esteemed institu- 
tion your Honor is the meritorious representative." 

And now we shall conclude. We hope we have succeeded in 
demonstrating that "Dollar Diplomacy" is a great injustice and 
is the ruin of those countries in which it is pursued, at the same 
time endangering the prestige of the United States in the eyes 
of all Latin-America to the benefit of only a few privileged 
citizens of the United States. We Central Americans lack the 
means to r§lieve the situation and to resent this injustice, and for 
the moment we have to trust to the straightforwardness and honesty 
of the American people, and the people's worthy representatives in 
Congress, and especially in the Senate, which is investigating this 
matter. We admire this great country, and we are far from 
believing that the people are responsible for the errors of a few of 
its public men in leading positions. We hope for justice to be done 
us. ami for a revival of the Pan-American Fraternity, which will 
give peace, progress and liberty to all the nations of ibis continent. 

Juan Leets. 

New Orleans. November, 1912. 



ADDENDA 



55 

ADDENDA A 

Memorandum of Minister Brown. 

Under instructions from my government, which I have just 
received by telegraph, I have the honor and the pleasure to inform 
the Government of Honduras that the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. 
has informed my government that they are prepared to agree in 
the arrangement of the foreign debt of Honduras, the delivery of 
the railway wharf of Puerto Cortes, and the advancement of a sub- 
stantial amount for internal improvements which may be necessary, 
acquiring new bonds which must be duly secured. 

Messrs. Morgan & Co. have notified my government that the 
Council of Foreign Bonholders had accepted the proposal of Morgan 
& Co., who now have control of the British and American securities, 
including the railway and wharf, and that the Council of Foreign 
Bondholders, acting in behalf of the holders of bonds, have in- 
formed the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
foregoing, and that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
having cordially approved the new project, has, by request of the 
Council of Bondholders, given notice to Minister Carden of the 
change in the situation. 

I have instructions to manifest that if the Government of Hon- 
duras would send a special agent to the United States with full 
powers to negotiate with Morgan & Co., the Government of the 
United States would extend to him all facilities. 

I beg to add that the Government of the United States feels itself 
happy to see, in the said proposals, the prospect of a good result 
and for a settlement upon a favorable basis for the amortization of 
the national debt, which would be for the prosperity, tranquility 
and national 'strength of Honduras. 

(Signed) Philip Brown, 
American Minister to Honduras. 

Tegucigalpa, July 17, 1909. 



ADDENDA B 

Cablegrams. 

Tegucigalpa, Dec. 10, 1910.' 
Paredes, Honduras Consulate, New York: 

Accept -agreement ; sign agreement and return. 

(Signed) Davila. 



56 



New York, Dec. 11, 1910. 
President Davila, Tegucigalpa^ Honduras: 

Consult situation prominent people to decide destinies Eepublic. 

(Signed) Paredes. 

Cablegrams. 

New York, Dec. 24, 1910. 
President Davila, Tegucigalpa, Honduras: 

I have refused to sign convention — American Protectorate — ■ 
Santo Domingo plan. Complied with my duty. Present you my 
resignation. (Signed) • Paredes. 

Tegucigalpa, Dec. 29, 1910. 
Paredes, New York: 

Country is on the verge of a disastrous civil war. Only the loan 
can save it. Think patriotically. Must make efforts to gain time. 
Loan will be made in spite of us. At least, we must try to avoid 
bloodshed to the Eepublic. I await details. 

* (Signed) Davila. 

Tegucigalpa, Jan. 20, 1911. 
Paredes, Honduras Consulate, New YovJc: 

Your resignation not accepted. Sign loan without delay. Gov- 
ernment assumes all responsibility. Civil war appears to be formid- 
able. Loan may avoid bloodshed and prepare beneficial evolution, 
preventing Bonilla coming to power. Subscribe contract this week. 
Answer. (Signed) Davila. 

Letter of President Davilla to Minister Paredes. 

Tegucigalpa, Jan. 12, 1911. 

Minister of Honduras, General Juan E. Paredes, Con-sulado de 
Honduras, 66 Beaver Street, New Yorl- : 

My Esteemed Friend — I am in receipt of yours of Nov. 28th and 
Dec. 5th. 

Estrada Cabrefa, who ls the promoter of this war ami that of 
August last year, has displayed a prodigious activity to produce the 
revolution, and all elements are conjoined against the Government, 
unjustly. To get out of these difficulties we take to tight hard. 

The Government of Honduras was notified officiallv that if the 



57 

loan was not signed, it would be carried through at all hazards, in 
worse conditions for the Kepublic. Nevertheless, we said nothing, 
did not give any promises until we could receive your indications. 
The last proposition made by the bankers, which you transmitted 
by cable, we consider it as decisive, and for that reason we ordered 
you to sign and return. 

The American Minister asked me for a copy of that cable, and I 
gave it to him. When you refused to sign the treaty at Washington, 
the disgust of the State Department raised to indignation. 

(Signed) Davila. 

Tegucigalpa, Jan. 27, 1911. 
Paredes, Honduras Consulate, New York: 

Ceiba has fallen. San Marcos, Colon, has also been taken by in- 
vasion from Nicaragua. The war, according to official declarations, 
took place on account of delay in signing the loan, notwithstanding 
promises made since Dec. 10th. War between factions which de- 
vastates the country, and the loan will be made by any means. Let 
us put one side our "amour propre" in order to avoid the ruin of 
Honduras. If you cannot sign, help Lazo. Let us work together 
in behalf of peace. (Signed) Davila. 



ADDENDA C 

Aid for Nicaragua Asked by Estrada — She will Never Thrive 
Without Our Effective Intervention, Says Ex-President — 
Urges a Protectorate — President Diaz Hopes for Our Help, 
He Declares— Blames Americans for Eevolutions. 



[New York Times, Sept. 10, 1912.] 
In the course of an interview with a Times reporter yesterday, 
Ex-President Estrada, of Nicaragua, who is stopping at the Hotel 
St. George, Brooklyn, said that Avithout the effective intervention 
of the United States warfare in Nicaragua would continue 
indefinitely, ruining the Central American country, and sooner or 
later involving the United States in trouble with England or Ger- 
many. Mr. Estrada, who declares that the presidency rightfully 
belongs to him, also brought grave charges against a number of 
Americans in Nicaragua, blaming them for present conditions there. 



58 

Mr. Estrada and his faithful henchman, General Moncada, are 
starting for Nicaragua early this week to support the government 
of President Diaz, in whose favor Mr. Estrada handed over the 
reins of the Chief Magistracy in 1911, in order to avert, so he says, 
war with the Conservative faction. 

"I would like you, through the New York Tim es, to convey a few 
words to the American people," said Mr. Estrada. "It is succinctly 
this: Without the active help of the United States Government, 
Nicaragua will never thrive. She will be always the same." 

"You mean a sort of American protectorate?" he was asked. 

Arbiter for Nicaragua. 

"Yes," he answered without hesitation. "A protectorate along 
the lines exercised in Cuba and Panama, without, of course, impair- 
ing our sovereignty. We want the United States Government, 
whether it be Eepublican or Democrat, to keep an eye upon ns, 
supervise our elections, and, in a word, become the arbiter and judge 
of our destinies. I speak in my name and in the name of President 
Diaz. My ideas are his, as well as those of the majority of the 
people of Nicaragua. It's the only way in which we can hope for 
peace and progress. I am still titular head of Nicaragua. I did 
not resign, as has been stated, but merely handed the government 
over to the Vice-President during my absence. 

"For the last twenty years Nicaragua has been in the hands of 
a savage system of militarism. There are no real- elections, every- 
thing is a farce, and everybody wants to be President and rule. 
Tbe result is that the country has been and still is a seething pot 
of anarchy, which is gaining proportions every day. 

"But it is not alone our people who brew all this trouble. They 
are the least responsible. I charge that the majority, if not all, of 
the revolutions in Nicaragua in recent years have been engineered 
and openly financed by American companies anxious to gel conces- 
sions and monopolies from the government. 

"Take the case of the Bluefields Steamship Company. Zelaya 
gave these people tbe exclusive monopoly for tbe navigation of the 
River Escondido and its affluents. When 1 reached the presidency 
I also found that exclusive concessions for the exploitation of the 
mining, liquor, tobacco, cattle, fishing and other national industries 
were in the hands of m few Americans and Germans. 



59 



Conspiracies on All Sides. 

"What was the result ? I found conspiracies were being hatched 
on all sides. Mena, my War Minister, was planning a revolution. 
The United Fruit Compaq, which was after a similar concession, 
a railroad, was pushing him all the time. I had positive proofs 
that he was going to start a revolution on May 14, 1911, so I 
arrested him on May 9. The Conservatives clamored for his release, 
and I handed over the presidency to Diaz to avert war, although I 
might have carried it on successfully, because I had the backing of 
600 Liberals, who rallied around me at the time." 

Continuing, Mr. Estrada said that Mena's revolution was being 
backed by the United Fruit Company and the partisans of Zelaya. 

Mr. Estrada was frank enough to admit that the revolution 
headed by him which overthrew Zelaya had received financial aid 
from certain American companies established on the Atlantic coast 
of Nicaragua. He said these companies had contributed, off and on, 
something close to $1,000,000. The house of Joseph W. Beers was 
in for $200,000, and that of Samuel Weil for about $150,000. . 



ADDENDA D 

The Secretary of State to the Nicaraguan Charge. 

Department of State, 

December 1, 1909. 

Sir — Since the Washington Convention of 1907 it is notorious 
that President Zelaya has almost continuously kept Central America 
in tension or turmoil, that he has repeatedly and flagrantly violated 
the provisions of the conventions, and by a baleful influence upon 
Honduras, whose neutrality the conventions were to assure, has 
sought to discredit those sacred international obligations to the 
great detriment of Costa Pica, El Salvador and Guatemala, whose 
governments meanwhile appear to have been able patiently to strive 
for the loyal support of the engagements so solemnly undertaken at 
Washington under the auspices of the United States and of Mexico. 

It is equally a matter of common knowledge that, under the 
regime of President Zelaya, republican institutions have ceased in 
Nicaragua to exist, except in naiiie; that public opinion and the 



60 



press have been throttled; and that prison has been the reward of 
any tendency to real patriotism. My consideration for yon personally 
impels me to abstain from unnecessary discussion of the painful 
details of a regime which unfortunately has been a blot upon the 
history of Nicaragua and a discourageemnt to a group of Eepublics 
whose aspirations need only the opportunity of free and honest 
government. 

In view of the interests of the United States and of its relation 
to the Washington Convention, appeal against this situation has 
long since been made to this government by a majority of the Cen- 
tral American Eepublics. There is now added to the appeal, through 
the revolution, a great body of the Nicaraguan people. Two 
Americans who, this government is now convinced, were officers 
connected with the revolutionary forces, and therefore entitled to 
be dealt with according to the enlightened practice of civilized 
nations, have been killed by direct order of President Zelaya. Their 
execution is said to have been preceded by barbarous cruelties. The 
Consulate at Managua is now officially reported to have been 
menaced. There is thus a sinister culmination of an administration 
also characterized by a cruelty to its own citizens which has, until 
the recent outrage, found vent in the case of this country in a 
succession of petty annoyances and indignities which many months 
ago made it impossible to ask an American Minister longer to 
reside in Managua. From every point of view it has evidently 
become difficult for the United States further to delay more active 
response to the appeals so long made to its duty, to its citizens, to 
its dignity, to Central America and to civilization. 

The Government of the United States is convinced that the revo- 
lution represents the ideals and the will of the majority of the 
Nicaraguan people more faithfully than does the Government of 
President Zelaya, and that its peaceable control is well-nigh as 
extensive as that hitherto so sternly attempted by the Government 
of Managua. 

There is now added the. fact, as officially reported from more than 
one quarter, that there are already indications of a rising in the 
Western provinces in favor of a presidential candidate intimately 
iated with the old regime. In this it is easy to see new elements 
tending toward a condition of anarchy which leaves, at a given 
time, no definite responsible source to which the Government of 



61 

the "United States could look for reparation for the killing of 
Messrs. Cannon and Groce, or, indeed, for the protection which 
must be assured American citizens and American interests in 
Nicaragua. 

In these circumstances the President no longer feels for the 
Government of President Zelaya that respect and confidence which 
would make it appropriate hereafter to maintain with it regular 
diplomatic relations, implying the will and the ability to respect 
and assure what is due from one State to another. 

The Government of Nicaragua which you have hitherto repre- 
sented is hereby notified, as will be also the leaders of the revolu- 
tion, that the Government of the United States will hold strictly 
accountable for the protection of American life and property the 
factions de facto in control of the Eastern and WESTERN portions 
of the Republic of Nicaragua. 

As for the reparation found due, after careful consideration, for 
the killing of Messrs. Groce and Cannon, the Government of the 
United States would be loath to impose upon the innocent people 
of Nicaragua a too heavy burden of expiating the acts of a regime 
forced upon them or to exact from a succeeding government, if it 
have quite different policies, the imposition of such a burden. Into 
the question of ultimate reparation there must enter the question 
of the existence at Managua of a government capable of respond- 
ing to demands. There must enter also the question of how far 
it is possible to reach those actually responsible and those who 
perpetrated the tortures reported to have preceded the execution, 
if these be verified ; and the question whether the government be one 
entirely disassociated from the present intolerable oonditions and 
worthy to be trusted to make impossible a recurrence of such acts, 
in which case the President, as a friend of your country, as he is 
also of the other Eepublics of Central America, might be disposed 
to have indemnity confined to what was reasonably due the relatives 
of the deceased, and punitive only in so far as the punishment might 
fall where really due. 

In pursuance of this policy, the Government of the United States 
will temporarily withhold its demand for reparation, in the mean- 
while taking such steps as it deems wise and proper to protect 
American interests. 



62 



To insure the future protection of legitimate American interests, 
in consideration of the interests of the majority of the Central 
American Kepublics, and in the hope of making more effective the 
friendly offices exerted under the Washington Conventions, the 
Government of the United States reserves for further consideration 
at the proper time the question of stipulating also that the Con- 
stitutional Government of Nicaragua obligate itself by convention, 
for the benefit of all the governments concerned, as a guarantee for 
its future loyal support of the Washington Conventions and their 
peaceful and progressive aims. 

Prom the foregoing it will be apparent to you that your office 
of Charge d' Affaires is at an end. I have the honor to enclose your 
passport, for use in case you desire to leave this country. I would 
add at the same time that, although your diplomatic quality is 
terminated, I shall be happy to receive you, as I shall be happy 
to receive the representative of the revolution, each as the unofficial 
channel of communication between the Government of the United 
States and the de facto authorities to whom I look for the protection 
of American interests pending the establishment in Nicaragua of 
a government with which the United States can maintain diplo- 
matic relations. 

Accept, sir, etc., 

(Signed) P. C. Knox. 



ADDENDA E. 

Message of President Madriz to President Taft, Kegarding 

the Landing of Marines from the American 

Warships in Bluefields. 

Campo de Marte, June 15, 1910. 

His Excellency, President W. IF. Taft, Washington: 

Your Excellency will permit me to refer to certain acts relating 
to our civil war. 

On the 27th of May last the forces of my government took the 
Bluff by assault, same being n strong position which defended Blue- 
fields. The commander of our forces was instructed to proceed 
immediately and take the city, which bad been evacuated, and 



G3 



which would have terminated the campaign. This was frustrated 
by the attitude of the commander of the cruiser Paducah, who in- 
timated to the commander of our forces that he would use his force 
to oppose the taking of the city, and actually landed his marines 
and occupied the city. This action assured the revolution a base 
for its operations, and enabled it to withdraw all of its forces from 
the city to oppose our single column, and thus was able to frustrate 
a combination which had been carefully prepared and whose success 
was assured. 

This government purchased in New Orleans the British steam- 
ship Venus, to-day called "Maximo Jerez," which sailed for San 
Juan del Norte with clearance from the America'n authorities after 
exhibiting dona fide all of the elements of war which she had 
aboard, and which were considered articles of free commerce. In 
San Juan del Norte her nationality was changed to that of Nica- 
ragua, and she was armed for war and dispatched to blockade Blue- 
fields. The blockade had for its object the prevention of the revo- 
lution from receiving, as it had done before, arms and provisions 
from New Orleans. 

The government of your Excellency has denied the right of our 
vessels to blockade the port and prevent American vessels entering, 
and thus has kept open to the revolution its source of supply — New 
Orleans. 

The taking of the Bluff gave my government possession of the 
Bluefields Customhouse, and we expected to deprive the revolution 
of the revenues which this customhouse produces; but the govern- 
ment of your Excellency has declared that the revenues of this 
customhouse should be paid to the revolution, and this has, in a 
great measure, annulled the victory attained by our forces at the 
Bluff. 

The government of your Excellency has denied our right to pre- 
vent American vessels from passing in front of the Bluff on their 
way to the customhouse established by the revolution at Schooner 
Key, on the Escondido Eiver, notwithstanding the decree of my 
government closing the Port of Bluefields and prohibiting this 
traffic, as a necessary measure of defense and pacification. 

The commander of the Paducah threatened the commander of 
the Maximo Jerez, stating that he would fire on his vessel and sink 
her if our forces attempted to attack Bluefields. 



64 



The chief of our forces at the Bluff having noticed that certain 
boats in the service of the revolution were using the American flag 
to pass in front of our forts without' detention, notified the com- 
mander of the Paducah of his intention to stop this free traffic of 
these boats in front of his lines. The commanders of the Paducah' 
and Dubuque replied that they would use their cannon on him to 
enforce respect due American commerce, even if it consisted of 
arms and ammunition for the revolution, and that one shot fired on 
such boats would be considered a declaration of war against the 
United States. 

Lastly, I know that in Bluefields, although under protection of 
American marines, an attack is being prepared against' our position 
at the Bluff and Pearl Lagoon. The intentions of the commander 
of the Paducah prevent us anticipating the enemy's actions, which 
we have a right to do as a legitimate defense. 

It is my duty to state to your Excellency, frankly, that I cannot 
find any way to reconcile the action herein enumerated with the 
principles of neutrality proclaimed by the law of nations; and 
having full confidence in the high character of the Government of 
the United States, I have no hesitancy in respectfully asking your 
Excellency to rectify the orders given to your naval authorities in 
Bluefields. 

Thus can this government easily terminate a bloody and isolated 
revolt, which in itself is without life, but which is working towards 
the ruin of Nicaragua. 

Jose Madriz, 
President. 



ADDENDA E 

(Copy.) 

Washington, June 19, 1910. 
Minister of Foreign Affair*: 

The policy of the United Mates remains as set forth, in the Secre- 
tary of State's letter of December first, 1909, to Minister Eodrigiuv, 
then Charge d'Affaires, whereby relations villi the Zelaya Govern- 
ment were broken off. That letter and statements of the consistent 
applications of the same policy to conditions as they arose were 
duly published. 



65 



As to the statements made in the telegram of Doctor Madriz to 
the President, the Government of the United States took only the 
customary step of prohibiting bombardment or fighting by either 
faction within the unfortified and ungarrisoned commercial city of 
Bluefields, thus protecting the preponderating American and other 
foreign interests, just as the British commander had done in case 
'of Greytown, where there were British interests. The Government 
-of the United States has acknowledged the right of each faction to 
maintain a blockade, but has refused to permit vessels, illegally and 
-clandestinely fitted out in American waters, to interfere with Amer- 
ican commerce. 

The Government of the United States simply insists that each 
faction shall collect duties only for the territory under its de facto 
control, and refuses to permit the collection of double duties. 

If any violation of neutrality has occurred it was in connection 
with the sailing of the Venus from New Orleans as an expedition 
of the Madriz faction. (Signed) Knox. 



ADDENDA E. 

Managua, June 23, 1910. 

To Ministro de Nicaragua, Washington, D. C, 1912: 

According to the rights of the people, no neutral government can 
prevent or disturb the military operations in time of war, which is 
legally executed by belligerants. Foreigners are subject to all con- 
tingencies of these operations, the same as natives. In consequence, 
I cannot consider the acts of the American marines in having pre- 
vented the operations of our armies at Bluefields as legal. 

Eegarding the sailing of the Venus from New Orleans, I am con- 
vinced that she has not violated any of the laws of the United States. 
Furthermore, the clearance given by the authorities at New Orleans 
only obligated the vessel to maintain neutrality during her voyage, 
which she actually did. Once her voyage, for which she had been 
given clearance, terminated, she entered other waters and changed 
her nationality in accordance with the laws of Nicaragua; and the 
laws and authority of the United States have nothing to do with 
the ultimate destination of the vessel, which has had, and has, the 
right to execute warlike operations, amongst which figures the 
blockade. 



6G 



I omit at present to refer to other details of Mr. Knox's note ; but 
I want made known the certainty that, but for the interference of 
the naval authorities of the United States, in the manner explained 
in my cablegram to President Taft, Bluefields would have been 
taken, the revolution defeated and Nicaragua in peace. 

Madriz. 



EXHIBIT E 

[Telegram.] 

"Blitfp, 5 p. m., July 23d, 1910. 
"To the Supreme Command of All Arms, Managua: 

"The Executive Delegate sent me from San Juan del Norte the 
telegram you addressed to him, which contains a copy of a cable 
you received from the Norwegian Consul General at Havana^ and 
also a copy of a telegram sent you by the Executive Delegate at 
San Juan del Norte relative to the steamers 'Hiram' and 'Utstein/ 
at the same time giving me instructions of what I should do upon 
the arrival of these steamers here. 

"As some steamers had been sighted, I thought one might be 
the 'Hiram," and I sent out two despatches, one addressed to the 
Captain of the 'Hiram' and the other addressed to the Commander 
of the American Squadron anchored opposite this Fort, which 
despatches said: Bluff, July 21st, 1910— To the Captain of the 
Steamer 'Hiram,' opposite the Bluff: Please take note [here I gave 
him copy of the telegram I received from the Executive Delegate, 
and also a copy of the cable that had been received from the Consul 
General of Norway at Havana] I have reliable information that 
you have war contraband aboard intended for the revolution headed 
by General Juan J. Estrada, and in consequence of and in con- 
formity with the information given me in the telegram and cable, 
of which I give you a. copy herewith, 1 herewith order you to de- 
liver In this authority whatever war supplies you may have aboard, 
and I warn you that, should you refuse to do so. I shall confiscate 
your vessel in conformity with the laws of my country. 1 also 
inform you that you will he held responsible for your action in this 
incident, and thai I shall a<l\ise my Government of whatever action 
you will lake, and thai mv Government may report your conduct 
to the Norwegian Government. 



G7 

"I do not doubt that you, seeing that justice and right is with 
us, will facilitate the delivery of this war contraband. I send you 
this communication in duplicate, so you may confirm receipt of 
this dispatch at the foot of one of them. Yours truly [signed] 
F. M. Eivas, Inspector General of the Atlantic Coast. 

"The second despatch reads as follows: Bluff, July 21st, 1910 — 
Sir : I herewith acquaint you with a communication I received 
the 16th inst. from the Executive Delegate: S'an Juan del Norte, 
July 16th, 1910.— General Fernando M. Eivas, the Bluff: Under 
date the 12th inst. I was advised over the wire by the President 
that the Minister General, Mr. Baca, received a cable from the 
Consul General of Norway in Havana, which reads as follows : 
[Here follows the cable.] This authority has trustworthy informa- 
tion that the steamer 'Hiram' brings war supplies for the revolu- 
tion under the leadership of General Juan J. Estrada. I am 
despatching a communication to the Captain of said vessel in 
which I demand the surrender of all war material to this command,, 
and I am basing my demand on the information contained in said 
cable received from the Norwegian Consul General. I trust that, 
once you are aware of the information given us in this cable, you 
will see that justice and the right are with us and that you will 
not oppose in any way that my demand to the Captain of the 
'Hiram' is not complied with, and that, should you object, you will 
notify me in writing before you will permit the 'Hiram' to enter 
and to proceed to Bluefields, which I doubt very much you will 
permit, knowing, as I do, that your Government has declared its 
neutrality, and having satisfied myself that you know how to in- 
terpret this neutrality. Your attentive and never-failing servant, 
[signed] F. M. Eivas, Inspector General of the Atlantic Coast to 
the Comamnder of the Naval Forces of the United States as- 
sembled opposite the Bluff. 

His answer was the following: 

"No. B, 6110, U. S. A. 'Dubuque,' 3d Class, in the Eoad to Blue- 
fields, Nicaragua, Central America, July 22nd, 1910. 

"Sir — I have the honour to confirm receipt of your communica- 
tion of the 21st of July, 1910. I shall cause the steamers to anchor 
near my vessel while the nature of their cargo is determined, and 
thereafter I shall act according to demands of circumstances and 
in accordance with instructions from my Government relative to- 



G8 



the protection of American commerce and the maintenance of 
neutrality. Eespectfully [signed] H. E. Eines, Naval Commander 
of the United States, in Comamnd of the Marines at Present on the 
Oriental Coast of Nicaragua, to General F. M. Eivas, Commander 
at the Bluff, Nicaragua, Central America." 

'Last night the steamer 'Utstein' arrived and immediately I sent 
a, despatch aboard identical to the one sent to the Captain of the 
''Hiram/ but the Captain of the 'Utstein' refused to receive the 
despatch, saying that if anything was wanted of him an under- 
standing should be had with the Commander of the 'Dubuque.' 

"The communication was delivered to the Commander, who de- 
clared that he was not responsible for the Captain of the 'Utstein' 
accepting or refusing to accept despatches, and that much less 
would he sign the duplicate of the despatch which I had sent along 
in order to have a proof that said despatch had been delivered to 
him. Furthermore, the Commander of the 'Dubuque' declared 
to General Francisco Altschul and Mr. Ofilio Arguello, the latter 
being my interpreter, that HE WAS A PAETISAN OF THE 
EEVOLUTION, and that he had told the Captain of the 'Utstein' 
that, if he did not care to, not to communicate with us, and that 
he would give the Captain of the 'Utstein' his unconditional sup- 
port, and shortly afterwards he sent marines aboard that vessel 
and ordered the vessel to proceed to Bluefields, which took place 
to-day. I have sent a despatch to the Representative of the Nor- 
wegian Consul in Bluefields, protesting against the actions of the 
Captain of the 'Utstien,' heading this protest with a copy of the 
cable received by the Consul General of Norway in Havana. This 
communication to the Norwegian Vice Consul in Bluefields is to be 
delivered through the Commander of the 'Dubuque,' supposing 
that he cares to do so, but, taking into consideration the hostility 
this official has shown us, it is doubtful that this communication 
will ever reach its destination. 

"So long as there is no warship here of another nation, and in 
command of an officer who is really neutral, the interest of your 
Government will be at the mercy of the officers of the United States 
Navy, who are inspired and counseled by the American Consul in 
Bluefields, who is a more revolutionary rebel than Estrada and 
"Chamorro. 

Vdin' subaltern, (Signed) F. M. Rivas." 



69 

ADDENDA E 

"New Orleans, 7 p. m., Novbr. 9th. 
"President, Managua: 

"Guatemala advises Bluefields cargo has not been for yet. Last 
of October shall send to Bocas large quantity of shells, also men. 
From Bluefields Diaz answered: Shall try and sustain ourselves 
until arrival of steamer." Altschul. 

"New Orleans, 7 :40 p. m., 17th Novbr. 
"President, Managua: 

"War elements 'have arrived in Bluefields it seems are the same' 
advised by cable last week — hailing from Bocas — Steamer Utstein 
leaves now for Port Barrios with war supplies. Altschul.'" 

"New Orleans, 8 :38, 18th of Novbr. 
"President, Managua: 

"Utstein will arrive Barrios Sunday, to transfer 44 eases rifles 
and 114,000 shells to a gasoline schooner bound for Bluefields. 
Guatemala uses Barrios as a base for the revolution. Altschul." 

"Bluefields, 15th November. 
"President, Guatemala: 

"If war supplies are not received before the 20th, revolution will 
have to be abandoned. Diaz. Cabrera answered. Ulstein,' with 
war supplies aboard, will arrive in a few days/' 

"New Orleans, 11 a. m., Novbr. 24th. 
"President, Managua: 

"Ulstein left for Bermuda Monday, from Port Barrios; will 
arrive Bluefields to-morrow." Altschul. 

"Washington, Jany. 13. 
"Estrada, Bluefields': 

"THEY ADYISE YOU NOT TO PAY ATTENTION TO* 
KIMBALL. Castrillo." 

"Washington, Jany. 14. 
"Estrada, Bluefields: 

"State Department does not support Kimball: Castrillo/' 



70 

"Washington, Jany. 14. 
~" Estrada, Bluefields: 

"STATE DEPAETMENT INFORMS' ME THAT MADEIZ 
IS VEEY WEAK. Castrillo." 

"Washington, Feb. 12/10. 
"Estrada, Bluefields: 

"State Department will proceed energetically in our favor. 

"Castrillo." 

"Bluefields, Feb. 11/10. 
"Castrillo, Washington : 

"We know positively that Madriz has no elements of war and is 
trying to obtain them in Costa Eica and Honduras. Our operations 
continue with vigor. Chamorro army every day stronger. Corea 
animates Madriz. Continue pretending moral support of Ameri- 
can Navy at Corinto, and try and have Washington Cabinet influ- 
ence Mexico. Estrada/' 

"Bluefields, Feb. 9/10. 
"Chamorro, Panama: 

"Want to know how many Americans you can enlist im- 
mediately. I can send steamer 'Senator.' This depends on your 
answer. Diaz." 

"Colon, Feb. 14/10. 
"Diaz, Bluefields: 

"Can enlist not less than 25 Americans. If you can send steamer, 
be sure to tell me what date it will arrive at port of embarca- 
tion. Chamorro/' 

'"President, Managua: 

"New York. 1 :15 p. m.. 7th of December. 
"The revolution and this Government will never accept Irias. 
Deposit in Dolores Estrada will impede further sacrifice of lives, 
and the disembarking of Americans. Eead note of Knox to 
Tvodriguez. Bolanos." 

"New York, 6:40 p. m.. 17th Decbr. 
"President, Managua: 

"Appointment of Madriz considered an error. Will not be 
recognized by tbis Government nor by those of Central America, 
and revolution will not cease. Bolanos." 



71 

"New Orleans, 3 p. m., Novbr. 6th. 
"President, Managua: 

"Adolfo Diaz cabled via Guatemala asking for 1,000 rifles and 
300,000 shells. Altschul." 

"Bluefields., Nov. 8. 
"Arambura, New York: 

"Ask Castrillo what is the opinion of Washington with reference 
to new Republic. Has steamer sailed? If not, what is the cause? 
When will she sail? Answer immediately by Western Union Code. 

"Diaz." 

"Blttefieds, Feb. 4/10. 
"Rita, Guatemala (Estrada Cabrera) : 

"Latest news is Chamorro, Camoapa, Mena, Santo Tomas now 
on the way to combine with Chamorro. I am anxiously awaiting 
'arte.' (?)' Diaz." 

"Bluefields, Feb. 5/10. 
"Saenz, Guatemala (Estrada Cabrera) : 

"We require urgently 200,000 cartridges, Remington, 43 y 50,000 
cartridges. ( ?) May you instruct ( ?) prompt dispatch? Ofrezco mi 
garantia. I offer my guaranty. Adolfo Diaz." 

"Bluefields, March 7/10. 
"Saenz, Guatemala: 

"Present state of affairs, peace is entirely in your hands. Wash- 
ington Tanzimat without consulting you in the matter." 



ADDENDA F 

EXCERPT FROM A MESSAGE WHICH PRESIDENT 
MADRIZ, OF NICARAGUA, WROTE WITH HIS OWN 
HAND, AND WHICH WAS TO BE SENT TO THE 
NATIONAL CONGRESS, BUT WHICH, ON ACCOUNT 
OF LACK OF TIME, WAS NEVER SENT : 
Notwithstanding I cannot help but refer to the principal of tbem, 
because it explains the political transition which I have just com- 
municated to you ; I refer to the intervention of the United States 
in our domestic fights. 



72 



This intervention is made known to you through a cable message- 
which I have addressed to President Taft in regard to it. I will 
give you a concise idea of same : 

As the peace overtures which were offered during the middle of' 
last March between this Government and the faction in Bluefields. 
were frustrated, on account of the pretentions of General Estrada, 
who desired to establish conditions which I did not consider com- 
patible with the dignity of the Republic, it was necessary, in order- 
to determine the situation, to continue our military operations 
against the enemy. To do so, we sent our armies by land, one 
against Bluefields under command of General Paulino Godoy, and' 
another against Rama under command of General Benito Chavarria. 
By sea, we sent from San Juan del Norte our boats armed for war,, 
the steamship Maximo Jerez (formerly the Venus) and the steam- 
ship San Jacinto, under command of the Executive Delegate, Dr. 
Julian Irias, and the .Chief of the Expedition, General Fernando- 
M. Rivas. The ships carried sufficient landing forces to assault 
the Bluff, and attack Bluefields, so that the column of General 
Godoy could attack the revolutionary forces which they found 
entrenched outside of the city. The ships were to establish a 
blockade of Bluefields and close the port completely to foreign com- 
merce, in order to deprive the revolutionists of re-enforcements and 
help which would arrive from New Orleans. The combined oper- 
ations would have resulted in the fall of Bluefields, which had 
remained defended, and the defeat and submission of the revolu- 
tion, which, deprived of all co-operation from the outside by the- 
blockade, could not long resist. 

Tn the brilliant attack of June 27th, the troops from the steam- 
ship Maximo Jerez assaulted and took the Bluff, which had been 
thought impregnable. Its possession on our part placed Bluefields 
in our hands. The forces of General Godoy attacked the enemy's 
formidable positions, and, after a bloody fight, would have crowned' 
its efforts with victory, if the forces at the Bluff would have been 
able to dislodge the enemy from its base of operation and attack it 
from its rear. The column under General Chavarria defeated the 
revolutionists in El Toyal, near Rama, and if our forces had won- 
in Bluefields, Rama would necessarily have fallen. 

But the decisive moment, when Hie whole country saw with satis- 
faction the advent of peace, the power of the United States crossed' 



73 

our path, prevented our victory, and once more brought the clouds 
of blood and^death, which we, with pain, still see floating upon the 
horizon of our country. 

The Commander of the American cruiser Paducah, anchored in 
the waters of Bluefields, for reasons inconsistent in the light of 
Eight, intervened directly in the fight, protecting the rebels, cutting 
off the further attack by our forces and frustrating the result of 
our sacrifices and our victory at the Bluff. In fact, he landed! 
marines to project Bluefields, and to prevent the attack by our 
forces on that rebellious city; and according to statements of im^ 
partial Americans, whose reports were published in the American! 
press, the American marines reinforced the positions of Estrada's 
army, thereby conducting themselves as revolutionists. This con- 
duct cannot be justified as a protection of foreigners, and especially 
of Americans living in Bluefields. 

Internationa] law does not authorize this exception to the un- 
deniable right of sovereignty and of belligerency. As sovereigns,, 
we can impose our authority in any Nicaraguan city; as belliger- 
ents, we can attack and destroy the enemy in any place, if same is : 
not within the territory of another. Bluefields was the cradle and! 
seat of the revolution. Its government was located there. To take 
it, or force its surrender, was to destroy the base of the revolution. 

In regard to the danger to American interests, international law 
establishes that foreign residents in a place where a state of war' 
exists are subject to all contingencies of the operations executed 1 
legally by the belligerents. This undeniable principle was sustained' 
by the American government during the bombardment of San Juan 
del Norte, an open city, unfortified, unarmed, a purely commercial 
locality, by the ship Cyane, of the American Navy, in the year 18521 

Furthermore, this government purchased in New Orleans the 
steamship Venus, an English merchantman. Before she left New 
Orleans destined for San Juan del Norte, the revolutionary agents 
endeavored to prevent her leaving, alleging to the government 
authorities in New Orleans that she sought to violate the law of the' 
United States. The authorities carefully examined the mattery — 
inspected the ship, heard all the proofs adduced on both sides,, 
consulted the Departments of Commerce and of Justice of the 
American Government, — and resolved that,, according to the laws 
of the United States, the voyage of this, ship; ( eo.uld] not: be prevented.. 



The Venus brought arms destined for the Government of Nicaragua 
at San Juan del Norte. In the United States, the traffic in arms is 
free, except the right of belligerents to seize same as contraband 
of war. 

The Venus left New Orleans, carrying regular clearance papers 
issued by the port authorities. The papers given her were signed 
under the obligation on the part of the vessel to maintain neutrality 
during her voyage. The Venus complied with her obligations of 
neutrality during her voyage and entry at her destination, where 
she arrived, unarmed, at San Juan del Norte. She could do no 
more, and, above all, was not under the American flag. At this 
port, before the British Consul, she changed her register under the 
English flag for that of Nicaragua, after which she armed for war 
and was sent to operate against the rebels of Bluefields. In all this 
there was no infraction of the laws of the United States, nor inter- 
national law. With all the Government of the United States has 
declared that the Venus cannot operate against American commerce 
by using the right of search on the high sea, nor that of blockade, 
because of the pretext that this vessel left New Orleans through 
subterfuge and deceived the authorities of the United States. On 
this account, the avenues of help from the outside remained open 
to the revolution, and especially from New Orleans, where, lately, 
large shipments of war material have been made, destined for the 
revolution. This explains clearly why measures were taken to 
prevent the blockade. 

The principal customhouse of the coast is at the Bluff, and this 
was established by law before the revolution. The possession of 
this post gave us authority over the customhouse and the right to 
the revenues produced by same. The American Government de- 
clared that these revenues belong to the Estrada faction, and ordered 
that the American commerce pay same to the revolution in a new 
customhouse established in Schooner Key, in the River Escondido. 

As we were in possession of the Bluff, we could still have pre- 
vented any boats from entering the river and going to the custom- 
house established by the revolution, but the commanders of the 
American gunboats Paduc&h and Dubuque threatened to fire on us 
with their guns if our forces at the Bluff interfered with American 
commerce. "One shot,'' they said, "fired on a vessel carrying the 
American flag would be considered a declaration of war against the 
United States." 



75 



In order to insure the free movement of vessels past the Bluff, the 
commanders of the American vessels stated they would place at all 
times a guard of American marines on the vessels, which they have 
invariably done. 

To-day, on account of this action, vessels are passing the Bluff 
carrying the American flag — these include all kinds of vessels, 
among which, schooners from San Andres and Providence are 
loaded with provisions for Bluefields. Furthermore, a tug employed 
by the enemy in its hostile operations, which fired on a lighter 
bearing our men, passed the Bluff under protection of the Ameri- 
can flag. 

When our forces occupied the entire coast from San Juan del 
Norte to Cape Gracias the Executive power ordered to establish a 
customhouse at Pearl Lagoon to collect duties on exports and im- 
ports from those districts under our authority, but when we notified 
the commander of the Dubuque of our action in the premise he 
replied to us, imposing restrictions which, in effect, practically gave 
the revenues of the coast to the Estrada faction. Finally, notwith- 
standing the occupation of Bluefields by the American marines, 
and the sham neutrality which they pretended to maintain, an attack 
was prepared on Pearl Lagoon position without our being able to 
prevent the enemy from carrying out its intentions. 

As some of the vessels which ran between the United States and 
Bluefields are of Norwegian nationality, this government made 
■overtures to Norway, to the end that these vessels respect the closing 
•of the port of Bluefields. That government, recognizing the legality 
of our act, thought that it was duty-bound to accede to our petition, 
■and to this effect notified its Legations in Washington, Havana and 
the Norwegian Vice Consul in Bluefields. The American Govern- 
ment officiously intervened, and in a communication addressed to 
the Norwegian Minister in Washington, objected to the order of the 
Norwegian Government, under the pretext that the blockade was 
ineffective and prejudicial to the interests of American commerce. 

The Norwegian steamship Utstein having arrived at Bluefields, 
and as we had advices that she carried elements of war for the 
revolution, our commander at the Bluff addressed a communication 
to her prohibiting the delivery of this contraband of war which she 
had on board. The captain of the Utstein declined to receive the 
•communication, and, violating our orders and those of his own 



76 



government, entered the port under protection of the marines from 
the U. S. S. Dnbuque. 

On account of the commander of the Bluff answering the fire of 
the revolutionary artillery stationed on Halfway Key, one of our 
projectiles fell near Bluefields, and the commander of the Dubuque 
gave notice that a repetition of this would be considered a bombard- 
ment of Bluefields Madriz." 



ADDENDA G. 

Managua, September 14th, 1912. 
Jefes Politicos, Governor-Intendant and Commandants: 

I transmit to you the following communication, dated the 13th 
inst, directed to this office by his Excellency, George F. Weitzel,. 
Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of the United 
States at this capital, so that you may give it due publicity : 

"Legation of the United States of America, 

Managua, September 13, 1912. 

Excellency : I have the honor of informing your Excellency that 
the Department of State has given me instructions by cable to 
transmit to the Government of your Excellency, and unofficially to 
the leaders of the rebel forces, and to make public the following 
authorized declaration of the policy of the United States during the 
present disturbances. 

The policy of the United States during the present- disturbances 
in Nicaragua is to take the necessary measures to adequately pro- 
tect the Legation in Managua, to maintain open the ways of com- 
munication, to protect the life and property of Americans. Upon 
repudiating Zelaya. whose regime, of barbarism" and corruption 
was ended by the Nicaraguan nation after a bloody war, the Gov- 
ernment of the United States condemned not only the individual, 
but the system. Consequently this government could not tolerate 
any movement to re-establish the same destructive regime. 

The Government of the United States therefore will oppose any 
attempt to restore Zelavism and will lend its moral and efficient 
support to the cause of good government legally constituted for the 
benefit of the people of Nicaragua, who, for a long time, it lias 
endeavored to nssist in their just aspirations towards peace and 
prosperity under a constitutional and orderly government. 



77 



A group of about 125 American planters residing in a region of 
Nicaragua have asked for protection; about two dozen American 
houses doing business in that country have asked for protection; 
the American banks, which have invested funds in railways and 
steamships in Nicaragua, as part of a plan to relieve* the deplorable 
financial situation, have asked for protection. The American 
citizens who are actually' in the employ of the Government of Nica- 
ragua, and even the Legation, have seen themselves exposed to im- 
mediate peril during the bombardment. Two American citizens, 
the reports state, have been barbarously assassinated; besides the 
Emery claim due to American citizens, and the indemnity for the 
killing of Cannon and Groce during the war with Zelaya, there are 
various other claims of Americans and' interests originated by con- 
cessions, in Washington. 

The United States is under the obligation of exercising its 
influence for the maintenance, of general peace which is seriously 
menaced by the present uprising ; and in this manner to exact strict 
compliance with the convention of Washington and lend due sup- 
port to its designs and terms. 

All the Republics of Central America can depend upon powerful 
mediums of co-operation. 

These are the important moral and political interests which 
require protection. When the American Minister asked the Gov- 
ernment of Nicaragua to protect the lives and property of Ameri- 
cans, the Minister of Foreign Eelations answered that the troops of 
the government were occupied in putting down the rebellion. 

Consequently my Government desires that the Government of 
the United States guarantee with its own forces the security and 
property of American citizens in Nicaragua, and to extend this same 
protection to all the .inhabitants of the Republic. 

Under these conditions, the policy of the United States shall be 
to protect the life and property of its citizens in the manner indi- 
cated, and at the same time employ its influence by adequate means 
to protect the legal and organized government, so that Nicaragua 
may continue its program of reform, free from the obstacle put in 
its way by the vicious elements who wished to restore the methods 
of Zelaya in citing General Mena to rebellion in flagrant violation 
of his promises given to his Government, the American Minister 
and the Dawson Convention, by the terms of which he was solemnly 



78 



obligated, and his attempt to overthrow the government of his 
eountry^, moved exclusively by selfish motives and without even pre- 
tending to fight for a principle, makes the present rebellion, from 
its beginning, the most inexcusable one in the annals of Central 
America. The' character of the actual disturbance and the proceed- 
ings employed impress them with the stamp of anarchy rather than 
that of an ordinary revolution. 

The moral condition of those who immediately made common 
cause with Mena, as well as their uncivilized and savage conduct in 
breaking an armistice, mistreating women, violating their word of 
honor, torturing peaceful citizens, exacting contribution, and, above 
all, the barbarous bombardment of the city of Managua, the deliber- 
ate destroying of the lives of innocent persons and their property, 
the killing of women, children and the sick in the hospitals, the 
cruel and barbarous assassination of hundreds said to have been 
perpetrated in Leon, identify Mena's rebellion with the abhorred 
and intolerable regime of Zelaya. 

I beg your Excellency to accept the reiterated expressions of my 
esteem and most distinguished consideration. 

Geokge E. Weitzel, 

American Minister. 
To His Excellency, 

Don Diego M. Chamorro, 

Minister of Foreign Relations." 

Your attentive servant, 

Diego M. Chamorro, 
Minister of Foreign Relations. 



ADDENDA H. 

Decree by the Dictator Diaz. 

Tlir President of the Republic: 

Whereas, the Constitutive National Assembly, convened by De- 
cree of April the 5th, 1911, overreached the limit of its powers, 
ill*- President, in Ministerial Council, decrees: 

Article 1. Meanwhile the Constitutive National Assembly, 
which is to he convened immediately, dues not dispose otherwise, 
the present Constitution shall be valid only as far as the Executive 



79 



and Judicial Powers are concerned. The Executive shall assume 
Legislative Power. 

Art. 2. The functions of the Constitutive National Assembly, 
convened by Decree of April 5th, 1911, are hereby declared termi- 
ated. 

Art. 3. The people are to be convened for the election of Depu- 
ties to a Constitutional Assembly which shall reform definitely the 
Constitution and Constitutive Laws, at the same time exercising 
the Powers of Legislation. 

Given at Managua, in the Presidential Palace, the 18th day of 
October, 1912. 

Adolfo Diaz. 

The Minister of the Interior, Miguel Cardenas. 

The Minister of Agriculture and Finance, Pedro Rafael Cuadra. 

The Minister of Foreign Relations and Education, Diego M. 
Chamorro. 

The Sub-Secretary of the Army and Navy, Benjamin Cuadra. 

The Minister of Improvements and Public Works, Elsias Pallais. 



ADDENDA H. 

Protest Proclaimed in Blueeields, October, 1912. 

(Final Part.) 

We, the undersigned Nicaraguan citizens, who love the Sov- 
ereignty and the dignity of our Republic, and pronounced enemies 
of all foreign intervention on our soil, and without any previous 
understanding with the people in the interior, whose attitude we 
do not know even now, due to lack of communication with the in- 
terior, have unanimously resolved : 

1. To abtstain from any participation whatever in the elections 
just decreed. 

2. 'To protest most vigorously and with all our heart against 
the infamous aggressive stand taken by the Government of the 
United States against our beloved country, Nicaragua ; and, 

3. To condemn the shameful conduct of those Nicaraguans who 
are traitors to our country and who are besmirching the honour o'f 
the Indo-Spanish race. 



80 



Bluefields, C. A., October, 1912. 

Rosendo Argucllo, Jacob Jaen, Manuel H. Giron, Jose M. 
.Zacarias G., Juan Ignaeio Rivas, J. Ramon Cisneros, Ciriaco 
•Pineda G., Salvador Lejarza, A. Hunter, Pio E. Guzman, Juan 
Davila R., J. P. Chevez, J. P. Delgadillo, Guillermo Childres 
Raudales, Gustavo Cortes, Samuel Gutirre^, M. Ig. Argiillo, F. R. 
Baldovinos, Carlos A. Espinosa R., E. Castrillo £., Eduardo Del- 
gad illo, J. M. Araica, Carlos Alberto Castro, Jesus Sierra F., 
Narciso Bermudez, Ygnacio Dinarte, Patricio Solis, B. Herrera, 
Narciso Bermudez, Ignacio Dinarte, Patricio Solis, B. Herrera, 
Franco Aviles. 



ADDENDA I. 

San Salvador, August 26th, 1912. 
'To President Taft, Washington: 

The Nicaraguan situation is being aggravated more and more 
•every day, and I fear serious complications if American troops in- 
vade N"icaraguan territory. In Leon the masses revolted upon the 
•arrival of the marines, and had it not been for the intervention of 
the Salvadoran Minister we would now have to lament grave con- 
sequences. I respect fully request you to suggest to President Diaz 
to cnlcr info some arrangement whereby peace can be secured, 
accepting a third parly in whom the Executive power is to be de- 
posited. 

"I am prompted to address this communication to you by my 
ardent desire for peace in Central America and my sincere friend- 
ship for the Government and the people of the United States. 

"Presidente Araujo." 



ADD i:\DA T. 

(Translated from Spanish.) 

W \smi\i;to\. Septbr. 5th. L912. 
To the American Legation in San Salvador: 

The President desires that you solicit nn audience with President 
Araujn and thai you place in iris hands the following communica- 
tion, word for word, which is nn answer: "TTis Excellency, the 



81 

President of the United States, estimates very highly the assurances 
of your ardent desire for peace in Central America and the assur- 
ances of your friendship. These motives will no doubt guaranty a 
strict adherence and an enforced obedience to the stipulations of the 
Washington Convention, in that part that may concern the Sal- 
vadoran Government, and will no doubt be a guaranty that the 
Salvadoran Government will carry out the dispositions made by the 
Government of the United States to create confidence in the peace 
of Central America, carried out by this government, which is the 
government best fitted to do so, and because it is justified in doing 
so by the stipulations of the Washington Convention, and because 
it is completely neutral in all Local issues which might frustrate 
the intentions of any one of the Governments of Central America. 

"I am, with you, of the opinion that the political situation in 
Nicaragua is very grave. The Government of the United States 
has never intended to Leave its Legation and the lives and interests 
of its citizens in Nicaragua to the mercy of a rebellion that had 
no justification and which, by its acts, recalls the epoch of Zelaya, 
committing the most flagrant outrages against all principles of 
honour, humanity, law and order and civilization, as indicated by 
Your Excellency. I do not think it jnsf to suggest to the legitimate 
Government of Nicaragua that it should deal with persons who 
have demonstrated that they will not respect agreements made with 
local authorities, legal representatives and within their right. 

"In consequence of all this, and in order to expedite the carrying 
out of ils obligations, the Government of the United States pro- 
poses, in conformity with a solicitation made by the Nicaraguan 
Government, fo take such steps as are most convenient to protect 
its interests and to insure peace, taking in consideration that every 
one of the Centra] American Republics has solemnly compromised 
itself with this government to maintain the Washington Conven- 
tion. 

"It has pained me to learn, although I may say that I have not 
given any credit to the rumor, that the present revolution in Nica- 
ragua is being supported from Salvadoran territory. 

"I deem it hardly necessary to say to Your Excellency that Sal- 
vador will have a chance to vindicate its policy in conformity with 
the Washington Convention. William H. Taft." 



82 

ADDENDA I. 

"San Salvador, Sept. 23, 1912. 
"Legation of El Salvo-dor, Washing ion, D. C: 

"Please place before Mr. Under-Secretary Wilson, in a verbal 
conference, the exact copy of this dispatch, begging him to bring 
it to the attention of His Excellency, President Taf t, for whose 
consideration it is forwarded. The dispatch is as follows : 

" 'It is understood here that the naval forces occupying Nica- 
raguan territory have engaged in military operations against the 
revolutionists at Granada. So grave an event seriously compromises 
the other Central American governments. In order to safeguard 
my own, and fulfilling lofty duties to humanity, which I feel sure 
will find a generous echo in the President, please suggest to him 
the proposition that in order to avoid greater bloodshed in our 
brother nation a propitious opportunity is presented to the Ameri- 
can government to lend its high offices to humanity by aiding my 
government, either by joint or separate action, in placing Don 
Salvador Calderon in charge (provisionally) of the supreme power 
in Nicaragua, while constitutional order is being re-established by 
pacific and legal means. Sr. Calderon is a person of blameless ante- 
cedents, illustrious and honorable, a person likewise acceptable to 
the American government and a friend of President Diaz, who has 
indicated to my government that he would accept him in such a 
capacit}'. My government promises to exert moral pressure upon 
the rebellious chiefs for the acceptance of Sr. Calderon in agree- 
ment with that government, which would thus lend a service, un- 
forgetable in the memory of the Central American people, avoiding 
the profound upheaval which the gravity of the events has caused 
in this country, which likewise would deeply reverberate in the 
moral opinion of the whole continent. Explain to the President my 
good intentions in this grave emergency, which I was not expecting, 
because the Department of State had indicated to you that Ameri- 
can naval action would be limited to guaranteeing foreign lives and 
property and safeguarding the American Legation and Consulate in 
that country — a manifestation which wo received with complacency, 
the more so as it was confirmed by Minister Weitzel to our Minister 
in Nicaragua. 

The unavoidable consequences which the continuation of this 
useless conflict in the form and character in which it to-day presents 



83 

itself would bring to Central America cannot escape the exalted 
penetration of the President, and you will make one more effort in 
the mode proposed by interesting deeply the humanitarian senti- 
ments of the head of that government. 

"I see with regret that the agreements entered 'into in Washing- 
ton by the Central American delegates, under the mere attitude 
of good offices and generous hospitality which Ex-President Eoose- 
velt lent them, appear to be invoked in favor of the position lately 
assumed. El Salvador being a contracting party, judges it as its 
undeniable duty — a duty which becomes a right when it deals with 
the interpretation of the facts which directly affect it — to declare 
to President Taft, in the frankest and most respectful manner, 
that the good offices which the United States and Mexico lent to 
the Central American Plenipotentiaries are ever remembered with 
pleasure, but that they ought to be limited to what they intentionally 
signify. The firm relations of cordial friendship which bind El 
Salvador to the American government authorize me to exercise this 
right in the most courteous and well-intentioned way.' 

"You can add pertinent explanations concerning the contents of 
these instructions to the Secretary of State, appealing to h's friendly 
courtesy to convey them to the high functionary for whom they 
are designed. 

(Signed) "Manuel E. Araujo." 



84 




DR. JOSE MADRIZ, 
Former ['resident of Nicaragua. 



JOSE MADRIZ. 

Jose Madriz was bom in the City of Leon, Nicaragua, C. A., 
February 21, I860. 

Mis parents were poor and honorable. In spite of their poverty, 
they resolved in give their son a literary education and Jose" re- 
ceived his elementary, high school and professional training in 
the city of his birth. The deficiency in his school training, due to 
the adequate educational facilities, was more than counterbalanced 
by his mental talents and a close application to his studies, 



85 



He was fortunate in that his intellectual training came at a 
period in the country's history when the illuminating ideas of the 
great patriot, Maximo Jerez, a noted jurist and philosopher, were 
in the ascendancy. 

His vocation as a lawyer was crowned with marked success, and 
in 1893, when only 27 years of age, he was summoned by President 
Zelaya to the exalted position of Secretary of State, a position 
which he administered with brilliancy for several years. 

During this incumbency he was sent to the Atlantic coast of 
Nicaragua in the capacity of Executive Delegate, charged with an 
important political mission. Difficulties had arisen in that terri- 
tory, known as the "Mosquito Reserve," as a result of the stablish- 
ment of a protectorate over it by His British Majesty. As a re- 
sult, largely, of his intelligent labors, all of that coast was re- 
incorporated as a part of the Nicaraguan Republic, and an era 
of development in that section was immediately begun and has 
continued since in an astounding manner. For this reason Dr. 
Madriz, perhaps more than anyone else, deprecated the proposal 
of the revolutionists of 1909 to declare the Atlantic coast an in- 
fieneudent republic, or, rather, ostensibly independent, for the 
truth is that, if such severance had occurred, it would have been 
subjected to a protectorate by a foreign powei 

On account of internal political dissensions Dr. Madriz had to 
resign "his position as Secretary of State in 1895. However, he was 
later restored to his elevated position in fulfillment of conditions 
imposed upon President Zelaya at a conference between the execu- 
tive and the Liberals, of Leon, as a means of averting civil strife. 
This, unfortunately, did not hnvp thp 'dpsirpd rp.saiH, and Zelaya 
faced a revolution. 

During the several years that Dr. Madriz served Zelaya he could 
and did do so conscientously, for Zelaya then was regarded as one 
of the best presidents in Latin- America, honest, a respecter of the 
laws of the country, and, indeed, practically a liberal ruler. 

When the revolution referred to broke out, Madriz was in its 
ranks. The revolution was unsuccessful and Madriz emigrated 
to Salvador, where he resided until 1907. There he married Miss 
Hortensia Cobos. Pour children resulted from this union, two 
sons, Ricardo and Jose, and two daughters, Hortensia and- Mercedes. 



86 

Although he did not accumulate a fortune in his law practice in 
Salvador, his family lived in comfort and always moved in the best 
social circles. 

In Salvador, and in Honduras and Guatemala (in which latter 
two republics he lived for a short while), Dr. Madriz's eminent 
culture, intellectual achievements, and courteous manners attracted 
to him the friendship and esteem of all those who had the good 
fortune of his acquaintance. His brilliant eloquency made it a 
rare pleasure, indeed, to hear Dr. Madriz speak. 

In 1907, notwithstanding his political animosity toward Zelaya. 
the hostility shown by other Central American Presidents to the 
Liberal Party in Nicaragua prompted Madriz to return to Nicara- 
gua and lend his earnest co-operation to the efforts to avoid an 
invasion, which then appeared to be and, in fact proved, inevitable. 
Dr. Madriz, like other adversaries of Zelaya, was prompted by 
high motives and a patriotic desire to assist Zelaya. The diffi- 
culties confronting the adjoining republics made Dr. Madriz and 
others of the patriotic who were strong believers in the necessity for 
a union of the Central Americau republics, to think, in the pos- 
sibility of the union at least, of the three republics which had made 
the last effort to effect it. Madriz was disillusioned, however, when 
Zelaya sank far below his estimations by. abandoning the cherished 
hope of the union, and preferring to content himself with a change 
in the executive power of Honduras. This change of president in 
the neighboring republic, however, resulted in no benefit to either 
Honduras or Nicaragua, due to grave mistakes made by Zelaya as 
a result of his narrow-mindedness in those circumstances. 

Thus, disillusioned and disappointed, Madriz again left Nicara- 
gua, this time, however, without having had any political rupture 
with Zelaya. He went to Honduras with the intention of making 
this country his permanent homo. Circumstances unforeseen, how- 
ever, compelled a change of his plans later. 

The governments of Latin-American accepted the proposal of 
a: Central American peace conference in Washington and Madriz 
was appointed head of the Nicaragnan delegation. Tn this confer- 
ence, in accord with the Honduran delegates, he advocated the 
restoration of his old country, or nation, in the union of the five 
republics, which had been his constant dream. These efforts were 
again in vain and the conference bore no practical results. 



87 

Although representing Zelaya's government, Madriz without 
exception made proposals, and accepted such, which had for their 
object the enforcement and observance of law in all Central Amer- 
ican countries, and, in truth, it must be admitted that Zelaya 
never failed to support the acts of Madriz even if his suggestions 
and advice frequently were inimical to the personal interests of the 
rulers, who were wont to consider their word as the law. Un- 
fortunately, most of the tentative steps taken in line with these 
suggestions were eventually rejected by the conference. 

One of the results of this Washington conference was the estab- 
lishment of the Central American Court of Justice at Cartago, 
Costa Eica. Dr. Madriz was appointed 'a judge of this court by 
the Mcaraguan Congress. Upon his return from Washington Dr. 
Madriz remained in Costa Eica, attending to his duties in connec- 
tion with this Court until December, 1909, when he was summoned 
by the Nicaraguan Congress to take the presidency of the country, 
Zelaya having decided to tender his resignation. 

We were justified in expecting an era of peace in Nicaragua, 
under the administration of President Madriz, because he had 
the confidence of the Zelaya faction in Nicaragua, and should have 
had the confidence and support of the revolutionists, like many 
of whom he had been for several years an exile from the country 
and a pronounced adversary of the Zelaya administration. But, 
local jealousies and other causes, which do not properly belong 
here, were responsible for a continuance of the most disastrous civil 
war the country ever witnessed. 

Those of us who had an intimate acquaintance with Madriz, 
and who realized that peace could not be soon effected, were loath 
to see him accept the presidency, knowing that, because of his 
pacific nature, he was unfitted for the difficult task which was 
then present. Madriz, in time of peace, undoubtedly would have 
proved one of the best presidents Latin-American ever knew. His 
character and training, however, did not fit him for an epoch of 
war. A man of profound feelings of amity and peace, he was not- 
capable of exercising strong tactics against his enemies, notwith- 
standing he knew they were conspiring against him. This gave 
courage to his adversaries. In fact, he was a president of whom 
they were unafraid. He was not a man willing to order the spilling 
of the blood of his brothers to maintain himself in power. 



88 

In this connection, we do not wish: it to appear that we would 
censure hm. He did right, as his desire was to leave to his chil- 
dren a name unbesmirched with sanguinary acts. However, for 
the sake of his country, it would have been better if he had spared 
himself for other and better opportunities. 

The Madriz government, weighted down by the heavy hand of a 
foreign government, foresaw that a continuation of the civil strife 
inherited from the Zelaya regime, would not result beneficially 
to his native land, and with a firm belief that he had done all pos- 
sible in defense of the national honor, Dr. Madriz left the country 
and went to Mexico, where he had many sincere friends, acquired 
during his visit to that republic as a delegate of the Peace Confer- 
ence in Washington, to thank President Porfirio Diaz for the em- 
ployment of his good offices in the interest of Central American 
peace. 

It was the purpose of Dr. Madriz to establish himself in Mexico 
City in the practice of law, hoping to find there the peace of 
mind which was denied him in Central America, but death put an 
end to his plans for the future. An unconquerable, but sudden 
disease prostrated him* for a few days, and on the 1-ith of May. 
1911, he died; yet in the memory of all good, patriotic Central 
Americans he lives. 

In Nicaragua his demise was lamented in almost every home and 
even his political enemies, who, during his life, had not hesitated 
to defame him, bowed in grief before the altar of his memory. 
The National Assembly of Nicaragua honored Madriz's memory by 
giving his name a place in the "Hall of Fame** of that country 
This honor conferred upon him is proof that Madriz embodied the 
national cause. 

May this posthumous honor result, at least, in consolation for 
the family of the departed and for those of us who had the honor 
and distinction of his friendship. We trust it will encourage Iho 
Central American youth to live up to the lofty example set by this 
great patriot. 

P. Bonilla. 
New Orleans, October, 191?. 



ESTADOS UNiDOS 



Y LA 



AMERICA LATINA 



" DIPLOMACIA DEL DOLLAR' 



NUEVA ORLEANS, DICIEMBRE DE 1912 



JUAN LEETS 



NEW ORLEANS, LA. 

The L. Graham Oo.. Printers. 

19 12. 



PROLOGO. 



Al Pueblo Americano: 

Al Senado de Estados Unidos: 

A los Miembros de la Cdmara de Representantes: 

Inspirado por el profundo sentimiento de justicia de que estart 
penetrados los ciudadanos de la gran Eepiiblica Americana desde 
su fundacion, y con absoluta confianza en la integridad de los 
Eepresentantes del pueblo en el Congreso de Estados Unidos, 
presento este humilde momorial en nombre de los ciudadanos de las 
Eepublicas de Centro America, que han sufrido las consecuencias de 
la violenta e inicua politica del Departamento de Estado, bajo la 
direccion de Philander C. Knox. 

La publicacion de este memorial tiene dos fines: 

1°. — Poner en conocimiento del pueblo americano y de los miem- 
bros del Senado y Camara de Eepresentantes algunos detalles de 
la llamada "DOLLAR DIPLOMACY" de Mr. Knox, tal como ha 
s-ido aplicada a las Republicas de la America Central. 

2°. — Aprovechar toda la influencia que en si mismos tienen los 
hechos que presentamos en favor de la restauracion de los vinculos 
de verdadera amistad entre los pueblos de la America Latina y 
Estados Unidos, que la ruinosa y egoista politica de Mr. Knox 
ha destrozado 

En esta labor he sido ayudado por algunos de los mas notables 
hombres de Estado de Centro America, trabajando todos al impulso 
del patriotismo y con un profundo y sincere deseo de establecer 
la justicia en donde la iniquidad, con futiles pretextos, ha produci- 
do no mas que la ruina y devastacion, el desconcierto, la discordia 
y el rencor. En este memorial, lo mismo que en la declaracion 
que personalmente di ante el Comite del Senado que practica 1.7 
investigacion de los asuntos relativos a la revolucion de Nicaragua, 
he procurado comprobar con documentos todos mis cargos; y, en 
ningun caso, he hecho una aflrmacion que no encierre en mi con- 
cepto la mas absoluta verdad. 

Aunque los hechos que presento demuestran que los grandes y 



lundamentales principios de libertad y justicia de la madre de 
las Eepiiblicas, han sido desconocidos o enredados en las mallas 
de las falsas doctrinas proclamadas por el Departamento de Estado, 
los ciudadanos de las pequenas Eepiiblicas del Sur, tienen todavia 
eompleta confianza en el pueblo de este gran pais, y hacen esta 
formal apelacion ante sus Eepresentantes, en la esperanza de que, 
despertando interes en conocer a fondo la conducta de Mr. Knox, 
resultara una escrupulosa investigacion, y en consecuencia la 
justicia. 

Aunque el resultado de la reciente election de Presidente y 
Eepresentantes al Congreso asegura un proximo cambio en el per- 
sonal del Departamento de Estado, trayendo consigo un marcado 
cambio en la politica que este Gobierno seguira en sus relaciones 
exteriores, la injusticia liecha a Centro America por medio de la 
perniciosa Dollar Diplomacy, ha sido demasiado grande para que 
pueda quedar desconocida por quienes sientan patrioticos impulsos. 
Por esta razon nosotros no queremos olvidar lo pasado y dejar al 
}>ueblo de los Estados Unidos en la ignorancia de los nocivos planes 
y erroneos actos que han sido realizados bajo el manto de la diplo- 
ic acia. 

En este memorial he procurado en detalle una verdadera descrip- 
tion de la intervention del Departamento de Estado en los ne- 
gocios de Centro America y los resultados de la politica Knox. 
En breve resumen, nos proponemos demostrar : 

1. — Bajo pretexto de dar auxilio a las pequenas Eepiiblicas de 
Centro America, el Departamento de Estado ha usado lo que se ha 
complacido en llama r "Dollar Diplomacy." para forzar sob re aque- 
llos paises contratos de emprestito que darian a un grupo de ban- 
queros de Wall Street, no solo millones de dollars adquiridos ile- 
gitimamente, sino tambien oportunidades para inmensas y perni- 
ciosas especulacioin is \ absoluta libertad para explotar los vastos 
recursos de aquellas tierras, y hasta para controlar la Admistracion 
ptiblica. 

2. — Los termifios de los contratos de emprestito que el Secretario 
Knox se ha empefiado tan asidnamente en imponer sobre tTicaragua 
y Honduras, son viciosos; y cuando sean revelados en sus detalles 
al pueblo americano, provocaran indignation y en6rgicas protestas. 

3. — iLa politica de Knox al tratar con Centro America ha pro- 
vocado un manifiesto sentimiento antiamericanista en donde antes 



no habia mas que sentimientos de amistad hacia el pueblo de esta> 
gran Republica. Disturbios, revolucion y pobreza han sido los 
perniciosos resultados. 

4. — En una ocasion Mr. Knox ha dado apoyo a una revolucion 
en Nicaragua, en otra ha adversado la revolucion y sacrificado las 
vidas de soldados americanos para conservar en el poder a un 
usurpador y traidor, que es un pobre instrumcnto del Seeretario para 
la realizacion de su plan de entregar a Centro America a los banque- 
ros de New York. 

5. — Mr. Knox condeno a Zelaya, un dietador en Nicaragua, y lo 
derroco del poder, colocando en el un Gobierno que ha traido la 
pobreza en vez de la prosperidad, la discordia on vez de la armonia, 
el despotismo en vez de la libertad; y por otro lado, ha apoyado 
constantemente al peor tirano y dietador que la America Latina 
haya conocido, al Presidente de Guatemala. Manuel Estrada Ca- 
brera. 

6. — Con pleno conocimiento del Departamento de Estado se han 
permitido expediciones filibusteras que han salido para Centro 
America de los puertos del Golfo, y en una ocasion, el conocimiento 
de la proxima salida de una de esas expediciones fue usado para 
hacer presion sobre el Presidente de Honduras con el fin de ha- 
cerle aceptar el emprestito Morgan, que. es liien sabido, era resistido 
por dicho Presidente, y fue rechazado por el Congreso y el pueblo 
de Honduras. 

7- — Por sus personales designios los financieros americanos desea- 
ron la intervencion en la reciente guerra civil de Nicaragua, y. 
por otro lado han querido para el Gobierno de Estados Unidos la 
politica de no intervencion en Mexico. . En Nicaragua solo han sido 
matados dos americanos en combate al servicio del Gobierno, sin 
oue en ningun otro caso hayan sufrido dano en sus personas o 
propiedades, ni siquiera estuviesen en peligro. En Mexico gran 
numero de americanos h'an sido intencaonaimente matados, muchos 
mas han sido heridos, otros han sido secuestrados para pedir rescate 
por ellos, y millones de dollars de propiedades americanas han sido 
destruidos. En Nicaragua Mr. Knox intervino: en Mexico profesa 
la politica de no intervencion. Estos son hechos, de que se deduce 
algo que perjudica el buen nombre de Estados Unidos. 

8. — Los hechos referentes a la intervencion del Departamento de- 
Estado en Centro America han sido cuidadosamente ocultados al * 



6 

pueblo americano, o han sido falseados o exagerados. Algunas 
veces se han dado en Washington eemioficialmente a la prensa in- 
formaciones exclusivamente para el uso del publico americano, en 
las cuales se ha variado en absoluto la verdad de los hechos, general- 
mente con el proposito de preparar la opinion publica en favor de 
la actitud de Mr. Knox y de sus colaboradores, por medio de tales 
falsedades. 

Entre los documentos que ahora presento, que son parte de los 
que puse a disposicion del Comite del Senado, algunos de los mas 
importantes fueron depositados en mis manos por Dona Hortensia 
C. de Madriz, viuda del Ex-Presidente de Nicaragua, Dr. Don. 
Jose Madriz. El. Dr. Madriz, al ocurrir su prematura muerte en 
Mayo de 1911, estaba empehado en la preparacion de una historia 
de las relaciones del Departamento de Estado con la revolucion de 
Nicaragua en 1909 ; y la seiiora de Madriz, deseosa de que los hechos 
y documentos coleccionados por el no quedasen imitiles, resolvio 
entregarmelos para hacerlos conocer del pueblo y Congreso ameri- 
canos, no solo para la vinclicacion de la memoria de aquel gran honi- 
bre de Estado, sino por el beneficio que el pueblo americano reportara 
del conocimiento de los actos perniciosos cometidos por ciertos 
i'uncionarios del Gobierno de Estados Unidos. 

Al dar mi testimonio en el mes de Octubre ante el Sub-Comite 
presidido en El Paso por el Honorable Senador Fall, oncontre al 
Comite ansioso por hacer luz en la oonducta del sefior Knox y sus 
agentes hacia las Eepublicas de Centro America. Coloque en 
manos del Senador Fall muchos de los mas importantes documentos 
que traje a este pais, y quede satisfecho de que la causa de una 
debil nacion, mi pais adoptive estaba en buenos manos. — En mi 
viaje a El Paso me acompan6 como consejero legal el notable 
jurisconsulto hondureho, Doctor Don Angel Ugarte. 

Aunque nacido en Rnsia, soy centroamericano de corazon. En 
mi patria adoptiva lie sido honrado con importantes posiciones 
gubernamentales. Es la cuna de mi esposa e hijos; y por ello es 
mi mas vivo deseo hacer cuanto este a mi alcance por asegurar su 
prosperidad y el imperio en ella de la lib'ertad y de todos los bene- 
ficios de las instituciones republicanas. He dedicado a esta causa 
todos mis esfuerzo>. y siempre la considerare como sagrada. 

New Orleans, Diciembre de 1912. 

Juan Leets. 



LA DIPLOMACIA DEL DOLLAE. 

La politica que el Secretario de Esta'do, Mr. Philander C. Knox, 
ha aplicado a la America Latina, durante la Presidencia de Mr. 
Taft, ha sido denominada por sus mantenedores "Dollar Diplo- 
macy." En este escrito nos proponemos estudiar ese fcistema de 
politica y sus funestas consecuencias para los paises interesados. 

Antes queremos echar una ojeakla sobre la politica que anterior- 
mente habia puesto en practica el Gobierno Americano en relacion 
con las demas Kepublicas del continente. 

Durante la mayor parte 'de la vida de esta gran nacion, ha pre- 
valecido en el animo de sus h'ombres de Estado, y en la opinion 
general del pueblo, el sistema de no intervencion en los asuntos de 
los demas paises. Por esta razon han podido los EE. ITU. crecer y 
desarrollarse de manera tan asombrosa, siendo su Gobierno durante 
mas de un siglo el mas barato entre todos los del mundo. Al pro- 
ceder asi se han conformado con los preceptos del padre de la 
patria, de George Washington, quien, con su clarividencia, percibio 
la grandeza que habia de alcanzar su pais, pero haciendola depender 
del complimiento de tan sabio consejo que dio a sus contemporaneos 
y a las futuras generaciones. 

Doctrina Monroe. 

James, Monroe, otro de los grandes hombres de Estado america- 
nos, conformandose con aquei Salvador principio, comprendio que, 
para poder mantenerlo en practica, era necesario impedir que las 
naciones europeas fundasen en America grandes imperios. A raiz 
de la independencia de las naciones latino americanas, se organizo 
la Santa Alianza, en virtud de la cual los monarcas absolutos euro- 
peos se comprometieron a enviar sus ejercitos a reconquistar para 
Espana las que acababan de ser sus colonias. El restablecimiento 
del regimen monarquico en America, bajo la proteccion de los 
grandes Poderes, habria sido una constante amenaza para EE. UU., 
habria hecho a la larga imposible su vida republicana, y, sobre todo, 
habria h'echo imposible la politica aconsejada por Washington, y 
obligado al pais a mantener un gran, ejercito permanente de mar 
y tierra, que es el cancer de la vieja Europa. Monroe, gran estadista 



8 

y gran patriota, lo comprendio bien, y notified al mimdo su famosa 
doctrina "America para los Americanos/' que entonces fue muy 
claramente entendida., por mas que despues haya sido tan tergi- 
yersada, y por lo tanto tan discutida. Entonces no cupo duda de 
que Monroe se propuso asegurar la independencia y la tranquilidad 
de su propio pais y de todas las republicas del eontinente; pero a 
nadie se le ocurrio, y menos a su generoso autor, que alguu 
dia podria ser empleada como una amenaza para la autonomia de las 
naeiones latino amerieanas que el se propuso proteger; que es lo 
que despues ha sueedido y nos proponemos demostrar en el curso 
de este estudio. 

Panamericanismo. 

Como un desarrollo de la doctrina de Monroe, y para facilitar 
su cumplimiento, Mr. James G-. Blaine, Secretario de Estado bajo 
la Administracion Harrison, inicio la idea del panamericanismo, y 
propuso a las dermis naeiones del eontinente la reunion de la 
prim era conferencia de Delegados de todas ellas, que se reunio en 
Washington en 1S89. De esta primera conferencia surgio la Oficina 
Internacional de las Eepublicas amerieanas, encargada de organizar 
las futuras conferencias, que periodicamente han venido verifican- 
•dose, con el fin de lograr el acereamiento de las dos razas, y en 
consecuencia, el de las naeiones que las representan. 

Otro grande hombre de Estado, Mr. Elihu Root, al llegar a la 
Secretaria de Estado bajo la Administracion Eoosevelt, se apodero 
de esa idea y se convirtio en su mas entusiasia ]u'opagandista. 
Concurrio personalmente a la Conferencia celebrada en Eio de 
Janeiro en 1906, visitando la Eepublica Argentina, Chile y otros 
paises, y mas tarde, en 1907, Meixco, en donde pronuncio famoeisi- 
mos discursos, que hicieron en los pueblos latino americanos la mas 
grata impresion, creando en ellos grandes simpatias hacia Estados 
Unidos. El senor Eoot, en su propio nomhre y como Secretario 
de Estado, garantizo que la politica de su Gobierno era de fraterni- 
dad hacia los pueblos y Gobiernos de la America Latina, y que la 
nacion mas pequefia de ellas como la mas grande, tendrian asegu- 
radas su independencia y su autonomia, a la. vez que la integridad 



de su territorio. Iguales declaraciones ratifico ante la Conferencia 
Centroamericana de paz celebrada en Washington en fines de 1907.* 
Si esa politica que el Secretario Koot mantuvo firmemente hacia 
aquellos paises se hubiese sostenido, el credito del Gobiemo ameri- 
cano ante ellos hubiera ido en aumento, y no seria, como es hoy, 
objeto de la mayor desconfianza y causa de constante alarma, 
hasta el punto de estar convirtiendo en mas de alguno en odio el 
carino que antes se tenia por el nombre de anglo americano; por 
mas que nosotros reconocemos que no es la culpa de este pueblo 
sino de su Gobierno. En vez de seguir aquella politica tan sana, 
de la cual con razon podria esperarse la armonia, la prosperidad y 
el bienestar de todo el continente, se introdujo una de doblez y de 
falsia y de proteccion a especulaciones financieras. Mexico, Santo 
Domingo y Centro America son en la actualidad las victimas del 
nuevo rumbo que ha seguido el Departamento de Estado de EE. 
TJU. Aunque nuestro principal objeto es hacer luz en la cuestion 
de Centro America, y especialinente de Nicaragua, por considerarlo 
todo intimamente ligado, haremos una breve resena de lo refereute 
a los otros paises mencionados. 

* Ya escrito lo que dice el texto, han llegado a nuestras manos 
pcri6dicos de Centro America en que esta reproducido en espafiol un 
discurso pronunciado en Bstados Unidos por el seftor Root, que, por 
sus terminos. nos inclinamos a oreer que es apocrifo. En el declara que 
Estados Unidos son la Roma Moderna, '-'colocada por Dios para actuar 
de ARBITRO no solo en los destinos de toda la America, sino en Europa 
y en Asia." Declara que su pais tiene el destino manifiesto de controlar 
toda la America, faltando solo determinar los medios para realizarlo. 
Declara como frontera natural del territorio de esta Republican el 
Canal de Panama, y que en la segunda mitad del siglo XX causara 
extraneza que no se haya redondeado su marpa comprendiendo Mexico, 
Centro America y todas las Antlllas, siendo solo cuesti6n de tiempo el 
ver flotar en esos territorios la bandera norteamericana; pero al mismo 
tiempo declara a los latino americanos ineptos para la vida republicana, 
indignos de la ciudadania yanlcee, destinandolos asi, a desempenar en 
manos de sus compatriotas el papel de ilotasi, porque las dos razas son 
antitetica's, inamalgamables, separadas por un abismo. Dice que para hacer 
la anexi6n tienen poder bastante, faltando solo una resolucion conjunta 
del Consrreso; y pronostica que eso se hara, sea de cualquiera de los 
tres partidos contendientes el nuevo Presidente. 

Repetimos que no concebimos que quien se ha captado las simpatfas 
del continente americano por su levantado panamericanismo, sea autor 
de los conceptos anotados; y menos que el grande hombre de Estado 
lanzase tan imprudente reto, no solo a la America, sino a todas las 
naciones del mundo. amenazando a muchas con arrebatarles sus pose- 
siones en el mar Caribe. 

Tenemos confianza en que al leer el sefior Root estas llneas, escritas 
por quien ha sentido por §1 la mas profunda admiraci6n, se apresurara 
a tranquilizar a la America Latina, principalmente, protestando contra 
la autenticidad del discurso que su prensa le atribuye; o dara la versi6n 
autentiea del mismo, si, hubiese sido alterado. 

El no haber visto en la prensa de este pais publicado ni comentado 
tan importante como trascendental documento, nos inclina a creer que 
no estamos equivocados al considerarlo ap^ierifo. 



10 

Eevoluciones en Mexico. 

Ese pais, bajo la dilatada Administracion del General Don Por- 
firio Diaz, habia alcanzado un alto grado de progreso y de prosperi- 
dad, al amparo de la paz, que duro mas de treinta anos. No ado- 
lanto, es cierto, en materia de educacion politica del pueblo, y de 
practica de publicas libertades, siendo esto el justo cargo que puede 
liacerse al serior Diaz, porque no preparo a los mexicanos para 
apreciar y sostener su fructuosa labor, que se ha desmoronado al 
empuje del primer huracan revolucionario, que aun esta destrozando 
aquella nacion. 

Hasta 1909 la Administracion en EE. UU. batia palm as al senor 
Presidente Diaz por su modo de gobernar, presentandolo como mo- 
delo a las demas Eepublicas del Sur; por lo eual, el haber caido 
en desgracia ante el Departamento de Estado, no debe atribuirse 
a su celo en favor de la practica de las instituciones democraticas. 
No conocemos a fondo la causa del eambio, pero podemos conje- 
turarla. En fines de 1909 estallo en Nicaragua una revolucion 
contra el Presidente J. Santos Zelaya, por quien el Secretario Knox 
tenia gran aversion, al punto de forzarle a resignar el Poder y a 
salir de su pais, circunstancias en las cuales el Presidente Diaz 
mostro a Zelaya sus simpatias, hasta brindarle uno de sus vapores 
de guerra para trasladarse a Mexico. Esto llego a provocar un 
incidente 'diplomatico, que aunque parecio satisfactoriamente termi- 
nado, debe creerse que dejo profundo resentimiento en el sehor 
Knox, a juzgar por los sucesos posteriores. 

En 1910 estallo en Mexico un movimiento revolucionario, loca- 
lizado al principio, pero que fue extendiendose rapidamente por 
todo el pais. Ese movimiento conto con capital y elementos de 
guerra suficientes, porque la frontera de EE. UU. estaba practica- 
mente abierta para introducir estos, y el dinero americano abundo 
tn favor do la revolucion. Entonces el Gobierno americano llev6 
n la frontera niillares de soldados, y movilizo una poderosa escuadra 
con nbjeto declarado de llevarla a los puertos de Mexico; y todo 
dejaba entender que se pensaba en una intervencion armada, funda- 
da tn los danos que la guerra causaba a las personas y bienes de 
los ciudadanos americanos, y que, para mantener el pretexto, se 
trataba eon tanta benevolencia a los revolucionarios. Mas, ya sea 
por la accion en contrario del Congreso americano, ya sea por el 



11 

■convencimiento de que la invasion seria la serial para la conclusion 
de la guerra civil, provooando la union de todos los mexicanos en 
defensa de su patria, es el hecho que no hubo tal intervencion. El 
gobierno del seiior Diaz cayo; pero desgraciadamente no termino 
con eso el estado revolucionario. De entre las mismas fllas de los 
vencedores resultaron descontentos, que continuaron la lucha, la 
cual, con alternativas de buena o mala suerte, se sostiene todavia 
para desgracia de aquella tierra. En esta segunda epoca revolu- 
cionaria la conducta del Departamento 'de Estado ha sido entera- 
mente contraria a la anterior. Hoy tiene en la frontera solo unos 
centenares de soldados; y sin embargo han sido bastantes para 
hacer efectiva la neutralidad del territorio americano. La revolu- 
cion esta hoy positivamente privada de elementos de guerra y de 
toda clase de recursos que de tierra americana pudiera sacar, porque 
se persigue y castiga con severidad a todo violador de neutralidad, 
dandose fiel cumplimiento a una proclamacion del Presidents Taft 
tendente a prevenir tales violaciones. Y hasta se ha concedido el 
paso por territorio americano a fuerzas del Gobierno mexicano, para 
ir a combatir a los rebel des. 

Este contraste que hacemos notar entre las dos epocas revolu- 
cionarias, ha dado lugar a creer que la Administracion en este 
pais no ha tenido simpatias por determinado partido o persona en 
el vecino, sino empeho en prolongar la lucha para fines ulteriores, 
•que felizmente no se realizaran, porque hay razon para esperar un 
oiimbio radical en la politica hacia la America latina en el nuevo 
periodo presidencial. 

Por nuestra parte, al hacer esta referenda a la situacion de 
Mexico, no tenemos el proposito de pronunciarnos en favor de uno 
u otro bando de los contendientes, sino hacer notar la inconsecuencia 
de la Administracion americana, y la doblez con que ha procedido, 
que quedara como punto de referenda al tratar de su proceder 
en Centro America, 

Docteina Knox. 

La doctrina Monroe, como antes hemos indicado 1 , fue en su origen 
bien acogida por los pueblos' latino americanos; pero, cuando mas 
tarde se ha querido ampliar en el sentido de significar el derecho 
de tutela de los Estados Unidos sobre las demas republicas del 



12 

Hemisferio, ha si do rechazada unanimemente por ellas su arbitraria 
y pemiciosa interpretation. Es unisona la voz de aquellos pueblos 
en decir : "Lo que nosotros veiamos de bueno en esa doctrina, era 
la garantia de nuestro dereeho a la vida; pero si hubiera de signi- 
ficar que nos protege contra las naciones de Euro-pa, para que los 
EE. UU. nos dominen a su sabor, no' encontramos en ella ningiin 
benefieio. No hay ninguna ventaja en ser salvados de las fauces 
del tigre para ser destrozados por las garras del leon." 

Y ultimamente, bajo la Administracion Taft, el Secretario de 
Estado, Mr. Knox, ha agregado al dereeho de tutela o tie policia, 
sobre las naciones del continente, el dereeho al protectorado finan- 
eiero, tomando a su cargo la administracion de sus rentas, especial- 
mente en Centro America, segun lo explicaremos en seguida. 

En su primer aho, el sehor Knox, parece que tuvo la vision clara 
de lo que podria salvar a aquellos paises, asegurando en ellos la 
paz, y con ella el progreso. Parece que tuvo el proposito de 
esforzarse en conseguir el reaparecimiento de la antigua nacion, 
Centro America, f ormada por los Estados de Guatemala, Honduras, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua y Costarrica, como el mejor medio, quizas 
el unico, para lograr aquel fin. Pero, si penso en eso como estadista, 
resurgio en el el hombre de negocios, y resolvio encomendar la 
pretendida tutela sobre aquellos paises a sindicados que se organi- 
zarian en Wall Street, para proceder a la explotacion de aquellas 
tierras, no en benefieio siquiera del pueblo norteamericauo, sino 
en el del grupo de banqueros privilegiados. a quienes se entregarian. 
El exanien de los negocios propuestos, siguiendo esa politica, bauti- 
zada con el nombre de "Dollar Diplomacy/' justifica nuestros 
asertos ; y vamos a hecer ese examen, aunque brevemente, como 
causa de las revolnciones en varios de los paises dondc se ha qnerido 
introducir o se ha ensayado, que son en general las repiiblicas que 
bana el mar C'aribe. 

Vamos a c.\|)oner la Doctrina Knox, tal como sus autores v man,- 
tenedores la presentan y defienden. El Presidente Taft en sus 
mensages, y el mismo y el Secretario Knox en discursos ante las 
Tiiivcisidnilcs y ante los electores, han declarado enfaticament^ que 
su politirea tiende a asegurar la paz y el progreso de las republicas 
latino amerieanas, Mistiiuyendo los dollars a las balasj: que, to- 
mando los agentes del CJobierno americano a su cargo la adminis- 



13 



tracion de las aduanas, se quitaria el principal aliciente para las 
revoluciones, suponiendo que estas obedecen solo al deseo de apo- 
derarse de las rentas publieas para enriquecerse sus autores: que 
su sistema ha sido ensayado con el mejor exito en Santo Domingo, 
en donde hace algunos anos que esta funcionando satisfactoria- 
mente : que los proyectos de emprestito estan concebidos en terminos 
los mas favorables para los paises que se trata de proteger; y, en lo 
general, ban endosado de manera absoluta los planes de explotaeion 
de aquellas tierras concebidos por los banqueros favoritos del De- 
partamento de Estado. 

Santo Domingo. 

Como la Administration americana abona su politica con la ex- 
periencia becha en Santo Domingo, queremos exaniinar, aunque sea 
a la ligera, la situacion de ese pais despues de que ha caido bajo el 
protectorado financiero del Gobierno amerieano. Desde hace mas 
de quince ahos un grupo de especuladores americanos celebro un 
contrato para el arreglo de la deuda externa de dicha nacion, 
teniendo por base el manejo de las aduanas por medio de los agentes 
del sindicado que se organizo al efecto. El negocio habria sido un 
completo fracaso para los especuladores, sino hubiesen logrado mas 
tarde interesar el Gobierno amerieano, imponiendo al efecto al Go- 
bierno de la isla un tratado.en virtud del cual haria el Presidente 
de EE, UU. el nombramiento de los colectores de las aduanas, para 
manejarlas a su discrecion, quedando a cargo del Colector General el 
servicio de la deuda extrangera. Los especuladores quedaron a 
cubierto de todo riesgo, porque desde aquel momento el cumpli- 
miento del convenio quedaba en verdad garantizado por el poder de 
EE. UU. 

Si el plan hubiese dado buen resultado, podria haber tenido 
alguna excusa en la circunstancia de que con el se detuvo la accion 
de varias naciones europeas que enviaron buques de guerra para 
colectar por la fuerza los creditos de sus nacionales; si bien para 
detener esa. accion habria bastado la aplicacion de la doctrina Mon- 
roe, tal como la han entendido notables publicistas sudamericanos, 
a la cabeza de los cuales aparece el muy notable senor Luis M. Drago 
que ha dado su nombre a una nueva doctrina. Pero el plan fue un 
fraoaso, al menos en relacion con el fin que ostentaron sus autores. 



14 

Es cierto que, por haber introducido mayor orden en la adminis- 
tration, el producto de la renta aumento considerablemente en los 
primeros ahos, si bien en los pcsteriores ha seguido su curso regular. 
En cuanto a honradez, la prensa americana ha dado cuenta de un 
gran escandalo relacionado con el Colector General. Y los otros 
lines que se perseguian, el buen servicio de la deuda extrangera y 
el mantenimiento de la paz, tampoco se han conseguido. Eespecto 
a lo primero, por ser mas autorizada, dejaremos la voz al Consejo de 
Tenedores de Bonos Extranjeros en Londres, que en su report 
correspondiente al ario de 1910, dice: "El Consejo tiene que declarar 
que hingunos pasos se han dado todavia para reparar la injusticia 
hecha a los tenedores de bonos ingleses de la deuda de Santo Do- 
mingo bajo el arreglo de 1908. Al tiempo de presentar las pro- 
puestas referentes a la deuda de Honduras en 1909, se did a 
entender al Consejo que la materia tendria pronta atencion; 
pero fuera 'de vagas indicaciones de que el asunto no se habia perdi- 
do de vista, ostensiblemente nada se ha liecho ; y por consiguiente, 
el credito exterior 'de Santo Domingo nada ha ganado, y se halla en 
peor situation que antes, porque ya no esta en manos de su propio 
Gobierno remediar el mal. 

Eespecto al manteninmiento de la paz, el fracaso ha sido mas 
completo. En el trascurso de los mencionados quince anos h'a 
habido dos Presidentes asesinados y una serie de revoluciones, de- 
bidas al descontento popular contra sus gobernantes, por ser instru- 
mento de un Poder extranjero. En los ultimos dos alios sobre todo, 
puede asegurarse que no ha gozado aquel infortunado pais de un 
momento de perfecta tranquilidad, no obstante que, o mas bien por 
eso mismo, los movimientos han sido sofocados por la presion de 
los buques americanos; y en los momentos actuales, esa presion 
no ba bastado, y ha sido despachada una verdadera expedicion, que 
todavia no se sabe si va a proteger al Gobierno o a los revoluciona- 
rios.* 

(j Porque entonces el Presidente Taf t y el Secretario Knox siguen 

♦La revoluci6n de Santo Domingo ha terminado, con intervencidn 
del Gobierno americano, cuyo Delegado se declan - ) en favor de ella. 
dando por resultado la ealda del Presidente Victoria, y la elevaci6n a 
la Presidencia del Arzobisps cat6lics. Es curioso que la diplomacia 
de un pafs en su maryorfa protestante, haya apoyado en aquel lugar la 
entrega del poder al jefe de la. iprlesia cat61ica. la mas intolerante de 
todas las sectas, que privara de la libertad relig-iosa, tan sagrada en 
Kstados T'nidos, no s61o a los nativos, sino tambien a. los extranjeros. 
Este es uno de los llamados beneficios de la Dollar Diplomacy. 



1*1 



entonando canticos en favor de su intervencion en Santo Domingo, 
y siguen presentandola como modelo para ejercer igual accion en 
los demas paises? No pueden creer de buena fe lo que afirman, 
porqne los hechos, a la vista del mundo, est an desmintiendo sus 
palabras. 



Ahora examinemos los resultados de la benevola y fraternal in- 
fluencia de esa politica en los paises de Centro America donde se 
lia intentado o logrado introducir. 

COSTAKEICA. 

Hace unos cuatro anos qne se celebro un contrato entre el Go- 
bierno costarricence y un sindicado de banqueros de New York 
sobre arreglo de la deuda extrangera y emision de un emprestito, 
con la consabida base de la entrega de las aduanas al Colector o 
colectores que nombrase el Presidente de EE. TJU., todo en forma 
muy semejante al plan de Santo Domingo, si bien no figuraba como 
parte contratante el Gobierno americano. El Congieso costarricence 
rechazo aquel contrato como atentatorio a la soberania nacional. 
Despues se celebro con Mr. Minor C. Kieth, nno sustancialmente 
ignal en la parte financiera, pero sin mencionarse intervencion de 
Gobierno extranjero. Este fue aprobado por el Congreso. y esta en 
practica. No es nnestro proposito abonar este convenio, que quizas 
pudo haberse celebrado en mepores concliciones ; pero si podemos 
declarar que, por no contener ninguna estipulacion atentatoria a 
la soberania de Costarrica no ha producido irritacion en la opinion 
piiblica, que aun en aquel pais esencialmente pacifico se hubiera 
tra'ducido en trastornos. 

Guatemala. 

Por el mismo tiempo recibio el Gobierno de Guatemala propuestas 
de contrato de emprestito semejantes al rechazado por el Congreso 
de Costarrica, recomendadas por el Departamento de Estado, al 
menos en terminos generales. El Poder Ejecutivo no quiso asumir 
la responsabilidad de resolverlas y las paso al Congreso, el cual las 
devolvio sin discutirlas, encargando al Ejecutivo estudiarlas con 
el debido detenimiento y celebrar la que mejor le pareciese. Conocido 
el sistema despotico de gobierno en Guatemala, debemos hacer justi- 



16 

cia a su Presidente, reconociendo que con eso demostro no querer 
entrar en ese arreglo, aunque buscando la manera de demorarlo sin 
ponerse mal con el Departamento, sistema de moratorias que ha 
continuado hasta el momento presente; lo cual, si no le abona por 
su entereza de caracter, demuestra su prudencia y su deseo de 
conservar el poder. Al mismo tiempo ha logrado tener satisfecho 
al Departamento, secundando todos sus planes en las demas sec- 
ciones de Centro America, como lo haremos ver adelante. 

Hondukas. 

Casi simultaneamente con las proposieiones de emprestitos hechas 
a los dos paises mencionados, el Departamento de Estado, por 
medio de su Ministro en Tegucigalpa, insinuo al Gobierno de 
.Honduras la conveniencia de mandar representantes a Washington; 
con el fin de aprovechar la buena disposicion de un sindicado de 
banqueros de Wall Street para encargarse del arreglo de su deuda 
extranjera, suministrar fondos para obras de progreso y redimir 
la deuda interior ; asegurando que esas condiciones serian mas venta- 
josas para el pais que las convenidas entre dicho Gobierno y el 
Ministro ingles, representante de los tenedores de bonos. Vease el 
anexo A. 

Antes, el Departamento de Estado habia logrado ejercer su in- 
fluencia cerca del Foreign Office de Londres, para que anulara, 
como anulo, el arreglo antedicho. 

El Gobierno de Honduras mando comisionados a Washington y 
New York, quienes recibieron las proposiciones de los banqueros, 
basadas en en una convencion previa con el Gobierno americano, el 
cual asumiria la administracion de las aduanas hondurenas por 
medio de empleados que practicamente serian de nombramiento y 
remocion del Presidente de EE. ITU., y que on el hecho resultaban 
irresponsables. 

El emprestito seria de diez millones de dollars, al tipo de emision 
de 88%, con interns de 5% y 1% de amortizaci6n. De estoa millone? 
no habria de llegar a Honduras ni ol 10%, inclusive lo que ivia 
invertido en maquinaria, utiles y materiales de ferrocarril, que reprc- 
sentaria la mayor parte de ese 10%. Por las demas condiciones del 
negocio, en realidad significaba que Honduras haria no s61o el 
Bacrificio de su soberania, si no tambien el de sus rentas en beneficio 



17 

del grupo de banqueros, quedando aquel pais sujeto a vivir de la 
caridad de sus llamados protectores. Reducido a numeros el 
proyecto significaba para Honduras el pago en 40 arios de mas de 
26 millones de f dollars, en vez de ocho que habria debido pagar, 
segun el arreglo con el Ministro ingles, sin tener este peligros ni 
condiciones vergonzosas. Y, sin embargo, tanto el Presidente Taft 
como el Secretario Knox han proclamado que estaban tendiendo su 
mano generosa a aquellos paises para librarlos de una enorme deuda 
extrangera, cuando en realidad su accion significa el plan de colocar 
a aquellos pueblos en la imposibilidad de vivir con gobierno propio, 
para que se vean forzados a pedir como gracia la anexion o el pro- 
tectorado absolute. Y significa ademas que el Poder Ejectivo ameri- 
cano gobernaria en el hecho en aquellos paises, sin responsabilidad 
filguna ante su propio pueblo, pues llegado el caso la declinarja en 
el grupo de fmancieros sus aliados, contra quienes las leyes de EE. 
UU. nada podrian, y contra quienes las leyes de los paises oprimidos 
tampoco podrian nada, porque serian aplicadas bajo la influencia y 
poder efectivo de los mismos eulpables de cualquier abuso cometido, 
Tal proyecto se mantuvo secreto tanto aqui como en Honduras, 
pues el Presidente de aquel pais no dio cuenta de las proposiciones 
ni al mayor numero de sus propios Ministros, por exigencia del 
Departamento y de los banqueros. El representante de Honduras 
estuvo resistiendo la flrma del tratado y contrato propuestos, con 
instrucciones de su Gobierno, hasta que en el mes de Julio de 1910 
sobrevino una tentativa revolucionaria, por medio de una expedi- 
cion maritima en el Atlantico ; y, no obstante el celo que en otras 
ooasiones ha demonstrado la marina americana en tales casos, en 
esta sus buques brillaron por su ausencia. La revolucion fracaso 
en su principio; pero el Departamento la aprovecho para hacer 
comprender al gobernante de Honduras, ya por medio de sus Eepre- 
sentantes en Washington, ya por medio del Ministro americano en 
Tegucigalpa, que solo aceptando el arreglo financiero propuesto, se 
libraria de la repeticion de la tentativa, porque el Departamento se 
encargaria de impedirla o ahogarla. El Presidente de Honduras, 
General Miguel E. Davila, que a toda costa queria conservar el 
Poder, comenzo a variar sus instrucciones a su Agente financiero 
en New York, a la vez Enviado especial en Washington, General 
Don Juan E. Paredes, pero resistiendo todavia al compromiso de 



18 

la soberania. Fue preciso para que cediese que la prensa de este 
pais se encargara de haeer publico que si el Presidents Davila no 
aceptaba la negociacion, esta se haria de todos modos, porque la 
revolucion seria inevitable y su jefe estaba comprometido a 
aceptarla. 

Cuando el Presidente Davila pedia que se impidiese en EE. UU. 
la salida de la anunciada expedicion, quejandose a la vez de que 
•el Presidente de Guatemala estaba auxiliandola, se le contestaba 
indefectiblemente "Firme el arreglo ftnanciero." Por ultimo dio 
la orden de firmar la eonvencion y contrato de emprestito, orden 
que al principio resistio en absoluto el representante, pero que al tin 
cumplio, previa protesta, firmando la eonvencion el 10 de Enero, 
•cuando ya habia estallado el anunciado movimiento revolucionario 
y sido tornados dos puertos, pero negandose a firmar el contrato con 
los banqueros. Esta materia lia sido completamente puesta en 
claro por el senor Paredes en varios folletos que aqui ha publicado, 
y de los cuales reproducimos bajo el anexo B algunos documented 
importantes. 

Cuando la expedicion que salio de la costa americana llego a 
la de Honduras, despues de haber trasbordado cerca de la de Griiate- 
mala los elementos de guerra que el Presidente de aquel pais habia 
ofrecido. habia buques de guerra americanos en aquellas aguas, y 
no ejercieron ninguna accion par detener el movimiento. El 
crucero americano Tacoma abordo al buque revolucionario Hornet, 
que era el principal de la expedicion, para averiguar si habia violado 
la neutralidad ; pero su eapitan declaro que nada iregular encontro 
en el. Cuando la eonvencion fue firmada el Hornet fue capturado 
por el mismo crucero, pero despues que habia desembarcado todos 
Ins elementos de guerra. 

La eonvencion de emprestito fue improbada el ultimo de Enero 
casi por uuaniniirlad por el Congreso hondureno, a pesar de lo eual 
siguio exigiendo el Departamento la firma del contrato con los 
banqueros, el cual fue firmado en Febreero, no por el Senor Paredes, 
que fue removido, Bino por el Plenipotenciario hondureno perma- 
nente. Mas al ser improbada dicha convenci6n, volvio a ser mani- 
fiestamente parcial en favor de la revolucion la conducta de la 
marina americana, o mejor dicho, del Departamento de Estado. 

Cuando el Departamento ejerci6 ^-u mediaeion para llegar a la 



19 

paz, en nota que comunico a los contendientes, a su Ministro en 
Tegucigalpa y al jefe de la Escuadrilla, conteniendo las bases de 
su intervencion, declaro que Puerto Cortes debia ser Zona neutral; 
% en consecuencia el Capitan del Tacoma exigio que las fuerzas del 
Gobierno constituido desocuparan el puerto, y asi lo hicieron, 
quedando bajo la proteccion de los Consules extrangeros y de los 
buques de guerra, pero principalmente, bajo la fe de la declaracion 
de neutralidad hecha por el Secretario de Estado. Por eso con harta 
sorpresa escucho el Presidente Davila de boca del Ministro ameri- 
c?.no, en nombre del Capitan del Tacoma, la exigencia de que diese 
su autorizacion para entregar el puerto a los revolucionarios. Davila 
se nego, alegando las razones expresadas, pero el Ministro insistio 
al dia siguiente; y despues de varias horas de discusion, sin duda 
aburrido, dijo a Davila : "Es inutil que sigamos perdiendo tiempo : 
•el puerto esta entregado a la revolucion desde" ayer; si quiere U. 
•que haya conferencia de paz con la mediacion americana, acepte 
el hecho consumado." Y en efecto el puerto habia sido entregado 
a los revolucionarios desde antes de solicitor la autorizacion del 
Presidente Davila. 

El sefior Knox en sus mencionadas instrucciones habia declarado 
•C'omo base esencial para la transaccion que se buscaba, que el tercero 
en quien el Presidente Davila depositaria el Poder con el fin de 
poner termino a la contienda, debia ser persona enteramente 
imparcial, que diese garantias iguales a todos los hondurenos sin 
distincion de partidos ; y sin embargo, con instrucciones suyas, su 
comisionado Sr. Dawson, en quien los Delegados a la conferencia de 
paz de Puerto Cortez declinaron la designacion del tercero, escogio 
al Dr. Francisco Bertran, hombre cuyos meritos personates no 
discutimos, pero que estaba al servicdo de la revolucion, militando 
en sus filas activamente, y era reconocido como uno de los mejores 
amigos personales del jefe de ella. Por tal motivo no se logro la 
concordia de los hondurefios que se buscaba, pues siendo el Presi- 
dente de hecho el Jefe vencedor, fueron ilusorias las garantias 
prometidas y estipuladas en el convenio de paz en favor de los 
'Contrarios. 

De esta con dn eta doble del Departamento resulto un beneficio. 
El favorecido por el Departamento tampoco quedo satisfecho; y, 
como la opinion publica en Honduras estaba tan claramente mani- 



20 



festada en contra de la propuesta negoeiacion de emprestito, hasta- 
este dia el nuevo Presidente, burlando las esperanzas que en el 
tenian los especuladores, no ha firmado el contrato, a pesar de que- 
se le han propuesto modificaciones ventajosas para el pais. Le ha 
f avorecido para su resistencia la actitud adversa a esas negociaciones 
de parte del Senado americano; actitud que ha merceido tantos 
aplausos en los pueblos latino americanos. La actitud del Senado- 
fue en gran manera debida a los trabajos que, por inieiativa propia. 
y sin ayuda de ningun Gobierno, hicieron unos pocos centro ameri- 
canos, especialmente el patriota Dr. Don Policarpo Bonilla; 
que dio por resultado hacer luz en un asunto que se habia conservado 
en el misterio. Si el Senado hubiese ratificado la convencion, el 
Depart amento de Estado se habria atrevido a ejercer energica pre- 
sion sobre el Presidente de Honduras ; y este, sabedor por experien- 
cia propia de lo que era capaz de hacer para lograr su objeto, por' 
conservar el poder, es probable que habria imitado a su antecesor. 
Creemos dejar demostrado que los dos ultimos movimientos re- 
volucionarios ocurridos en Honduras han sido la obra del Departa- 
mento de Estado americano, o por lo menos conocidos y tolerados 
por el, como consecuencia de la famosa Dollar Diplomacy; y va- 
mos a procurar en seguida demostrar la culpabilidad del mismo 
Departamento respecto a las dos rutimas revoluciones en Nicaragua. 
para sacar las conclusiones finales, de que resultara la absoluta 
condenaeion de la politica Knox en Centro America, y en general 
en la America Latina. 

Nicaragua. 

Por la misma epoca en que se hicieron propuestas de emprestito- 
a las otras Eepviblicas, se hicieron tambien a Nicaragua, siendo 
Presidente el General Don J. Santos Zelaya, qnien no les dio 
entrada, siquiera para discutirlas; y mas bien arreglo un emprestito 
en Europa. en el quo ontraba como base principal la cancelacion 
<!c In deuda americana. Dado el erapeno que despues ha mostrado 
i I Senor Knox por esas negociaciones, hasta convertirlo en una 
ciiiv-liun de amor propio, so comprende facilmente que desde aquel 
momento quedase condenado a muerte el gobierno de Zelaya. Se 
lo promovieron enormes reclamaciones y se renovaron con desusada 
dureza muchaa otras, algunas de ellas monstruosas; pero no dieron 



1 1 



21 

lugar a un rompimiento, porque el gobierno de Zelaya propuso 
arreglos tan ventajosos para los reclamantes, que ni estos ni el 
Departamento tuvieron pretexto para rechazarlos. 

Pero el Sr. Knox tenia que castigar, como el diria, a Zelaya por 
su resistencia. Y la revolucion no se hizo esperar. El Jefe de 
la Costa Atlantica, Juan J. Estrada, formado a las ordenes del 
General Zelaya y hombre de su confianza, se sublevo contra este, 
entendiendose con los descontentos del Gobierno. Desde el primer 
momento de la sublevacion se pudo observar la benevolencia con 
que los rebeldes eran tratados por el Departamento de Estado, y 
^se vio la complicidad del Consul americano, senor Moffat, Keci- 
bieron libremente elementos de guerra y municiones de todas clases 
y dinero de capitalistas americanos; todo de manera notoria y con 
manifiesta tolerancia, y puede decirse, complacencia de funcionarios 
americanos. Como una de las mejores pruebas de nuestras aser- 
ciones, aparecera la declaracion de Juan J. Estrada, Ex-Presidente 
de Nicaragua y Jefe de aquella revolucion, la cual fiie publicada 
-en el New York Times del 10 de Septiembre de 1912. (Anexo C.) 

El senor Knox necesitaba un pretexto par obrar eon mas 
franqueza contra el gobierno de Zelaya. Si este pretexto no hubiera 
sobrevenido lo hubiera creaclo. Lo tomo de la fusilacion 
de los aventureros Cannon y Groce al servicio de la revo- 
lucion condenados a muerte por un Consejo de Guerra, 
por haber sido tornados infraganti poniendo minas para destruir 
las embaracaciones del Gobierno. JSTo ; queremos discutir, porque- 
no viene al caso, la legalidad de la scntencia, pues concedemos, si 
&e quiere que no la tuviese. Dado el hecho indiscutible de haber 
sido tornados con las armas en la mano y trabajando como dinami- 
teros, era bastante para que perdiesen el derecho a la proteccion 
de su Gobierno, conforme a los precedentes universales de los 
tiempos modernos; y lo ha reconocido recientemente el Presidente 
Taft, al notificar a los ciudadanos americanos que si se mezclan en 
la actual contienda en Mexico, correran de su cuenta todos los 
riesgos, sin derecho a ereprar apoyo de su Gobierno. Si Cannon y 
Groce estaban al servicio de la revolucion por interes de lucro, debian 
sujetarse a las consecuencias de su gruesa aventura. Si procedian 
' cntusiasmados por la justicia de la causa, combatiendo a un tirano, 
tenian que correr los riesgos que en tales casos corren todos los 



22 

patriotas que llegan a caer en manos de ese tirano. Mas en ningiiu 
caso quien viola la ley international puede pretender ser amparado 
por ella. 

En tales circunstancias lo mas que ha podido haeer el Departa- 
mento, y de ello hay precedentes, ha sido interponer su amistosa 
influencia en favor de los aeusados, para librarlos de la pena capi- 
tal, y tuvo tiempo de haeerlo el sehor Knox, con seguridad de 
exito, si realmente hnbiera estado interesado en favor de las 
victimas. 

Xo procedio asi el sehor Knox; y en su memorable nota al 
Encargaclo de Negocios de Nicaragua, occasionada por ese suceso, 
fechada el primero de Diciembre de 1909, rompe todos los princi- 
pios del Derecho International, annla todos los precedentes, y hace 
retroceder la civilization consagrando la fuerza como unica fuente 
de la justicia, cual si viviesemos en la edad media. 

En esa nota por si y ante si el sehor Knox declara injusta la 
sentencia del Consejo : declara que el gobierno de Zelaya es tiranico, 
.y abandonado de la opinion publica, y que todo el pais estaba 
eonmovido, lo cual era falso, pues la revolution estaba localizada en 
parte de la costa atlantica : declara que Zelaya era el perturbador 
de la paz de Centro America, el violador de los convenios de Wash- 
ington, motivando por eso las justas quejas de los otros Gobiernos 
de C. A., ([uienes consideraban una necesidad s\i desaparicion del 
Poder, sien'do esto ultimo tambien falso, porque tal declaracion 
pudo oirla a lo mas del Gobierno de Guatemala, instrumento 
para su politica de intervention en aqnellos paises; y. en consecuen- 
cia. const ituvendose en Juc/ de una nation e.\t ranjera. resolvio 
desconocer como Gobierno legitimo al presidido por Zelaya. cortando 
con el sus relaciones y declarandolo Gobierno de facto, al cual 
trataria de ignal manera que al Gobierno de facto de la revoluci6n. 
No creemos que haya en la historia de la diplomacia del mundo 
civilizado an ejemplo semejante. (i\jiexo D.) 

Pero todavia seria menor el escandalo, si el Departamento bu- 
biese cumplido lealmente In contenido en su resolucion. Xo fue 
rsi. sin embargo. Se coloc6 de manera nianifiesta. y sin guardar ni 
las formas, en favor de la revolucion, ayudandole con su poder 
moral y material a obtener el triunt'o. como vamos a demostrarlo 
* n seguida. 



23 

El Presidente Zelaya, anonadado por esa violenta actitud del 
Departamento de Estado, cometio el grave error de apresurar&e a 
depositar el Poder en la persona que el CongresQ eonforme a la 
Constitution designo al efecto, en vez de empeharse en obtener un 
triunfo importante sobre la revolution, para obligarla a eonsiderar 
su separation eorao la solution mejor del conflioto : y en caso de 
que el Departamento no se diese por satisfeeho, obligarlo a emplear 
la fuerza armada para hacer triunfar a los revolutionaries. Su 
separaeion prematura, en momentos en que estaban enfrentadas 
las fuerzas contendientes para librar una batalla decisiva, produjo 
logicamente el desconcierto, en sus fLlas ; y, como conseeuencia, el 
desastre del Recreo, quedio alientos a los revolutionaries, impulsan- 
dolos a continuar la lucha contra el sueesor de Zelaya, Doctor Don 
Jose Madriz, no obstante que les constaba que durante mas de once 
alios habia sido emigrado politico bajo la Administracion de aquel, 
y por lo mismo estaba muy lejos de ser corresponsable de los cargos 
que contra el hacian. Pero lo que mas contribuvo a la prolongation 
de la guerra, fue la actitud del Departamento. el cual rehuso re- 
conocer al Gobienro de Madriz, a pesar de estar legalmente cons- 
tituido, y dentro de las prescriptions del tratado de Washingtou 
(Conferencia Centroamericana de Paz), declarando que mantendria 
respecto a el la mismo politica que habia notificado al Eepresentante 
de Zelaya, y, no eonforme con eso, con violation del tratado ante- 
diclio, infliiyo cerca de los Gobiernos de Guatemala y El Salvador 
para que no lo reconociesen tampoco, siendo los tres los unicos del 
mundo eivilizado que dejaron de hacerlo. 

Oontinuo la lucha mas sangrienta que antes: pero. a pesar de 
todas las circunstancias desfavorables que quedan mencionadas, las 
fuerzas del Gobierno de Madriz lograron derrotar en el interior del 
pais a las de la revolution, reduciendolas a sus posiciones del Rama 
y a su base de operaciones, Bluefields, ambas en la costa atlantica. 
Para conseguirlo 1 , los ejercitos del Gobierno hicieron esfuerzos y 
sacrificios inauditos; y solo despues de penosisimas marchas por 
entre los pantanos, donde quedaban sepultados centenares de hom- 
„bres, eaballos y vehiculos, lograron legar a aquellos lugares, a la 
vez que una expedition maritima se apoderaba de todos los puertos 
y desemlbarcaderos de la costa. Con un ataque combinado captura- 
ron la fortaleza del Bluff, Have del puerto y ciudad de Bluefields.. 



24 

*Se preparaba el atacnie por tierra y agua a aquella plaza, cuando 
desembarcaron marinos de los buques de guerra americanes, y el 
Jefe de la flotilla declaro: que no permitiria hostilidades contra 
la ciudad: que no permitiria que se detuviese ninguna embarcacion 
mercante, ni para averiguar si llevaba elementos de guerra • y tarnpo- 
■co permitiria que eobrase el Gobierno derechos de aduana en la del 
Bluff, que era la establecida por le} r , porque debian cobrarlos los 
revolucionarios en la aduana interior que establecieron al perder 
la fortaleza, frente a la cual, y bajo el dominio de cuyos fuegos, 
tenian que pasar las embarcaciones para poder llegar al lugar de 
la llamada nueva aduana. 

Consecueneias logicas de esas determinaciones fueron: que los 
revolucionarios, teniendo garantizada la plaza de Bluefields, por la 
presencia de los marinos, pudiesen sacai sus fuerzas todas para 
empeiiarlas en la def ensa de la ciudad del Kama : que la plaza de 
Bluefields se hizo intomable, tenienclo por lo mismo los rebeldes 
asegurada contra todo riesgo su base de operaciones : que el panico 
y completo desaliento que habia comenzado a cundir en sus filas 
se trocaran en la mas absoluta confianza en su triunfo : que cesase 
la escasez de elementos de guerra y de toda clase de municiones en 
que se hallaban, porque, para que entrasen a la plaza sin ningun 
riesgo, iban a bordo de las embarcaciones neutrales, americanas o 
reyolucionarias, marinos americanos, portando la bandera de su 
pais, previa notificacion al Comandante del fuerte y al de la marina 
■del Gobierno, de que si hacian un disparo contra ellas o intentaban 
detenerlas, lo estimarian como declaration de guerra a EE, UU., y 
sus buques bombardearian el fuerte y hnndirian los buques nicara- 
giienses. 

El gobierno de Madriz, que estaba reconocido como legitimo por 
el de Xoruega, logro de este que prohibiera a todos los buques que 
portaran bandera de aquella nacioii e] fcrasporte de contrabando de 
guerra para los revolucionarios, o desobedecer en cualquier manera 
!as 6rdenes del Gobierno legitimo; pero el jefe de la marina ameri- 
cana en aquellaa aguas, apoyado expresamente por el Departamento 
de Estado, impuls6 a los capitanes de los buques noruegos a la 
rlesobedieitcia, poniendo a sn bordo marinos americanos, como ya 
se ha dicho, para garantizar su entTada libre; y, por haber informa- 
i n " a su gohierno la vcrdad en ese asunto el Vice Consul noruego, 



25 

Mr. Clancey, fue destituido del Yice-consulado aniericano que tam- 
bien ejercia. 

El resultado final de todo esto fue : que, no pudiendo continuar 
con esperanza de exito la lucha, ni mantenerse en sus posiciones las 
fuerzas de tierra de Madriz, emprendieron la retirada, que equiva- 
lio a una derrota, por las circunstancias del caso; y que, llegando 
al interior desmoralizadas, contagiaron el resto del ejercito, en el 
cual penetro el convencimiento de que no tenian que luchar en verdad 
con los rebeldes, sino contra el incontrastable poder del Gobiefno 
americano. 

El Doctor Madriz vio que la continuacion de la lucha significaria 
un inritil 'derramamiento de cangre, y deposito el Poder en un Di- 
putado al Congreso, quien lo entrego en el acto al jefe rebelde. 

Publieamos como anexo los documentos que comprueban nuestras 
precedentes afirmaciones, y principalmente la responsabilidad del 
Departamento de Estado en esos sucesos. Tambien va co-mo anexo 
la relacion inedita de los mismos sucesos, que tenia escrita el Dr. 
Madriz, para presentarla al Congi-eso, lo cual no tuvo tiempo de 
hacer. (Anexos E y E.) 

Para quien haya conocido personalmente al Dr. Madriz, hombre 
esencialmente civil, culto, ilustrado, patriota y honrado, causara 
sorpresa que el senor Knox se haya empenado en seguirlo coinba- 
tiendo, en \ez de darle su apoyo moral para que lograse la re- 
organizacion del Pais, evitandose asi que se perdiesen mas de cuatro 
mil vidas de nicaragilenses, y que se causasen danos a la propiedad 
por valor de millones; principalmente cuando el senor Madriz 
demostro con evidencia en sus proposiciones de paz, que su ambicion 
personal no seria obstaculo para llegar a ella, porque, si se ponia 
como condicion, renunciaria a ser candidato al hacerse la organiza- 
cion definitiva del Gobierno. Y no serviria de excusa al senor 
Knox el no baber conocido al senor Madriz, porque estamos seguros 
de que recibio informacion suficiente a ese respecto de quien no 
podia parecerle sospechoso, del Almirante Kimball, jefe de la escua- 
drilla que existia entonces en aguas nicaragiienses, quien trato per- 
sonalmente al Presidente Madriz, y nos consta que formo de 61 el 
mismo concepto que dejamos expresado. 

Quiza por la sinceridad con que a ese respecto haya hablado al 
Departamento el Almirante Kimball, fue sustituido en el mando 



26 



antes de terminal' la guerra. Y, eomo el sehor Knox ha liecho 
Question de amor propio el saear avante la Dollar Diplomacy, no 
podia convenirle Madriz, quien, precisamente por sus buenas condi- 
eiones, no servia como instrnmento para la realization de planes 
que envolvian nna verdadera traicion a su patria. y que la condu- 
cirian a su completa ruina. Necesitaba de hombres sin escrupulos, 
que sin rubor viven haciendo deelaraciones como esta : "Por fal 
de que los liberales no vuelvan al Poder, estamos dispuestos a aceptar 
cualquier yugo extrangero, aunque fuese el de la China.'" 

Y del conocimiento que de esos hombres tenia el sehor Knox, 
surgio el convenio Dawson, que se ha mantenido a tal punto secreto. 
que ni a los Diputados al Congreso de Nicaragua que lo pidieron,. 
quiso mostrarlo el Poder Ejecutivo. Aqui tampoco tenemos noticia 
de que su texto integro se haya public-ado: y ni alia ni aqui ha sido 
aprobado por el Poder Legislative, ni podria someterse a su rati- 
fication, por que no es pacto entre dos Gobiernos, sino entre nn 
Agente del Departamento y varios de los eaudillos rebeldes, a 
quienes aquel habia ayudado a triunfar, los cuales le mostrab'an 
su gratitud con complacencias de traidores a su patria. Sin 
embargo, el Departamento de Estado ha hecho de el algo venerable, 
sagrado, superior a la Constitution y leyes, no solo de Nicaragua, 
sino tambien de Estados Unidos. puesto que por atribuida viola- 
tion de ese convenio. se ha provacado y hecho mas sangrienta la 
ultima guerra en aquel infortunado pais, segun aparecera demos- 
trado adelante. 

Por lo que de ese convenio ha traspirado al publico, sabemos : 
que fue celebrado entre el Delegado Mr. Dawson y cinco de los que 
ellos Hainan personajes conspictios del Partido Conservador, a 
saber: Adolfo Diaz. Luis Mena, Juan J. Estrada. Emiliano 
Ch'amorro y Fernando Sol6rzano 3 de lo- cuales ninguno tenia repre- 
sentation legal del pais; y, en cambio de compromisos Bnancieros. 
que despues se tran llevado a la practica, aunque todavia qo se 
corioce hasta donde llegara su aleance, qued6 convenido que el 
senor Estrada continuaria ejerciendo In Presidencia por dos anos, 
durante Los cuales seria Vice-Presidente Adolfo Diaz: y que al 
tener que practicarse las eleeciones, los cineo nominados, (constituf- 
dn< por -i tnismos y por la gracia de Mr. Dawson en grandes elec- 
(ores de Nicaragua) escogerian entre ellos mismos los que deberian 



27 

ser electos President© y Yiee-Presidente para el proximo -per'ioda, 
aimlando asi el voto popular, o mas bien, conviftiendolo en una 
repugnante farsa. 

Sobrevino un desacuerdo entre dos de los grandes electores, el 
Presidente Estrada y sn Ministro de Guerra, Luis Mena, a conse- 
cuencia del cual el segundo fue redueido a prision; pero intervino 
el Ministro Americano Xorthcott, y obligo al Presidente a restable- 
cerlo en su puesto. Estrada encontro muy dura la exigencia, y 
dijo al Ministro que era incompatible con su permauencia en ejerci- 
cio del Poder. Al insistir el Ministro, Estrada se retiro, entregando 
la Presidencia a Adolfo Diaz. 

Poco antes, por no estar satisfechos Estrada y Meua con la Cons- 
titution que la Asamblea estaba dictando, o mas bien con sua 
tendencies politicas, porque h'abia sido electa por los partidarios de 
Emiliano Chamorro, la clisolvieron, convocando otra, que resulto 
electa a satisfaction de Mena, pero que en materia de principios y 
de legitima representation de la opinion publica, no diferia de la 
anterior. Estando esta reunida se celebro la convencion Kjiox- 
Castrillo, base para un contrato de emprestito, que tambien firmo 
Castrillo con un grupo cle banqueros de S"ew York. De ambos se 
dio cuenta a dicha Asamblea; pero como esta estaba dominada por 
Mena, y el se mostraba enemigo del negocio, para anular su 
cposicion se le permitio liacerse elegir Presidente para el proximo 
periodo por aquel Cuerpo, sin que nadie quisiese acordarse en aquel 
momento del convenio DaAVSon, que despues se ha considerado 
viola.do con ese acto. Heclia la eleccion, sin protesta de los grandes 
electores, ni del Ministro americano, ceso la dificultad -para la 
ratificacion de los convenios Castrillo; y, sin dar lugar a discusion, 
porque fue declarado el asunto de urgencia para resolverlo en una 
sola sesion, f ueron aprobados por una mayoria de antemano concerta- 
da. ahogando la voz de protesta de solo seis Diputados patriotas que 
en el seno de la Asamblea aparecieron, y la de dos Secretarios del 
Gobierno, que por ese liecho se retiraron cle sus puestos, para no 
mancharse con la nota de vendedores de su patria. 

En la condueta del Departamento de Estado salta a la vista un 
fenomeno curioso, pero mas que curioso, absurdo. Este gran pais, 
donde las libres instituciones son una verdad, que con razon se 
presenta a si mismo como el mo'delo de la reptiblica, y que es causa 



28 

de estimulo y objeto de imitacion paxa los pueblos latino americanos, 
aparece irnpulsalfido por medio de su G-obierno al de Nicaragua, no 
solo a violar sus leyes, sino todos los principios de la democracia. 
Desgrapiadamente este fenomeno se ha presentado constantemente 
como regla de condueta del Departamento en relacion con los parses 
del Sur, pues en los ultimos afios regularmente su intervencion o 
influencia se lian ejercido en favor de las tiranias y en contra de 
los legitimos dereohos de los pueblos. Cuando ha apoyado revolu- 
ciones, no ha tornado ningun interes, aiin para explicar su accion, 
<en que se establezca un G-obierno regular y de garantias. Ese feno- 
meno solo se explica, porque la politica del Departamento ha sido 
inspirada, no por la conveniencia de los paises, sino por intereses 
del momento, o por especulaciones fmancieras. Si otro hubiera sido 
•el movil, si de la intervencion hubiera resultado el establecimiento 
de un regimen de libertad, orden y honradez, aunque al principio 
hubiese repugnado al amor propio nacional tal intervencion, podria 
haber llegado a ser perdonada y hasta agradecida, en vista de los 
beneficios recibidos. 

Los convenios Castrillo estan calcados sobre las mismas bases que 
los propuestos a Honduras, pero con algunas condiciones todavia 
mas gravosas para Nicaragua. Como Nicaragua tenia una deuda 
externa insignificante y relativamente bien servida, la Diplomacia 
■ del Dollar tuvo que recurrir al plan de amortizacion de la deuda 
interna, representada por el papel moneda cirqulante y deprceiado, 
para tener pretexto de apoderarse de las aduanas ; y, para tener la 
seguridad de dominar en absolute la situacion financiera. invent6 
;la -Comfsion mixta de rcclamos. en que hay una mayoria de norte- 
americanos, designados por el Departamento o sus Kepresentantes, 
a discretion de qnienes qneda elevar la eifra de la deuda publica 
hasta donde crean que les conviene, asi como establecer ventajosns 
preferencias para los reconocimientos en favor de sus amigos. El 
emprestito contratado es de quince millones de dollars, al i hv ; do 
envision, fuera de gastos y otros gravdmenes, con interes de 5% 
anual y 1% de amortizacion. No es nuestra intenci6n entrar a 
cxaminar en sus detalles estn negociaci6n, que ha sido ampliamente 
discutida por la prensa en C. A., y especialmente tratada en una 
exposicion firmada por los desterrados politicos Doctores Espinoza e 
Trias. Bastenos afirmar que es la negooiaeion mas ruinosa que 



29 

jamas ha llegado a realizarse en pais alguno, y ese eoneepto tiene 
que ser ratificado por quienquiera que se tome la molestia de leer. 
los contratos. 

Los convenios Castrillo contienen la estipulacion de que s\* 
vigencia dependeria de la ratificacion por el Senado americano de la 1 
Convencion que les sirve de base, excepto por la suma de un millon 
y medio de pesos que desde luego serian anticipados, previa entrega 
de las aduanas de la Kepublica a los colectores americanos. Los 
centroamericanos eonfiabamos en que esos arreglos no se llevarian 
nunca a la practica, porque estabamos seguros de que el Senado 
americano nunca sancionaria tan monstruosa espe.ulacion ; pero, pa- 
ra forzar a aquel alto cuerpo a la ratificacion, se introdujo la clausula 
referida, que permitio al senor Knox comenzar a ensayar su sistema 
en C. A. Pero hay algo mas escandaloso aun. Sin duda se creya 
que todavia quedaba al Gobierno de Nicaragua demasiada vida, y 
le impusieron un contrato adicional de tres cuartos de millon de 
dellars con una garantia superabundante, la entrega de los ferro- 
carriles y vapores nacionales, en forma que mas bien parece un 
regalo. 

Con la negociacion de tan f uertes sumas de dinero deberia creerse 1 
que, al menos en el principio, el Gobierno nicaraguense estuvo muy 
desahogado, y el pais en una ventajosa situacion economica; pero 
es el hecho que jamas el tesoro publico ha tenido alia mayores 
apuros, ni ha habido mas pobreza general y estancamiento del co- 
mercio y de todo progreso. La razon es clara: del dinero que 
aparecia prestandose, nada entro a Nicaragua; y del producto de- 
la renta aduanera, solo un tanto por ciento muy reducido era de- 
vuelto al Gobierno despues de colectado por los Agentes extrangeros.' 

Cuando el Comite del Senado americano conocio de la Conven- 
cion Knox-Castrillo, aunque no hubo mayoria para hacer dictamen, 
resulto claramente demostrado que nunca seria favorable, y mas 
claro aun, que el Senado no lo ratificaria, a pesar de haberse creado 
de proposito y de manera tan injusta y arbitraria esos intereses 
americanos en aquel pais. Pero los especuladores deben haber re- 
cibido del Departmento segnridades de que el protegeria esos 
intereses en todo caso-, y lo demostraron con la resolucion de retener 
integramente los productos de las rentas que recaudaban, violando 
manifiestamente el contrato, y reduciendo al Gobierno nicaragiiense 



30 



a la mas absoluta miseria. Xo obstante esto,' o mas bien por eso, 
Irizo la entrega de los ferrocarriles y vapores, para recibir en cambio 
alguna parte de las sumas colectadas, en calidad de limosna, pues 
no de otra manera podra en adelante aqnel Gobierno vivir, ya que 
ha quedado enteramente a mereed de sns protectores. 

Tampoeo la practica del sistema Knox en Nicaragua ha dado el 
resultado que el ha declarado se proponia entre otros perseguir: 
el restablecimiento del credito exterior de aquellos paises. Anterior- 
mente se habia logrado en Nicaragua atender con relativa regulari- 
dad al servicio de la deuda externa: desde que entro en praetica 
el protectorado financiero, ese servicio ha sido completamente desa- 
tendido, siendo muchos los acreedores., entre ellos algunos ameri- 
canos no favoritos, que tienen derecho a quejarse por el cambio de 
6istema. 

Pero en compensacion de tantos males ^se habra logrado al menos 
el mantenimiento de la. paz ? Yamos a examinarlo. 

Comenzo a hacerse notorio dentro y fuera de Nicaragua que 4a 
eleecion hecha por la Asamblea en el General Mena para Presidente. 
como sucesor de Diaz, no era del agrado del Departamento de Esta- 
do, alegando como razon ostensible ser contraria al convenio Daw- 
son, siendo a la vez notorio que el favorecido con sus simpatias era 
el mismo actual Presidente Diaz: y se creyo entonces, y los heclios 
Be han encargado de demostrar que para ello habia razon, que el 
Ministro americano empujo al seiior Diaz a destituir al sefior Mena 
(lei Ministerio de Guerra. que ejercia por la vohmtad de otro 
Ministro americano. prometiendole. a no dndarlo. el apoyo de su 
Gobierno, on easo de dificultades. E^a fue la causa, o niejov dicho 
la ocasion, de la ultima guerra civil en aquella tierra. 

Mena estaba en posesion de la fnerza ptiblica del pais. La ge- 
neralidad do los jefes de ariiiaS eran hechura euya : y era notorio 
que el ejercia el poder efectivo en el Gobiemo. Debe creerse que 
el sefior Knox eetaba convencido por lo mismo de que su candidate 
favorito no podria continnar en el Poder por elecci6n, y que para 
lograr imponerse contra la I'uerza armada de Mena y contra la 
opinion pnblica representada por los liberates, era preciso que hu- 
biese una guerra civil, en que Diaz resultase vencedor con el apoyo 
extranjero. Si el Departamento hubiese querido evitar el derrama- 
miento de sangTe en Nicaragua, tanto en la snerra anterior como 



31 

en la ultima, le habria sido muy faeil prevenirlo, haciendo entonees 
lo que hizo mas tarde, desembarcar fuerzas para ocupar las plazas 
de importancia. Pero siguio el proeedimiento contrario. La 
(destitution del General Mena del Ministerio de la G-uerra, a- 
consejado por el Ministro americano era un paso que 
debia dar las conseeuencias logicas que no se hieieron esperar. 
Mena, poseedor de la mayor parte de los elementos de guerra do 
la Eepiiblica, puso en mano lo mas que pudo; y, con la cooperaeion 
de los liberates de Oriente con quienes entonees logro entenderse. 
reunio xm ejercito de voluntarios muy superior en numero y calidad 
al que podia oponerle Diaz, eon el cual en poco tiempo logro poner 
asedio a la capital de la Bepublica, y apoderarse de muchas plazas 
de importancia. La opinion publica fue favorable a la revolucion 
desde el primer momento, porque el Gobierno de Diaz, que nunca 
fue prestigiado, se hizo absolutamente unpopular y odioso, desde 
que consumo con las negociaciones de emprestito la venta de su 
patria. Mas no se hizo general el movimiento, sino hasta que, re- 
ducido a la ultima extrenidad el ejercito de Diaz durante el ataque 
a Managua, fue salvado solo por la defensa que del palacio hieie- 
ron los marinos americanos. Entonees el pueblo de Leon, que habia 
permanecido quieto, se levanto en masa, y ataco la fuerte guarnicion 
oue habia en la plaza, que fue destrozada. Derroto en seguida las 
fuerzas que enviaron a someterlo, y llamo a los jefes emigrados, 
cuyas ordenes no habia esperado para moverse. Pocos clias bastaroii 
para que el Gobierno quedase reducido a la oeupacion de la capital, 
de parte de los departamentos de Eivas, Chontales y Zelaya, y de los 
puertos, conservados bajo su dominio, lo mismo que la capital, por 
las fuerzas americanas. 

La fuerza material de los cien marinos que defendieron el palacio 
presidencial era de poca significacion, pero fue muy grande el efecto 
moral favorable causaclo en el animo de las tropas de Diaz, como 
desalentador en el de las asaltantes. 

Todavia en aquellos momentos pudo el Departamento, si hubiera 
querido, evitar que continuase el inutil derramamiento de sangre, si 
hubiera procedido con franqueza, declarando que estaba resuelto a 
usar el poder de su pais para debelar la revolucion, empleando 
la fuerza armada, que mas tarde empleo. Pero no lo hizo asi. 
Por el contrario : declaro que su objeto era unicamente proteger las 



32 

vidas e intereses americanos, comprendiendo entre estos los ferro- 
carriles y vapores nacionales, propiedad absoluta de Nicaragua, que 
habian sido entregados a los especuladores americanos pocos dias 
antes, apresurandose a haeerlo, probablemente en prevision del 
movimiento que se iba a provocar. El almirante Soutberland bizo 
expresas declaraciones de que, si se le devolvieran los ferrocarriles y 
vapores, se guardaria absoluta neutralidad, sin poder trasportar 
fuerzas ni elenientos de guerra de ninguno de los beligerantes ; y 
asieonsiguio que no se le biciera resistencia. Mas una vez aduehado 
de las lineas ferreas } r estaeiones, y fortifieadas las fuerzas ameri- 
canas en ellas, pretextaron la necesiclad de ir a socorrer las ninaa 
de un colegio frances, que estaban pereciendo de hambre, lo cual 
era falso, pues en el no habian niiias extranjeras, sino hijas del pais,, 
que tenian sus familiares o recomendados para atenderlas, y no pasa- 
rian mas necesidades que las que naturalmente tenian que sufrir 
todos los habitantes. Embarearon en los trenes en Managua consi- 
derables fuerzas, y cuando las tuvieron suficientes en Granada, 
cuartel principal del General Mena, intimaron a este la rendicion, 
con amenaza de emplear contra el la fuerza, y no dar cuartel a los 
vencidos, y Mena se rindio sin cambatir. Quiso hacer lo mismo el 
Almirante con el Doctor y General Benjamin Zeledon, pero este, 
joven, valiente y patriota, aunque seguro de ser derrotado y hasta 
de perder la vida, quiso salvar la honra del nombre nicaragiiense, v 
rehuso rendirse. La tropa amerieana despues de tres dias de ataque 
s la ciudad de Masaya por las fuerzas de Diaz inicio el combate 
con su artilleria contra la posieion de la Barranca el cual duro veinti- 
cuatro boras, y cuando lograron silenciar el fuego de los defensores, 
asaltaron la posieion. Al mismo tiempo las fuerzas del llamado Go- 
bierno nicaragiiense atacal>an pur otro lado la conligua plaza de Ma- 
&aya, la cual fuetomada varias boras despues que la Barranca. Zele- 
don, aun<|ue herido Logro -al ir. pero fur alcanzado y nmerbo el mismo 
dia. Esta batalla costo la vida do cuatro "marinos extranjeros y 
de mas de cien nicaragiienses del lado del Gobierno, y un numcro 
proporciona] de heridos, ignorando nosotros hasta este momento 
euantas bajas hubo de parte de la revoluci6n. 

Quedaba la ciudad de Leon y otras poblaciones del Norte en po- 
ller de la ]v\(iliici<m. aunque escasas de elementos de guerra. El 
Almirante intim6 la rendici6n a todos los jefes; y 6stos, sin duda 



33 

<queriendo evitar que/ sin posibilidad de triunfo, se derramase mas 
sangre, se soraetieron a la fuerza americana; pero el pueblo, indigna- 
-do por el ultra je hecho a su patria, trato de resistir, y en masa, sin 
que pudiese orgnizar defensa, fue ametrallado por los marinos 
americanos. Algo semejante habia pasado antes en Chichigalpa. 
Eesultaron de todos los encnentros en que intervivieron los 
■americanos unos once marinos muertos, y mayor niimero de 
beridos ; y, segiin los partes publicados aqui por la prensa, centenares 
de victimas nicaragiienses, entre muertos y heridos, nmchos de ellof? 
no combatientes. 

Debemos creer que el Departamento trata de hacer recaer la res- 
ponsabilidad de su conducta contra el Senado de su patria, a 
juzgar por el tono de cierta prensa inspirada maniflestamente en 
el mismo Departamento, y principalmente, por una informacion 
clacla a la prensa por el Presidente Taft en Beverly, en 
que declaro que la culpabilidad de lo ocurrido en Nicaragua (de 
la sustitucion de las balas a los dollars) pesaba sobre el Senado, por 
no haber ratiflcado la convencion de emprestito, que habria colocado 
las aduanas en manos de los agentes americanos, y qnitado el 
pretexto u objetivo principal para la revolucion. Esta declaracion 
del Presidente puede hacer pensar que el ignora muchos de los 
actos de su Secretario, pues las aduanas fueron entregadas a tales 
agentes desde muchos meses antes de la guerra; de rnanera que es'a 
entrega produjo el trastorno en vez de la paz prometida por la 
Dollar Diplomacy. 

Tambien se ha tratado de justificar la intervencion armada en 
Nicaragua porque la pidio el Presidente de hecho de aquella Eepu- 
blica; pero eso equivaldria a querer justificarla porque la hubiera 
pedido al Departamento el mismo Secretario Knox, de quien aquel 
gobernante es exclusiva hechura y docil instrumento. 

Debemos reconocer que los hombres del Gobierno de Managua 
conservan todavia un resto de pudor, aunque sea el de la mujer 
publica. En el telegrama en que dan cue'nta de su victoria a los 
Gobiernos de Centro America, no mencionan la cooperacion de 
las fuerzas extranjeras en la batalla de Massaya; y, para atreverse 
a privarlas de LA GLOBIA DEL TBIUNEO, han debido tener el 
asentimiento del Ministro americano en Managua. Pero ese falso 
pudor lo tuvieron unicamente ante la America Latina, porque en 



34: 



forma oficial el Secretario de Eelaciones Exteriores cle Nicaragua 
dio el pesame al Gobierno y pueblo amerieanos por la muerte de 
sus marinos, sin tener por cierto una palabra de elogio o siquiera. 
de conmiseracion para los centenares de soldados nicaraguenses que 
confiesa haber pereeido simultaneamente. 

Ha alegado igualmente el Departamento como. justificativo.para 
su intervencion el bombardeo de la plaza de Managua por los revo- 
Jucionarios, a la que llama plaza indefensa, causando la muerte de 
muchos no combatientes. Aquella plaza no era indefensa desde 
luego que estaba protegida por la fortaleza de la loma de Tiscapa, la 
mas fuerte en aquel pais, y en ella tenia el G-obierno concentrado 
casi todo el ejercito de que disponia. Pero si se creia que, conforme 
al Derecho Internacional, tenian derecho a impedir el bombardeo, 
debieron obligar al Gobierno a desocuparla y presentar aceion en 
otro campo de batalla, en la cual se decidiria quien debia quedar en 
posesion de la capital, y no ostentar la pretension, de que no hay 
ejemplo en la historia, de que un beligerante deb a privarse del 
triunfo que le daria la captura de la plaza mas importante del 
enemigo, por el peligro que corran sus habitantes. Ese h'abria sido 
un proce'dimiento, aunque arbitraio, imparcial, y habria producido el 
benefieio de la inmediata terminacion de la guerra. Pero h'aciendo- 
lo asi tenia que resignarse el Departamento a ver el triunfo de la 
revolucion, que nadie podia poner en dudaj': tenia que resignarse a 
ver el triunfo de un pueblo contra un Gobierno de traidores. su 
protegido ; y a ver en consecuencia desmoronado el edificio de la 
Dollar Diplomacy, levantado a tanta v°osta. Persis.tiendo en su 
politica, tenia que obrar como lo hizo; y para que su parcialidad 
sea mas manifiesta, no tuvo en seguida inconveuieuie en autorizar a 
sus fuerzas para cooperar en el bombardeo de la plaza de Masaya 3 
y amenazar con igual suerte a las de Granada y Leon, plazas no 
fortiiicadas, sin tomar en cuenta entonces el peligro de los no 
combatientes. 

I'm- otra paite ha pretendido justificai el Departamento sn 
ii liducta cob la Qecesidad <!e reprimir los excesos cometidos pot 
los revolueionarios. En la relaci6n que < I < ^ ello se ha dado a la 
pi< asa encontramos en la mayor parte de los easos falsedad, y en 
general calcnlada i'\ageraei6n de los hechos, todo con el objeto- 
de predisponei la opinion publica en este pais on favor de la in- 



35 

tervencion que de antemano estaba resuelta. Es natural que hay a 
habido actos incorrectos, pero es notorio que fue mucho mas mala 
la condueta 'del Uamado Gobierno. Estamos en posesion de antece- 
dentes que nos permiten asegurar que en ninguna guerra civil, ni 
en la de EE. TIF., ha habido tan pocos danos, relativamente ha- 
blando, a las personas y propiedades de los no combatientes, espe- 
cialmente de los extranjeros, como en la rtltima de Nicaragua. Si 
esa fuera una justification y no un pretexto, el Departamento ha- 
bria estado obligado con mayor razon, y desde hace mucho tiempo, 
a intervenir en igual forma en Mexico, como lo han hecho notar 
muchos organos de la prensa en este pais. Pero Mexico no es 
como Nicaragua un pais debil y pobre, ni hay en su Gobierno ni 
cntre los revolutionaries traidores a su patria que pidan la interven- 
tion. Alii tendria que ser una verdadera guerra de conquista, para 
mantener la. cual necesitaria de un poderoso ejercito de ocupacion 
quizas por mas de dos generaciones. 

Si en los demas Estados de C. A. bus Gobiernos hubie- 
ran cumplido con su deber demostrando la solidaridad 
centroamerieana, siquiera con una protesta, con lo cual 
habrian satisfecho la opinion de los pueblos, bien claramente 
manifestada en contra de la invasion extranjera, talvez se habria 
logrado que esa actitud sugiriera al sehor Ivnox la misma condueta 
prudente que ha observado respecto a Mexico. Pero aquellos go- 
bernantes en general han estado poseidos del terror que el sehor 
Knox ha sabido inspirarles. Han llegado hasta a reprimir la prensa 
y las manifestaciones del pueblo, encarcelando escritores que se han 
atrevido a hacerse eco de la indignacion popular ; y. caso curioso, 
han llegado hasta prohibir la reproduccion de escritos de protesta 
publica'dos en EE. UTJ. por centre americanos patriotas o por anglo- 
americanos amantes de.la justicia. 

Para explicar la inconsecuencia de su condueta, despues de todo 
esto el Departamento de Estado sigue sosteniendo que no ha becho 
la guerra en Nicaragua : que ha mandado fuerzas solo para defender 
las vidas e intereses de los americanos, las cuales no han estado en 
ningun momento en peligro, pues no ha podido ni podra evidenciar 
un solo caso en que algun extranjero haya sufrido en su persona 
6 intereses; y, por un peligro imaginario, ha sacrificado a tantos de 
pus compatrriotas, inmolados en aras de la Dollar Diplomacy. La 



36 

JTitervencion del Departamento en solo esta ultima guerra ha .costaclo 
a Nicaragua millares de vietimas., pues sin ella la campafia habria 
terminado en poeos dias con el triunfo de la revolution; y, lo que 
es peor. tratandose de la conveniencia de EE. UU., ha hecho perder 
•en la America Latina el buen nombre del soldado angloamericano. 
defensor en su propia tierra de la libertad y de la ley, convertido 
en Nicaragua en instrumento de tirania. ^creera acaso el senor 
Knox que esa faeil proeza sera un timbre de gloria y no de baldon 
para las armas americanas ? 

El senor Knox se muestra satisfecho de su labor, porque la ha 
llevado hasta sus ultimas consecuencias. Ha mantenido el ejercito 
extranjero de ocupacion en Nicaragua para garantizar, no una 
eleccion libre de Presidente para el proximo periodo, sino la elec- 
tion en favor de su protegido Diaz ; y ha conseguido su objeto, por- 
que el 2 de este mes, bajo el imperio de la ley martial, teniendo los 
ciudadanos el cuello bajo el tacon de la bota del soldado extranjero, 
el traidor Diaz resulto electo Presidente sin posible oposicion. 

Para el mismo dia se convoco al pueblo a eleccion de Diputados, 
porque el traidor, derogando la Constitution, asumiendo el poder 
absoluto de Nicaragua, asistido tambien para dar ese golpe de Estado 
por el poder americano, declaro disuelta la i^samblea Constituyente, 
la misma a que debia la sombra de poder legal que ha estado 
ejerciendo; pero la misma que, al cometer su traicion, lo declaro 
cesante en su funciones, cuando se incio la ultima contienda. 

Para que se juzgue de la clase de libertad electoral de que ha 
podido disfrutar el ciudadano nicaragiiense en esa eleccion, inserta- 
mos a continuacion la circular del Comandante General del ejercito 
de Nicaragua, Emiliano Chamorro, dirijida a todos los funcionarios 
civiles y militares encareciendoles hacer triunfar las candidaturas 
que recomienda. por ser las resueltas de conformidad con el famoso 
pacto DAWSON. 

"Casa presidencial. Managua Octubre 25 de 1912. Se- 
nores Comandantes de Armas y Jefes Politicos. — Participo 
a I'd. que reunidos los principales Jefes de la Kevolucion de 
Octubre para dar euniplimiento a lo estipulado on los oonvenios 
I >awson, hemos resuelto de comun acuerdo designar como eaudidatos 
del Partido Conservador en el pr6ximo periodo constituciona] para la 
Presidrticia v Vice-Presidencia de la Republica a los senores Adolfo 



37 

Diaz y Fernando Solorzano, respectivamente. Lo que tengo el 
gusto de decir a IT. para que se lo partieipe a todos Ids amigos y 
correligionarios, recomendandoles'"los trabajos electorales necesarios 
para hacer triuufar las candidaturas referidas. Con niuestras de* 
mi consi'deracion soy afectisimo amigo. — Emiliano Chamorro."' 

Este mismo Chamorro fue quien dirigio al Presidente de Hondu- 
ras el telegrama que en seguida insertamos, que fue interceptado 
en Leon, segun dice el Diario del Salvador fecha 4 de Septiembre^ 
del cual lo tomamos. Dice el telegrama: "Debemos contiar en el 
resultado final. Contamos con EL AUXILIO DE EE. TJIJ., que 
ya no tardan en hacer sentir su poder a los liberales y a los 'demas 
enemigos de nuestra causa." 

De manera que, si pruebas faltasen de la connivencia 
criminal de .los que mandan en Nicaragua con los inva- 
sores extranjeros, ese telegrama bastaria; pero a ese respect 
cxiste un documento que pasara a la historia de la Diplomacia 
americana como una escandalosa prueba del abuso de la fuerza de 
un Ctobierno pocleroso contra un pais debil, solo comparable a la 
nota 'del Seeretario Knox a que atras nos hemos referido. Ese 
•documento es la nota dirigida por el Ministro americano en Mana- 
gua, Mr. Weitzel, al Seeretario de Eelaciones Exteriores de aquel 
pais, que va como anexo "GL" 

Hacemos referenda a esa nota en este lugar, porque viene a 
demostrar como las ultimas elecciones en Nicaragua, han sido una 
farsa que llamariamos ridicula, sino fuera "por sus antecedentes" 
sangrienta; farsa en la cual ha intervenido de manera directa el 
Departamento de Estado, que pretence tener el proposito de ense- 
iiar a las naciones latino americanas la practica de la verdadera 
repiiblica:* 

Dice el sehor Weitzel, entre otras cosas "Al desonocer 
a Zelaya, a cuyo regimen de barbarie y corrupcion puso termino la 
nacion nicaragiiense, despues de una sangrienta guerra, el G'o- 



* Contra el g-olpe de Estado, la Dictadura y la usurpacion del Poder 
del traidor, han protestado los ciudadanos nicaragiienses que han podido 
hacerlo, absteniendose de dar su voto todos los que han tenido valor 
para desafiar a los esbirros del tirano, convertidos en argemtes electorales, 
y que no han querido hacerse complices de la farsa electoral, que no merece 
otro nombre, aunque tantas razones no hubiera, por el simple hecho de 
haber sido cpnvocado el pueblo el 18 de Octubre para concurrir ec votar 
el 2 de Noviembre, catorce dias de diferencia, sin tiempo suficiente ni 
para conoceir el decreto en muchos Departamentos de la Republica. 
Agregamos un fragamento de laprotesta publicada en Bluefields. y otro> 
del Decreto de Dictsrdura. (Anexo "H.") 



38 

bierno de EE. TJTL, condeno no solo al individuo sino el sistema, 
y este Gobierno no PODEIA TOLEEAE ningun movimiento para 
restablecer el niismo regimen destructor. El Gobierno de EE. UU., 
en consecuencia, SE OPONDEA A CTTALQUIEE EESTAUEA- 
CION del ZELAYISMO y prestara su eficaz apoyo moral a la 
causa del buen Gobierno legalmente constituido para beneficio del 
pueblo de Nicaragua, a quien ha tratado de ayudar desde largo 
tiempo en su justa aspiracion liacia la paz y prosperidad, bajo un 
Gobierno constitutional y de or den." Y como lo que Weitzel llama 
ZELAYISMO, es decir lo que no es DIISMO, unico que conviene 
al Departarnento, pudo restableeerse con toda seguridad por medio 
de una eleccion libre, es claro que la fuerza de ocupacion se ha 
{.puesto a que de esa eleccion pudiera resultar otro Presidente que 
no fuera su complice DIAZ. 

Lo que el senor Weitzel lia expresado en el parrafo trascrito, lia 
venido sien'do el caballo de batalla de Mr. Knox en los ultimos 
aiios para provocar disturbios en Centro America ; y queremos 
examinar por eso con mas detenimiento la materia. Dice el De- 
partamento que "su Gobierno condeno no solo al individuo sino 
■el sistema,'' refiriendose a Zelaya. ~No intentamos discutir ahora 
si tenia derecho de condenar al gobernante de un pais independiente, 
punto que ya tratamos antes; pero si fuese cierto que condena el 
sistema, habria toma'do precauciones para que el nuevo Gobierno 
cpie ayudo a crear fuese un modelo de practicas republicanas, de 
honradez administrativa y de amor a su patria, en vez de cubrir 
bajo su proteccion inauditos atropellos y atentados contra las per- 
&onas y propiedades. escandalosos latrocinios como antes no se ha- 
bian presenciado en Nicaragua, y la mas vil de las traiciones. Pero 
un Gobierno de leyes, lionrado y patriota no habria secundado su 
politica financiera. 

Por otra parte, no se explica c6mo se muestra el Departamento 
tan celoso contra el despotism" v alui<(is de Zelaya. y a la \e/ 
patrocina la tirania en otros paises, especialmente en Guatemala, 
donde Estrada Cabrera la ejerce desde hace tmis de catorce aiios 
'lc manera brutal, constiiuyendo un escarnio para la humanidad, 
una rergiienza para la eiyilizacidn. Y, no solo Guatemala ha sufrido 
el peso de esa tirania. Los demas paises 'de C. A. han visto 
perturbada su tranquilidad por la politica tortuosa de Cabrera. Ya 



39 

•dijimos que el dio los elementos para las ultimas dos revoluciones 
■en Honduras, y los dio tambien para la primera en Nicaragua, que 
de el recibio los primeros auxilios. Y sin embargo, el Departamento, 
que formo acusacion contra Zelaya como perturbador de la paz de 
la America Central, como el violador de los convenios de Wash- 
ington, jamas lo ha hecho contra Estrada Cabrera, ni ha intentado 
siquiera detener su accion perturbadora, como lo hizo siempre que 
s Zelaya se atribuia un proyecto semejante. 

El sefior Weitzel, secundando declaraciones hecbas en igual senti- 
do por el Departamento y hasta por el mismo Presidente, Sehor 
Taft. notifica que su Gobierno no consentira en la restauracion del 
Zelayismo. ^Que entienden por eso? Dificil les seria explicarlo, 
porque no conoeen suficientemente ni la historia, ni la situacion 
actual de Nicaragua, ni la indole del pueblo, ni el caracter v 
tendencias de los politicos do aquella tierra ; y esta ignorancia ha 
sido una de las causas de los errores y abusos de poder cometido c 
por el Departamento. Zelaya, como todos los gobernantes defepo 
ticos, no pudo formar un verdadero partieto politico. El personal 
que le servia era mudable segun las circunstancias o sus caprichos. 
Al dejar el poder, que era la unica base de su prestigio, lo habria 
perdido del todo, sino fuera que la intervencion americana en su 
patria hace pensar a mucbos que representa la cauf-a de la autono- 
mia nacional, por mas que la generalidad no lo crea asi, porque no 
supo caer luchando como heroe. Llamar zelayista al ultimo movi- 
miento revolucionario, demuestra grande ignorancia o mala fe. Lo 
inicio el General Mena., uno de los prohombres de la revolucion 
contra Zelaya, uno de los cinco candidatos del pacto Dawson, ro- 
deado de una fraccion del parti do conservador. Sin la interven- 
cion extranjera es seguro que el partido contrario se habria cruzado 
de brazos a presenciar la lucha entre sus enemigos politicos, para 
resolver despues de terminada, la actitud que le conviniera. Pero 
la intervencion hizo estallar la indignacion en la masa popular y. 
sin esperar orclenes de sus cauclillos, aplastaron las fuerzas del 
Gobierno. Esto lo hicieron principalmente las poblaciones de los 
Departamentos de Leon y Cbinandega, las mismas qiie adversaron 
unanimemente a Zelaya desde el ano de 1896. ^Donde esta entonces 
el Zelayismo de la revolucion? , Apenas se concibe que un Gobierno 
■serio se atreva a consign ar en 'documentos oficiales tales desaho^os 



40 

del Jefe de su Departamento de Estado, que revelan pasion per- 
sonalisima y a la vez despecho por la resistencia a su DOLLAR 
DIPLOMACY. 

Y despues de tanto abuso, de tanto escandalo <;se habra consegui- 
do la paz de Nicaragua? La respuesta la puede dar como nosotros 
cualquier extranjero que se tome -el trabajo de leer este escrito. 
Si fuera posible que el Gobierno americano persistiese en mantener 
su obra en Nicaragua, teridria necesidad de mantener tambien alla- 
un ejercito de oeupacion, como es preciso en todo pais conquistado, 
para que pudiese librar a los traidores del justo castigo que algiin 
dia ha de imponerles el pueblo que tan vilmente han yendido..* 

Creemos que podria darse a la dincultad una solution pacifica,. 
pero no juzgamos el momento ni las circunstancias propicias para 
indicarla. 

El Salvadoe. 

No tenemos noticia de que se hayan hecho insinuaciones de con- 
trato de emprestito a -aquella Republica, sin duda porque tiene 
una deuda extranjera muy pequefia. relativamente a la gran ri- 
queza del pais. Esa deuda, creada, lo mismo que la enorme 
deuda interna, por la corrompida y torpe administration de ante- 
riores gobernantes. no ha af ectado de manera irremediable las fuentes 

*Para mejor comprobar nuestras aserciones han llegado a nuestras 
manos periodicos de Nicaragua, que traen las noticias siguientes: 

Nov. 17, 1912. 

El tren presidential eustodiado por mnrinos americanos. 



Managua, Nov. 13. — Hoy a las 7 a*, m. partlo de esta con destino Sr 
Corinto el tren presidential compuesto de tres carros: en el centro, va 
el Presidente don Adolfo Diaz, el general Emiliano Chamorro. el 
Ministro don Diego M. Chamorro, don Carlos Cuadra Pasos y otros 
amigos. Delante y detr&s iban dos carros con cien marinos americanos. 
No llevan ni la banda, ni la guardia de honor por ser el Presidente 
Diaz enemigo de toda ostentaci6n. 



Suprfmese la Guardia de Honor. 

Managua, Nov. 13. — Por acuerdo del 9 del corriente suprlmese por 
ahora la Guardia de Honor del Presidente de la Republic;!. 



Solo uuedan 400 marinos. 

Manague. Nov. 12. — El quince 6 sea el vieVnes de la presente semana 
partiraij para Panamfi pi Almirantc Southerland y las fuerzas amerieanas 
con la excepci6n de 400 marinos que se quedan distribuidos asf: 300 
marinos en Campo Marte (Palacio Presidencial) y 100 marinos en De6n. 

;Que triste papel el de los marinos americanos! Veaseles convertiilo s 
en guardlas de corps de un tirario usurpador, para Ilbrarlo de las con- 
nclas de la justa tndignaci6n do su pueblo. Nunca habr&n soflado 
los contribuyentes americanos que el dinero que pagan y que sirve 
para sostener su fuerza pOblica, resultaria deflnitivamcfote Invertldo en 
el sostenimlento do Dietaduraix y en la opresi6n de pueblos libres y 
hermanos. 



41 

de production, y aquel pais podra librarse de ella por su propio 
esfuerzo, con la sola condition de ser regido por una serie de 
Administraciones honradas. Pero esto no quiere decir que el Sal- 
vador se veria libre de la action de la Dollar Diplomacy, si esta 
llegase a imperar en las relaciones de Estados Unidos con las 
demas republicas del centre Aunque se ve que habria sido la 
ultima en que se trataria de implantarla, no habria faltado un pre- 
texto, por futil que fuese, para obligar a su Gobierno al sacrificio 
de su autonomia. 

Asi lo ha comprendido el pueblo salvadoreno, y por ello su pa- 
triotismo ha hecho explosion, traduciendose en manifestationes de 
protesta contra la intervention americana en la ultima contienda 
civil de Nicaragua. Su Gobierno, presidido por el Doctor Manuel 
E. Araujo, segun decumentos que tenemos a la vista, supo colocarse 
a la altura de su deber, secundando las demandas de la opinion 
publica. No resistimos el deseo de agregar los telegramas criizados 
entre el Presidente Taft y el Presidente Araujo. (Anexo I.) 
porque en ellos se demuestran los siguientes puntos: 

1°. — Que el senor Araujo estaba seguro de llegar a la paz si 
el Presidente Diaz de Nicaragua depositaba el Poder en Don 
Salvador Calderon P., deposito en que ya habia consentido Diaz, 
pero que de seguro no se realizo porque no lo permitio el senor 
Taft, segon se desprende de la respuesta que dio a Araujo. 

2°. — i Que, el Presidente Araujo queria ante todo la 
paz de Nicaragua conseguida por la mediation pacifica 
de las otras Eepiiblicas de Centro America; pero en caso 
de no conseguirse, llegar hasta la intervention armada, antes que 
consentir en que la hiciese el Gobierno de Estados Unidos; lo cual 
habria tenido ademas la ventaja de que, despues de esa action con- 
junta, habrian seguido de seguro pasos mas avanzados hacia la 
union definitiva de aquellas naciones en una sola, sugeridos por 
el peligro comun. El seiior Taft se opuso a eso, declarando que su 
Gobierno, por ser completamente neutral, seria el mas a prop6sito 
para lograr el termino de la contienda, y ya hemos explicado como 
fue su neutralidad; y recordo para apoyar su opinion los convenios 
de Washington, que en realidad prohiben las intervenciones en las 
guerras civiles, convenios que el, Taft, se creia en el deber de hacer 
cumplir, pero reservandose el derecho de violarlos. 



42 

3°. — Que el Departaniento liabia declarado a los representantes 
del Salvador en Washington y Managua que el desembarque de 
marinos obedecia solo al intento de proteger la Legacion y Con- 
sulados y los intereses americanos, pero que no intervendrian en la 
contienda, declaration que, como ya hemos demostrado no fue 
cumplida, por lo cual Araujo formulo reclamation, aunque en 
terniinos muy corteses y suaves, con oportunidad todavia para que 
la fuerza extranjera se hubiese abstenido de derramar sangre ni- 
caragiiense. 

4°. — Que el sefior Taft da una prueba de su alegada imparciali- 
clad declarando que lo de Nicaragua era UNA REBELION SIX 
FUNDAMENTO, haciendo reminiscencia muy acerba de la epoca 
de ZELAYA, y cargos tan violentos como exagerados contra los 
revolutionaries, a la vez que proclamando la legitimidad del Go- 
bierno de Diaz, no obstante que, como ya dijimos, es un Gobierno 
de facto, que no ha tenido mas sombra de legitimidad que el 
nombramiento de una Asamblea, la misma que a ultima hora le 
destituyo. 

Nos hemos complacido en ver publicados en un folleto los docu- 
mentos que demuestran la conducta correcta y patriotica del Presi- 
dente del Salvador, a quien, como al de Honduras, se liabia aeusado 
de haber enviado armas y municiones al Gobierno de Diaz, en 
momentos en que los necesitaba en absoluto para hacer una naediana 
resistencia siquiera al empuje formidable de la revolucion, con lo 
cual habria contribuido a prolongar y hacer mas sangrientn la 
lucha, y se habria hecho complice de la traicion cometida contra 
Centro America. Tod as las comunicaciones que en dicho folleto 
aparecen, indican que el sefior Arajuo vio claro desde el principio 
cl peligro centroamericano. liaciendo esfuerzos para conjurarlo. lo 
cual no se compadece con la verdad de la grave acusacion que 
contra el se lanzo; pero mas complaci'dos estaremo>. si. cuando co- 
nozca el sefior Araujo tan grave acusacion, la desmiente exjn-esa- 
mente con pruebas directas y eoncluyehtes, porque podria quedar 
como un punto dudoso para la historia patria. 

Tratado y Convi.\( io\i s de Washington. 

En Noviembre de 1907 se runio en Washington la ('< )\'FERK \- 
C\\ CENTRO AMERICANA DE PAZ. quo tuvo por objeto poner 
U'rmino a las diferencias existentes entre los Gobierno? de varias 



43 

de las Eepiiblicas del Centro, y establecer solidas bases para la paz 
interior y exterior de todas ellas. Para lograr el fin desea'do ei 
Presidente Eoosevelt ofrecio generosa hospitalidad, y, unido al de 
Mexico, sus buenos oficios, que fueron desinteresados, y hasta donde 
fne posible, eficaces. Si la Conferencia no dio resultados praoticos, 
no fue culpa de los Gobiernos mediadores, sino de la estrechez de 
miras de algunos de los Presidentes representados en dicha Confe- 
rencia. Las Delegaciones de las Eepiiblicas de Honduras y Nicaragua 
propusieron como remedio para todos los males de Centro America 
el restablecimiento de la union de todas ellas en una sola nation, 
declarando no tener fe en ninguno de los demas medios propuestos 
o que pudieran proponerse. 

Este proyecto fue rechazado por niayoria, formada por las otras 
tres Delegaciones, como fueron rechazadas tambien otras mociones 
tendentes a restringir el poder absoluto que ejercen los Presidentes. 

Por la importancia que tienen para el objeto que nos proponemos 
vamos a insertar algunos articulos de los eonvenios citados. 

AETICULO II Tratado General. "Deseando asegurar en las 
Eepublicas de Centro America los beneficios que se derivan de la 
practica de las instituciones y contribuir al propio tiempo a afirmar 
su estabilidad y los prestigios de que deben rodearse, declara que 
se considera amenazante a la paz de dichas republicas, toda disposi- 
tion o medida que tienda a alterar en cualquiera de ellas el orden 
constitutional." 

La Convention Adicional se compone de tres articulos que dicen : 

"AETICULO I. Los Gobiernos de las Altas Partes Contratantes 
no reconoceran a ninguno que surja en cualquiera de las cinco 
republicas por consecuencia de un golpe de Estado, o de una revolu- 
tion contra un Gobierno reconocido, mientras la representation del 
pueblo, libremente electa, no haya reorganizado el pais en forma 
constitutional. 

AETICULO II. Mngun Gobierno de Centro America podra, en 
caso de guerra civil, intervenir en favor ni en contra del Gobierno 
del pais donde la contienda tuviere lugar. 

AETICULO III. Se recomienda a los Gobiernos de Centro 
America procurar, por los medios que esten a su alcance, en primer 
termino la reforma constitutional en el sentido de prohibir la 
reelection de Presidente de la Eepiiblica, donde tal prohibition no 



44 

exista, y en segundo, la adoption de todas las dispositions necesarias 
para rodear de completa garantia el prineipio de alternabilidad en 

el Poder." 

En la Convention para el establecimiento de una Corte de Jus- 
ticia Centro Americana, se encnentra el signiente. 

"AETICTJLO ANEXO. La Corte de Justicia Centroarnericana 
conocera tambien de los conf lictos que pueda haber. entre los Poderes 
Legislativo, Ejecutivo y Judicial, y cuando de hecho no se respeten 
los fallos judiciales o las resoluciones del Congreso National/*' 

Mas, aunque hemos leido y releido el Tratado y Convenciones 
que nos ocupan, no liemos encontrado un solo articulo, una sola 
palabra, que autorice la pretension que despues han ostentado el 
Departamento de Estado Americano, y el mismo senor Presidents 
Taft (Cablegrama al Presidente del Salvador fecha 5 de Septiembre 
de 1912) de que el Gobierno Americano tiene derecho, segun los 
mismos convenios, para obligar a las partes a su fiel cumplimiento. 
En el protocolo preliminar, origen de la Conferencia, encontramos 
el articulo II que dice : 

"Los Excelentisimos Senores Presidentes de las Eepublicas de 
Centro America invitaran a los Excelentisimos Senores Presidentes 
de los Estados Unidos de America y de los Estados Unidos Mexi- 
canos, para que si lo tienen a bien se sirvan nombrar sus repre- 
sentantes respectivos, a fin de que, CON UN CAEACTER PURA- 
MENTE AMISTOSO, presten sus buenos e IMPAECIALES ofi- 
cios para la realization de los propositos de la Conferencia.** 

Por lo que antecefde se comprende bien que ningun derecho de 
intervention se ha concedido al Gobierno de Washington ni al de 
Mexico, (el cual nunca lo ha pretendido) ; y por el contrario. en 
el Tratado General citado se declaran derogados todos los anteriores 
r-nnvenios centroamericanos, inclusive el celebrado a bordo del 
Marblehead, que se ratifico en el de San Jose de C. E., entre 
Guatemala, el Salvador y Honduras. En los convenios derogados 
se desi,u-n;ibnn como arbitros permanentes para todas s\is diferencias, 
los Presidentes de EE. TJU. y Mexico; y entonces podrian haber 
pretendido intorvenir para prevenir las contiendas. alegando con 
rfizon quo. on vez de tener que molestarse en l dirimirlas cuando ya 
hubiesen causado males irreparable?, preferian ponerles termino 
cnanto antes. 



45 



Pero, en el estado actual cle las eosas, lo unico que podrian y 
deberian haeer los Gobiernos mediadores seria continuar en sus bue- 
ii os y amistosos oficios para hacer efectivo el curnplimiento de los 
convenios que eon la misma amistosa influencia ayudaron a crear. 

Ahora examinemos si el G-obierno de Washington, en una forma 
o en otra, con o sin derecho, ha intentado siquiera que los Presi- 
dentes Centroamericanos cumplan lo pactado, como lo pretende. 

El articulo III de la convencion a'dicional preinserto, declara 
principio de Derecho Internacional centroamericano el de la alter- 
nabilidad en el ejercicio de la Presidencia ; y ese principio, aunque 
surgio cle la Conferencia como una simple recomendacion, fue 
aeeptado por los Presidentes y ratificado por los Congresos. Despues 
de estar en vigencia los convenios el sehor Estrada Cabrera se hizo 
reelegir en Guatemala, y no tenemos noticia de que el Departamento 
de Estado le h'aya recordado al menos su deber de entregar la 
Presidencia a un sucesor libremente electo. Por el contrario, ha 
seguido siendo uno cle los gobernantes favoritos del Departamento. 
En cambio combatio a Zelaya de la manera que hemos relacionado, 
no obstante que su reeleccion era anterior a la fecha de los convenios. 

En varios de los Estados centroamericanos se ha entronizado el 
despotismo y hasta crueles tiranias, y sin embargo, no recordamos 
que una sola vez el Departamento de Estado haya intentado algun 
remeclio para prevenir los alzamientos populares que regularmente 
han tenido por causa la desesperacion de los pueblos privados cle 
todas las garantias, aiin de las necesarias para vivir ; y pudo apoyarse 
en el articulo II del Tratado General antes trascrito, que declara 
atentatoria a la paz de C. A. toda alteracion del orden constitucional. 
Por el contrario, con excepcion de Zelaya, han merecido la confianza 
y el apoyo del Departamento los Gobernantes mas despoticos. 

Pudo apoyarse en el articulo II de la Convencion Adicional 
citada, que queda trascrito, para prevenir a los Gobiernos de C. A. 
sobre su deber de no reconocer al Gobierno que surgio de la revolu- 
cion en Nicaragua en 1910 y que existe todavia, porque el pais no 
se ha reorganizado constitucionalmente, ya que no se ha practicado 
ninguna eleccion antes del 2 de ISToviembre, y esta ya hemos 
demostrado que no mereoe ese nombre; pero en vez de hacerlo, se 
apresuro a reconocerlo el mismo y a darle su apoyo, aiin con la 
fuerza armada, contra su propio pueblo. En cambio ya hemos visto 



46 

conio se nego a reconocer al Gobierno Constitucional del Dr. Madriz. 
e influyo para que no lo reconocieran los de Guatemala y el 
Salvador. 

La Corte de Justicia Centro Americana en las dos revoluciones 
de Nicaragua ha intentauo el restablecimiento de la paz ejerciendo 
su mediacion; pero sus esfuerzos han. fracasado, principalmente, 
por que una de las partes contendientes contaba con el decidido 
apoyo del Departamento, llevado hasta donde lo hemos patentizado. 

Si el Departamento hubiese querido que el establecimiento de esa 
Corte no fuese, como ha sido, un completo fracaso, le habria ayudado 
en su labor pacifista. Pero hay algo mas : segun el articulo anexo, de 
la Convention sobre el establecimiento de dicho Tribunal, antes 
copia'do, toca a la Corte conocer de los conflictos que pueda haber 
entre los altos Poderes ; y pudo el Gobierno americano influir para 
que, si la election del General Mena por la Asamblea se consideraba 
indebida, o si despues se consideraba arbitraria la destitution del 
Presidente Diaz decretada por la misma Asamblea, fuese la Corte 
Centro Americana la que resolviese el caso, con lo cual la guerra 
habria terminado. 

Por ultimo, el articulo II 'de la Convencion adicional preinserto 
prohibe a los Gobiernos de C. A. intervenir en favor ni en contra de 
otro en caso de guerra civil; y el Gobierno americano ha visto cod 
mipasibilidad, euando no los haya impulsado, los auxilios prestados 
por el Gobierno de. Guatemala a las revoluciones de Honduras y 
Nicaragua. Mas ha hecho algo peor : arrogandose un derecho que 
los Convenios de Washington niegan a las mismas partes < ontra- 
tantes, el Departamento de Estado ha intervenido directa o indirecta- 
mente en favor o en contra de esas revoluciones, empleando la 
fuerza armada para debelar la ultima, no solo contra los comba- 
tientes, sino hasta contra multitudes indefensas. Y todo eso lo ha 
hecho invocando los Convenios de Washington, que dice querer 
ensefiar a cumplir, eon el ejemplo de tan eseandalosas violaciones 
de los mi8mos como dejamos anotadas. 

Creemos conveniente, por tratarse de la voz autorizada de un go- 
hernante, reprodncir un parrafo de la contestaci6n dada por el 
Presidente Araujo a la Corte de Justicia eentro-amerieana, re- 
firi6ndose a la ultima guerra de Nicaragua, y especialmente a la 
verdadera interpretaci6u de los Convenios de Washington. Dice 
asi : 



47 

"Cinco Estados independientes sin abdicar su soberania, ajustaron 
Tratados que crean relaciones eneaees de amistad, paz, eomercio y 
mutua correspondencia. Y ejerciendo buenos oficios, los Gobiernos 
de Estados Unidos de Norte-Anieriea y Mexico, por medio de 
ihistres representantes, presenciaron las deliberaeiones que precedie- 
ron a la conclusion final de aquellos contratos internacionales, cele- 
brados en Washington, merced a bondadoso y desinteresado asilo 
otorgado por el ex-Presidente de la Union Americana. Pero es 
de advertir, que en el texto de aquellos documentos, en el protocolo 
preliminar ni en las aetas respectivas, se consignan para aquellos 
nobles Gobiernos derechos u obligaciones provenientes de las rela- 
ciones contractuales llevadas a termino por los negociadores centro- 
americanos. Nada hay en la letra 6 espiritu de aquellos pactos, que 
pudiera considerarse como restrictivo del libre ejercicio de la so- 
berania de estos pueblos, y solo se nota en ellos el' espiritu de amor, 
respeto y mutua correspondencia que estan obligados a tributarse 
espontaneamente 6 mediante la sancion del arbitraje encomendado 
a nn Tribunal netamente centroamericano, como la Corte de Justicia 
de la cual Yuestra Senoria es digno organo." 



Alamos a terminar. Tenemos la esperanza 'de haber logrado 
demostrar que la politica de la "DOLLAR DIPLOMACY" envuelve 
una gran injusticia, y esta causando la ruina de los paises a que 
se aplica, a la vez que perjudicando el credito de los EE. TJTJ. en la 
America Latina y sus legitimos intereses en beneficio de unos pocos 
privilegiados ciudadanos americanos. Para conseguir la reparacion 
de esa injusticia, no tenemos los centroamericanos -medios a nuestro 
alcance, pero confiamos en la rectitud y honradez del pueblo ameri- 
cano y de sus dignos representantes en el Congreso, especialmente el 
Senado, llamado a conocer de esos asuntos. Somos admiradores de 
este gran pueblo; y muy lejos esta de nosotoros el creer que es 
culpable de los errores de algunos de sus gobernantes. Ansiamos 
ver que se nos hace justicia, y que renaee la fraternidad panameri- 
cana que ha de dar la paz, el progreso y la libertad a todas las 
naciones del continente. 

New Orleans, Noviembre de 1912. 

Juan Leets. 



ANEXOS 



51 

Anexo "A." 



Memorandum. 



Con instrucciones de mi Gobierno, que acabo de recibir por tele- 
grafo, tengo el honor y el placer de informar al Gobierno de Hon- 
duras que la firma de J. Pierpont Morgan & Co. ha avisado a mi 
G-obierno que estan preparados para convenir en el arreglo de la 
deuda Extranjera de Honduras, la entrega del ferrocarril y muelle 
de Puerto Cortes y la suministracion de una cantidad sustancial 
para las mejoras interiores que sean necesarias, adquiriendo bonos 
nuevos que serdn debidamente garantizados. Los Sres. Morgan & 
Co. han notificado a mi Gobierno que la Junta de 
Tenedores de Bonos Extranjeros ha aceptado la propuesta 
de Morgan & Cia., que tiene ahora control de las obli- 
gaciones Inglesas y Americanas, incluyendo el ferrocarril 
y muelle, y que la Junta de Tenedores de Bonos Extranjeros, obran- 
do de parte de los Tenedores de Bonos, ha informado al Ministro 
de Negoeios Extranjeros Britanico de lo anterior y que el Ministro 
de ISTegoeios Extranjeros, liabiendo aprobado lo mas cordialmente el 
nuevo proyecto, ha, a solicited de la Junta de Tenedores de Bonos, 
dado aviso al Ministro Carden del cambio de la situation. 

Tengo instrucciones de manifestar que si el Gobierno de Hon- 
duras enviara un Agente Especial a los Estados Unidos con amplios 
Poderes para negociar con Morgan & Co., el Gobierno^ de Estadoa 
Unidos le extenderia toda facilidad. 

Me permito agregar que el Gobierno de los EstaJdos Unidos se 
siente feliz al ver, en las propuestas indicadas, toda persepctiva de 
buen exito para un arreglo, sobre una base favorable para la amorti- 
zation de la deuda national, que seria en pro de la prosperidad, 
tranquilidad y fuerza national de Honduras. 

(f) Philip Brown. 

Ministro Americano en Honduras. 

Tegucigalpa, Julio 17 de 1909. 



52 
Anexo "B." 



Cablegram as. 



Tegucigalpa, Diciembre 10 de 1910. 
Paredes, 

Consulado Honduras, 

Xueva York. 
Acepte propuesta, firme arreglo y regrese. 

Davila. 



Xueva York, Diciembre 11 de 1910. 
Presidents Davilla, 

Tegucigalpa, Honduras. 
Consulte situacion personas importantes, resolver suerte Ke- 
publica. 

Paredes. 



Anexo "B." ' 

Xueva York, Diciembre 21 de 1910. 
Presidente Davila. 

Tegucigalpa. Honduras. 
•He rehusado flrmar Convention protectora'do Americano plan 
Santo Domingo. Cumplido mi deber, presento mi renuhcia. 

Paeedes. 



Tegucigalpa, Diciembre 29 de 1910. 
Paredes, 

Consulado Honduras, 

Xueva York. 
Pais esta al borde de una desastrosa guerra civil. Solo el em- 
prestito puede salvarlo. Medite patridticamente. Hay que bacer 
esfuerzos por ganar tiempo. Emprestito so hara ;i despecho de 
nosotros. Procuremos siqniera no ensangrentar Republican Espero 
detalles. 

Davila. 



53 

Anexo "B." 

Tegucigalpa, Enero 20 de 1911. 
Paredes, 

Consulado Honduras, 

Nueva York. 
ISTo se a'dmite renuncia. Eirme emprestito mayor brevedad. Toda 
la responsabilidad la aoepta el Gobierno. Guerra civil se presenta 
formidable. Emprestito puede evitar derramamiento de sangre y 
preparar evolucion provecbosa impidiendo que Bonilla llegue al 
poder. Suscriba contratos esta semana. Conteste. 

Davila. 



Anexo "B." 

Tegucigalpa, 12 de Enero de 1910. 
Sr. Ministro de Honduras, 

Gral. Juan E. Paredes, 

Consulado General de Honduras, 

66 Beaver St., • 

New York. 
Muy estimado amigo : 

Ttecibi sus apreciables cartas del 28 de Nov.'y 5 de Die. anteriores. 

Ante todo debo manifestar a TJd. que se ha creado una situacion 
muy dificil en este pais. La emigracion es mucha, como nunca, y 
voluntaria, pues los mismos que estan fuera'del pais dicen que el 
Gobierno no los hostiliza, pero que no quieren volver a Honduras 
sino en armas para ejercer venganzas. Estrada Cabrera, que es el 
autor de esta guerra y de la de Agosto del afio proximo anterior, 
ha desplegado una actividad prodigiosa para que la revolution se 
produzca, y los elementos todos se han conjurado contra el Gobier- 
no, injustamente. Para salir de estas dincultades tenemos que 
batallar mucho. 

El Gobierno de Honduras estaba notificado oflcialmente de que 
si no firmaba el emprestito, este se llevaria a cabo 'de todos modos, 
en peores condiciones para la Eepublica. Sinembargo nada dijimos, 
ninguna promesa hicimos sino hasta esperar indicaciones de Ud. 
La ultima propuesta h'echa por los Banqueros que Ud. nos trasmitio 
por cablegrama la consideramos como decifeiva, y por eso se le dio 
orden de que firmara y regresara. El Ministro Americano me 



51 

pidio copia de ese cable y se la di. Cuando Ud. rehuso firmar el 

Convenio en Washington, el disgusto del Departamento rayo en 

indignacion. 

° ■ i 

Davila. 



Anexo "B." 

..f 

Tegucigalpa, Enero 27 de 1911. ' 
Paredes, 

Consulado Honduras, 

Nueva York. 
Tomada La Ceiba. Tambien tornado San Marcos Colon por in- 
vasion frontera Nicaragua. La guerra segun declaracion oficial 
produjose por tardanza en firmar emprestito, no obstante promesa 
heeha desde 10 Diciembre. Guerra es cruel de partidos enconados 
que aniquilaran pais, y el emprestito se hara todos modos. Depori- 
gamos el amor propio y evitemos ruina de Honduras. Si Ud. 1 no 
quiere firmar ayudele a Lazo. Trabajemos en la obra comuri de la 
paz. 

Davila. 



Importantes Manifestaciones Del Ex-Presidente Juan J. Estrada 
en New York 



Asegura que las revoluciones estalladas en Nicaragua han sido ' 
fomentadas por companias norteamericanas. 



; Y pide el Protectorado 



Del New York Times (fecha 10 de Septiembre) traducimos lo si- 
guiente : 

"En el curso de una entrevista que tuvo aver un reporter del 
Times con el general Juan J. Estrada, quien vive en Brooklyn en- 
el Hotel St. George, dijo que sin la intervencion efectiva del Go- 
bierno de Estados Unidos, el estado de guerra continuaria en Ni- 
caragua y traeria complicaciones a este pais con Inglaterra y Alema- 
nia. 

El general Estrada declaro que el tiene perfecto derecho i la-. 



55 

Presidencia de Nicaragua, y expreso el convencimiento de que ciertoft 
iiorteamericanos son los causantes de la situaeion actual de aquellat 
Kepublica. 

Acompana a Estrada el general J. M. Moncada, su ex-Ministro. 

— Quiero dirigir por medio de The New York Times, drjo Es- 
trada, algunas palabras al pueblo norteamericano, y expresar, sobre 
todo que sin el Gobierno de Estados Unidos, Nicaragua* jamas podra 
vivir. . . . 

— (jAlu'de usted al protectorado de Estados Unidos? le pregunta-' 
mos. 

—Si, contesto, sin embarazo alguno. Hablo de un protectorado al 
estilo del de Panama y Cuba. Desearia yo que el Gobierno de Esta- 
dos Unidos, republicano 6 democrata, no quite sus ojos de Nicaragua 
y vigile alia las elecciones; en una palabra, que sea el arbitro y 
el juez de nuestros destinos. Hablo en nombre mio y en el del 
Presidente Adolfo Diaz. Mis i'deas son sus ideas y las del partido' 
conservador. Ese es el linico camino por donde podemos llegar a 
la paz y al progreso. Yo soy todavia el Presidente titular de Ni- 
caragua. Yo no he renunciado ese titulo, como se ha dicho, sma 
que simplemente deposite el poder en el vice Presidente Diaz du- 
rante mi ausencia, y el esta mandando dentro del periodo ' de mi 
eleccion. 

Y el general Estrada continuo expresandose como sigue: 

"Durante los ultimos veinte anos Nicaragua ha sido gobernada 
por un sistema salvaje. Alia no ha habido realmente elecciones. 
Todo ha sido una farsa. Todos han querido ser Presidentes. El 
resultado h'a sido la anarquia, hasta llegar al estado caotico actual., 
Pero no hemos sido solamente los nicaragiienses la causa de todas 
esas dificultades; de ellas somos los menos responsables. Yoaseguro 
que la mayoria de las revoluciones, sino todas, en los ultimos tiem- 
pos, han sido ,fomentadas, apoyadas y 'dirigidas por companias, 
norteamericanas ansiosas de obtener de nosotros concesiones y mono- 
polios de negoeios. ^Cual ha sido el resultado? Cuando llegue a 
la Presidencia, me encontre con conspiraciones por todos lados.' 
El general Mena, mi Ministro de la Guerra, estaba fraguando ima 
revolucion. El general Chamorro, otro de los jefes que me acorn-; 
paharon en la revolucion contra Zelaya, tambien estaba conspirandq 
por su cuenta. Se que una compania norteamericana, que iba tra& 



56 



de una concesion de ferroearril, era la que alentaba el golpe revo- 
lucionario en contra mia, para hacer su negocio. Tuve las pruebas. 
y la revolucion iba a estallar el 14 de mayo de 1911. Puse en 
arresto a Mena. Aleje de mi lado a ChamorrO. Los conservadores 
que me rodeaban, clamaron imos por la libertad de Mena, y otros 
se declararon sostenedores de Cbamorro. Para evitar la guerra, 
deposite el poder en el vice Presidente Diaz, habiendo podido ro^ 
dearme de los liberales, en cuyas filas habia yo figurado. En la 
conspiracion contra mi Gobierna estuvieron interesadas companias 
norteamericanas." 

Termina el reportaje de The Times, asi: 

"El general Estrada fue rudamente franco, demasiado franco, 
cuando concluyo diciendo que admitia qtie la revolucion que el ha- 
bia encabezado contra Zelaya, habia recibido la ayuda financiera de 
eiertas companias norteamericanas, establecidas en la costa atlantica 
de Nicaragua. Dijo que tales companias contribuyeron para la 
revolucion de Bluefields, con un millon de dolares; y la casa de 
Joseph W. Beers con unos doscientos mil, y la de Samuel Weil con 
cerca de ciento cincuenta mil dolares." 

Diario del Salvador, Octubre 2, 1912. 



Nota de Mr. Knox al encaegado de Negocios de Nicaragua. 

"Es notorio que desde que se firmaron las Convenciones de Wash- 
ington de 1907, el Presidente Zelaya ha mantenido a Centroamerica 
en constante inquietud y turbulencia ; que ha violado flagrantemente 
y repetidas veces lo estipulado en dichas Convenciones, y por una 
influencia poderosa sobre Honduras, cuya neutralidad aseguran 
las Convenciones, ha tratado de desacreditar aquellas sagvadas 
obligaciones internacionales, con detrimento de Costa Rica, El 
Salvador y C4iiatem;>la,cuyos Gobiernos solo con much a paciencia han 
podido mantener lealmente el compromiso solemne contraido en 
Washington bajo los auspicios de los Estados Unidos y de Mejico. 

"Es igualmente notorio que, bajo el regimen del Presidente 
Zelaya, las instituciones republicanas han dejado de existir en Nica- 
ragua, excepto de nombre; que la opinion publica y la prensa han 
sido esiranguladas, y que las prisiones han sido el precio de toda 
demostraci6n de patriotismo. 



57 

"Por consideracion personal hacia usted, me abstengo de discutir 
innecesariamente los penosos detalles de un regimen que, por 
desgracia, ha sido un borron en la historia de Nicaragua, y un 
desengafio para un grupo de Eepiiblicas que solo necesitan la 
oportunidad para llenar sus aspiraciones de un Gobierno libre y 
honrado. 

"Por razon de los intereses de los Estados Unidos y de su partici- 
pacion en las Convenciones de Washington, la mayoria de las Be- 
publicas de Centroamerica ha llamado desde hace tiempo la atencion 
a este Gobierno contra tan irregular situacion. Ahora se agrega 
el clamor de una gran parte del pueblo nicaragiiense por medio de 
la revolucion de Bluefields, y el hecho de que dos americanos, que, 
segiin conviccion adiquirada por este Gobierno, eran oficiales al 
servicio de las fuerzas revolucionarias, y, por consiguiente, tenian 
derecho a ser tratados conforme a las practicas modernas de las 
naciones civilizadas, han sido fusilados por orden directa del Presi- 
dente Zelaya, habiendo precedido a su ejecucion, segun informes, 
las mas barbaras crueldades. Ahora viene informe oficial de que 
el Consulado americano en Managua ha sido amenazado, y con esto 
se colma el proceder siniestro de una administracion caracterizada 
tambien por la tirania sobre sus propios ciudadanos, y que hasta 
el reciente ultra je hacia este pais se habia manifestado en una serie 
de pequenas molestias e indignidades que hicieron imposible desde 
hace algunos meses mantener una Legaeion en Managua. Desde 
todo punto de vista es evidente que ha llegado a ser dificil para los 
Estados Unidos retardar mas una actitud decidida, en atencion a 
los deberes que tiene para con sus propios ciudadanos, con su 
dignidad, con Centroamerica y con la civilizacion. 

"El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos esta convencido de que la 
revolucion actual representa los ideales y la voluntad de la mayoria 
de los nicaraguenses mas fielmente que el Gobierno del Presidente 
Zelaya, y que con su centro pacifico es tan extenso como el que tan 
cruelmente ha tratado de mantener el Gobierno de Managua. 

"A todo esto se agrega ahora que, segun informe oficiado de 
diversas fuentes, han aparecido indicios en las provincias occi- 
dentals de Nicaragua de un levantamiento en favor de un candi- 
date presidencial intimamente ligado con el viejo regimen, en el 
cual es faeil yer nuevos elementos que tienden a una condicion de 
anarquia, que pueden llegar con el tiempo a destruir toda fuente de 



58 

Gobierno responsable con el cual pueda el de los Estados Unidos 
discutir la reparacion por la muerte de Cannon y Groee, y hasta 
dificultar la protection con qne debe asegurarse a los ciudadanos y 
los intereses americanos de Nicaragua. 

"En estas cireunstancias, el Presidente de los Estados Unidos ya 
no puede sentir por el Gobierno del Presidente Zelaya aquel respeto- 
y confianza que debia mantener en sns relaciones diplomaticas, que 
comprenden el deseo y la facultad de conservar el respeto debido- 
entre un Estado y otro. 

"El Gobierno de Nicaragua que usted ha representado hasta ; 
ahora se servira quedar enterado por la presente notification, que 
lo sera tambien al jefe de la revolution, de que el Gobierno de los- 
Estados Unidos le hara estrictamente responsable de la proteccion 
de la vida de los americanos, e igualmente a las facciones de hecho- 
que dominan las regiones del este y del oeste de la Eepublica de- 
Nicaragua. 

"Eespecto de la reparacion que debe hacerse por la muerte de los-' 
Sres. Cannon y Groce, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos se resiste 
a imponer al inocente pueblo de Nicaragua un castigo tan pesado 
en expiation de las culpas de un regimen mantenido por la fuerza, 
6 4 exigir del Gobierno que surja, si este sigue una politica diferente, 1 
en pago de aquella penalidad. 

"Al discutirse esta reparacion, debe discutirse al mismo tiempo- 
la existencia en Managua de un Gobierno capaz de responder a la 
demanda. 

"Debe tambien considerarse hasta donde puede llegar la responsa- 
bilidad de los que perpetraron el hecho, y las torturas que pre- 
cedieron a la ejecucion, si esto se comprueba; y la cuestion de si 
el nuevo Gobierno esta enteramente desligado de las presentes 
intolerables condiciones, y es digno de que se le tenga confianza de 
evitar la repeticion de actos semejantes. 

"El tal caso, el Presidente de. los Estados Unidos, como amigo- 
que es de Nicaragua y de las otras Repiiblicas de Centroamerica, 
estara dispuesto a reducir la indemnizacion a lo que realmente se 
deba a los padres de los fusilados, y exigir el castigo solamente de 
aqnellos que lo merezcan. 

"De acuerdo con esta politica, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos 
suspendera temporalmente su demanda de reparacion, mientras 
tanto. dara los pasos necesarios para la debida proteccion de los. 
intereses americanos. 



59 

"Para asegurar la futura protection de los legitimos intereses 
americanos, y en consideration a los intereses de la mayoria de las 
Repiiblicas centroamericanas, la mismo que con la esperanza de 
hacer mas efectivos los oficios amistosos establecidos por las Con- 

r ,*■; 'J '.'.II. ('.'.' ' • 

venciones de Washington, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos se 
reserva para tiempos mas oporiunos el discutir las estipulaciones 
con que el Gobierno constitucional de Nicaragua se obligue, por 
medio de una 'Convention, en beneficio de todos los Gobiernos 
interesados, a garantizar en lo futuro el mantenimiento de las Con- 
venciones de' Washington y sus ideas pacificas y progresistas. 
1 "Por todo'lo anterior, usted debe de comprender que ha terminado 
srt mision de Ehcargado de Negocios, y tengo el honor de remitir 
ad junto su pasaporte para el caso de que usted quiera salir del pais. 
' "Debo agregarle al mismo tiempo que, aunque su mision diplo- 
matica ha terminado, tendre mucho gusto en recibir a usted, lo 
niismO'que teridfe el • gusto de recibir al representante de la revolu- 
tion^ uno y otro como niedios no oficiales de comunicacion entre el 
Gobierno ' de los fistados Unidos 1 ' y las autoridades de facto, con 
quienes habre de tratar para laproteccion de los intereses ameri- 
canos, mientras se estableee en ■ Nicaragua un Gobierno con el cual 
•puedan los EstadoS Unidos mahtener relaciones diplomat! cas. — 
Knox/'rr '>: 'i 



ANEXO '%",,, , 

MENSAJE dirigido por el Senor Presidente Madriz al de los 
Estados Unidps. Mr. Taf t, con motivo del , desembarque de marinos 
de los buques de guerra americanos en Bluefields. 



Campo Marte, 15 de Junio, 1910. 
Exmo Senor Presidente William H. Taft, Washington: 

Permitame V. E. referirme a ciertos hechos relacionados con 
nuestra guerra civil. , 

El 27 de Mayo ultimo las fuerzas de este Gobierno tomaron por 
asalto el Bluff, position fuerte que defiende a Bluefields. El jefe 
de esas fuerzas tenia orden de proceder inmediatamente a tomar la 
ciudad que se hallaba desguarnecida, lo que habria asegurado el 
termino de la campana. Esto se frustro por la actitud del Co- 



60 

mandante del Crucero Americano Paducah, que intimo al jefe de 
miestras tropas que se opondria con sus fuerzas a la toma de la 
ciudad y que, al efecto, desembarco marinos americanos para 
ocuparla. Con esto la revolucion aseguro su base de operaciones, 
pudo sacar de la ciudad todas sus fuerzas, para oponerlas a una sola 
de nuestras oolumnas, y se frustro una combination preparada cuida- 
dosamente y de exito seguro. 

Este Gobierno compro en Nueva Orleans el barco ingles VENUS, 
hoy Maximo Jerez, que salio para San Juan del Norte con licencia 
de las autoridades americanas, despues de exh'ibir BONA FIDE 
todos los elementos de guerra que traia a bordo como articulos de 
libre comercio. En San Juan del Norte fue nacionalizado como 
buque nicaragiiense, armado en guerra y destinado a bloquear el 
puerto de Bluefields. El bloqueo tenia por objeto impedir que la 
revolucion siguiera reeibiendo como antes, arnxas, provisiones y 
recursos de New Orleans. El Gobierno de V. E. ha negado a nues- 
tro barco el derecho de bloqueo respecto de los buques americanos 
y ha quedado abierta a la revolucion la fuente de New Orleans. 

La toma del Bluff dio a este Gobierno posesion de la Aduana de 
Bluefields, con lo que esperaba privar a la revolucion de la renta 
de la Aduana. El Gobierno de V. E. ha declarado que los derechos 
de Aduana deben pagarse a la revolucion, y esto ha frustrado en 
gran parte la victoria de nuestras armas en el Bluff. 

El Gobierno de V. E. nos ha negado el derecho de impedir el 
paso frente al Bluff de la naves americanas que vayan con deslino 
.5 una aduana revolucionaria que acaba de establecerse en Schooner 
Key, sobre el rio Escondido, no obstante el decreto de este Gobierno 
que cierra el puerto y prohibe ese transito como medida necesaria 
de defensa y pacificacion. 

Un dia el Comandante del Paducah amenazo al del Mjvximo 
Jerez con hacer fuego contra este y hundirlo, si nuestras fuerzas 
intentaban atacar a Bluefields. 

Habiendo notado el jefe de nuestras tropas en el Bluff, quo 
embarcaciones al servicio de la revolucion usaban la bandera ameri- 
cana para pasar frente a la fortaleza sin ser detenidas, notifico al 
Comandante del Paducah su resolucion de impedir el libre transito 
de esos barcos frente a sus posiciones. Los Comandantes del Pa- 
ducah y del Dubuque contestaron que harian respetar con los fuegos 



61 



de sus canones el comercio americano, aunque consistiese en armas 
y municiones para la revolucion y que un disparo contra esas 
embareaciones signiflcaria declarar la guerra a los Estados Unidos. 

Por ultimo se que en Bluefielcls, guarclado aun por marinos 
americanos se prepara un ataque sobre nuestras posiciones del Bluff 
y Laguna de Perlas. La intimacion del Comandante del Paducah 
.nos impide anticiparnos a la accion del enemigo como por legitima 
defensa tenemos derecho de hacerlo. 

Es mi deber decir francamente a V. E. que no hallo modo de 
conciliar los hechos enumerados con los principios de la neutralidad 
proclamados por la ley de las naeiones; y teniendo confianza en 
la alta rectitud del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, no vacilo en 
dirigirme a V. E. para pedirle respetuosamente la rectification de 
las ordenes dadas a sus autoridades navales en Bluefields. Asi 
podra este Gobierno concluir facilmente con una revolucion san- 
grienta y asoladora que carece de vida propia y que esta. labrando 
la ruina de Nicaragua. 

Presidente 

(f) Jose Madriz. 



ANEXO "E." 

A Ministro Relaciones, Managua: 

Washington, junio 19 de 1910. 

Permaneee inalterable la politica de los Estados Unidos expuesta 
en la carta del Secretario de Estado, del 1° de diciembre de 1909, 
al senor Eodriguez entonces Encargado de ISTegocios, por la cual se 
rompieron las relaciones con el Gobierno de Zelaya. 

Esta carta y la aplicacion conforme de la misma politica a la 
situacion que ha venido creandose, han sido debidamente publicadas. 
Eespecto a lo que dice el telegrama del Dr. Madriz al Presidente, 
el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos no hizo mas que dar el paso 
acostumbrado de prohibir el bombardeo 6 combates a cualquiera de 
las dos facciones dentro de la indefensa ciudad comercial de Blue- 
fields, protegiendo de ese modo los intereses americanos y otros 
intereses extranjeros, de la misma manera que lo habia hecho el 
comandante britanico, respecto de San Juan del Norte, en donde 
hay grandes intereses britanicos. El Gobierno de los Estados 



62 



Unidos ha reconocido el derecho de ambas facciones de mantener 
el bloqueo, pero ha rehusado permitir a buques que han sido ilegal 
y elandestinamente alistados en aguas americanas, molestar al 
eomercio americano. 

El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos simplemente exige que cada 
faccion cobre derechos solo en el territorio que se halle bajo su 
dominio de facto y no permitira que se recauden dobles derechos.. . 

Si hubiese ocurrido alguna violacion de la neutralidad, eso fue 
en relation con la salida del Venus, de Nueva Orleans en calidad 
de expedition de la faccion de Madriz. (f.) — Kxox. 



ANEXO "E." 



COPIA. 



Managua, 23 de Junio de 1910. 

Por el derecho de gentes ningun Gobierno neutral puede impedir 
ni estorbar en tiempo de guerra las operaciones militares que los 
beligerantes ejecutan legitimamente. Los extranjeros estan sujetos 
a todas las contingencias de esas operaciones lo mismo que los na- 
cionales. En consecuencia, no puedo considerar legal el hecho 
de que marinos americanos hayan impedido las operaciones de 
imestro ejercito sobre Bluefields. 

Respecto de la salida del "Venus" de Nueva Orleans, tengo la 
conviccion de que no ha habido violacion de las leyes de los Estados 
Unidos. Ademas, el zarpe dado por las autoridades de Nueva 
Orleans unicamente obligaba a la nave a guardar neutralidad du- 
rante el viaje, como sucedio en efecto. Terminado el viaje para 
el cual se habia dado el zarpe, entrada la nave en aguas agenas y 
nacionalizada conforme a las leyes nicaragiienses, las leyes y auto- 
lidades de 16s Estados Unidos nada han tenido que ver con el 
destino ulterior del buque, el cual ha podido y puede de derecho 
ejercitar todas las operaciones de la guerra, entre las cuales figura 
el bloqueo. 

Omito, por ah'ora. ob^ervar otros detalles de la nota de Mr. Knox; 
pero quiero hacer constar la seguridad que abrigo de que sin la 



63 

interposicion de las autoridades navales de los Estados Unidos en 
Bluefields, en la forma que explica mi cablegrama al Sehor Presi- 
dente Taft, Bluefields estaria tornado, la revolucion vencida y Nica- 
ragua en paz. 

(f) Madriz. 



ANEXO "E " 



TELEGKAMA. 



Bluff a las 5 p. m. del 23 de Julio de 1912. 
Senor Comandante General, Managua. 

El Senor Delegado del Ejecutivo me trascribio de San Juan del 
Norte el telegrama que Ud. le dirijio a el, trascribiendole el cable 
del Senor Consul General de Noruega en la Habana; tambien me 
trascribe los telegramas en que le habla de los vapores "Hiriam" y 
"Ulstein" y me dio instrucciones de lo que debia hacer a la llegada 
de dichos vapores. Como se me anuncio que estaban a la vista 
vapores, crei fuere el "Hiriam," hice dos comunicaciones : una 
dirijida al Capitan del vapor y otra al Comandante de las fuerzas 
navales de EE. U U. frente a esta fortaleza, las que dicen asi : 

"Bluff 21 de Julio de 1910. Senor Capitan del vapor "Hiriam," 
frente el Bluff. Trascribole: "(Aqui el cable trascrito por el senor 
Delegado del Ejecutivo y dirijido por el Senor Consul General de 
ISToruega en la Habana)" Tengo informes fidedignos que Ud. trae 
elementos de guerra a bordo para la revolucion encabezada por el 
General Juan J. Estrada. En consecuencia y de conformidad con 
las clausulas del cable antes trascrito, prevengo a Ud. entregar a 
este mando dichos elementos y de no hacerlo asi, sera confiscado el 
vapor de su mando de conformidad con la leyes de mi pais, decli- 
nando en Ud. de una vez, toda responsabilidad, y ademas le ad- 
vierto que la conducta que Ud. observe en este asunto, la pondre 
en conocimiento de mi Gobierno para que el a su vez, la ponga en 
conocimiento del Gobierno de Noruega, si asi lo estimare con- 
veniente. No dudo que Ud., penetrado del derecho y justicia que 
nos asiste, no opondra dificultades para la entrega de dichos ele- 
mentos. El presente es duplicado para que al pie de uno de los 
ejemplares, se sirva acusarme recibo. De Ud. S. S. (f ) F. M. Eivas, 
Inspector General de la Costa Atlantica." 



64 

La seglmda es como sigue: "El Bluff, 21 de Julio de 1910. 
Senor: Me permito trascribir a Ud. la comunicacion que .con 
fecha 16 del mes y aiio corrientes, lie recibido del Senor Delegado 
del Ejecutivo. San Juan del Xorte 16 del Julio de 1910. Senor 
General don Fernando M. Rivas. El Bluff. Con feelia 12 del 
eorriente mes, me dice el Senor President e, por telegrafo, que el 
Ministro General, Dr. Baca, ha recibido del Consul General de 
Xoruega en la Habana el siguiente cable. (Aqui el cable.) Este 
mando ha tenido noticias fidedignas que el vapor "Hiriam" trae 
elementos de guerra para revolucion que encabeza el General don 
Juan J. Estrada. Dirijo una comunicacion al Capitan de dicho 
vapor pidiendole la entrega de dichos elementos a este, apoyado en 
los coneeptos del cable antes trascrito. ISTo dudo que Ud.. impuesto 
de dicho cable, se convencera de la justicia y derecho que nos asiste, 
al expedir dichas ordenes a las cuales creo no pondra dificultades de 
ninguna especie, y caso tuviera objecion que hacer, espero se servhu 
participarmelo por escrito antes de que Ud. permita la entrada del 
Vapor "Hiriam" para Bluefields, cosa que dudo por el conocimiento 
que tengo de la neutralidad del Gobierno y del modo como Ud. 
lo ha sabido interpretar. De Ud. atto. SS., (f ) F. M. Rivas, 
Inspector general de la Costa Atlantica, al Comandante de las 
fuerzas Xavales de EE. UU. frente al Bluff.*' 

Este me contesto lo siguiente: 

"No.'B 6110, U. S. A. "Dubuque"' 3ra. elase, en la Bada de 
Bluefields, Nicaragua, C. A.. 22 de Julio de 1910. Senor. lro. 
Tengo el honor de acusar recibo de su comunicacdon de 21 de Julio 
de 1910. Bequerire a los vapores para que anclen cerca de mi 
buqUe mientras se determina la calidad de su cargamento ; entonees 
tomare la actitud que las circunstaneias demanden de acuerdo "Con 
las instrucciones de mi Gobierno con relaeion a la protecci6n del 
i 'iniTcio Americano y al mantenimiento de la neutralidad. Bespe- 
tuosamente, (f) H. B. Bines, Comandante \aval de los EE. UU. 
a I mando de bis niarinos presentes en la costa Oriental de Xienra- 
gua, al General F. M. Rivas, Comandante del Bluff." — "Nicaragua,. 
( . A.' - 

Aiinchc Heg6 el vapor "UMein ;" inniediatamente le niande un 
oficio igual al que diriji al Capitan del "lTiriain." pero se neg6 a 
recibirlo, manifestando que si algo querian con el, que se entendie- 



65 

ran con el Comandante del "Dubuque/' Las comunicaciones 
fueron entregadas a este Jefe, el cual manifesto que no respondia 
de que el Capitan del "Ulstein" quisiera 6 no recibir la comunica- 
cion, ni mucho menos ffrmar el duplicado que le mandaba como 
comprobante de que le habia enviado dicha coniunicacion. Ademas, 
el Comandante del "Dubuque" manifesto a los senores General 
Francisco Altschul y don Ofilio Argiiello, que me sirve de interprete, 
que el era partidario de los' revolucionarios y que le habia dicho 
al Capitan del "Ulstein" que si queria no se pusiera en coniunica- 
cion con nosotros ; que el lo apoyaba de una manera incondicional 
y al efecto, puso soldados y le ordeno entrara al puerto de Blue- 
iields, lo que verified hoy. He dirijido una protesta al representante 
del Consul de Noruega en Bluefields contra la conducta del Capitan 
del "Ulstein/' encabezando dicha protesta con la trascripcion del 
cable del Consul General de Noruega en la Habana. Esta coniuni- 
cacion sera remitida a su destino por medio del Comandante del 
"Dubuque" en caso quiera llevarla, dada la h'ostilidad de este 
Oficial de la Armada Americana, dudo llegue a su destino. Mien- 
tras en esta no haya una embarcacion de guerra al mando de un 
Jefe neutral que pertenezea a otra Nacion, los intereses del Go- 
bierno de Ud. estan a merced de los oficiales de la Armada Ameri- 
cana, que se inspiran en los consejos del Consul Americano en 
Bluefields, que es mas revolucionario que Estrada y Chamorro. 

Su subalterno, 

(f) F. M. Eivas. 



Anexo E 

"rJueva York, a la 1 :15 p. m. del 7 de diciembre. Presidente. 
Managua. Bevolucion y este Gobierno no aceptan nunca Iriat. 
Deposito en Dolores Estrada impedira mas derrame de sangre y 
desembarque americanos. Lea nota Knox a Bodriguez. Bolarios." 

"Nueva York, a las 6 :40 p.m. del 17 de diciembre. Presidente. 
Managua. Jiizgase falso nombramiento Madriz: no sera recono- 
cido por este Gobierno ni los de Centroamerica, y no terminarii 
revolucion. Bolanos." 

"ISTueva Orleans, a las 3 p. m. del 6 de noviembre. Presidente. 
Managua. Adolfo Diaz cablegrafio, via Guatemala, pidiendo 
urgentemente 1,000 rifles y 300,000 cartuchos. Altschul." 



66 

'"Xueva Orleans, a las 7 p. m. del 9 de noviembre. Presidente. 
Managua. Guatemala avisa a Bluefields cargamento aun no ha 
sido pagado. Ultimo oetubre enviara Bocas una gran cantitad 
cartuchos ; tambien hombres. De Bluefields contesto Diaz : "Tra- 
taremos sostener hasta llegada vapor." Altschul." 

"Nueva Orleans, a las 7:40 a. m. del 17 de noviembre. Presi- 
dente. Managua. Elementos de guerra llegaron a Bluefields; 
parecen ser los mismos avisados por telegrafo semana pasada, pro- 
cedentes Bocas. Buque "Tllstein" sale aliora para Puerto Barrios: 
lleva elementos de guerra. Altschul." 

"Nueva Orleans, a las 8 :38 del 18 de noviembre. Presidente. 
Managua. ULSTEIX 1 llegara a Puerto Barrios domingo, para 
trasladar 14 eajas rifles y 114,000 cartuchos a una gasolina que 
los llevara a Bluefields. Guatemala usa Puerto Barrios como base 
revolution. Altschul." 

"Bluefields, 15 de noviembre. Presidente de Guatemala. Si 
no se reciben elementos de guerra antes del 20, revolution debe ser 
abandonada. DIAZ." Cabrera contesto: "ULSTEIN, con ele- 
mentos de guerra, llegara dentro pocos dias." 

"Nueva Orleans, a las 11 a. m. del 24 de noviembre. Presidente. 
Managua. ULSTEIX salio para Bluefields limes, procedente de 
Puerto Barrio^ : llegara mamma a Bluefields. Altschul." 



Anexo E 

"Bluefields, Feb. 4 10. 

Rita Guatemala. (Estrada Cabrera.) 
Las ultimas nuevas son, Chamorro Camoapa. Mena en Santo 
Tomas abora listo combinar con Chamorro. Con ansias espero 
"ARTE." Diaz." 

"Bluefields, Feb. 5/10. 

Saenz Guatemala. (Estrada Cabrera.) 
Nenesitamos urgentemente 200,000 cartuchos Remington 43 y 
50,000 cartuchos. Puede Usted ordenar pronto envio? Ofrezco 
mi garantia. Adolfo Diaz." 



67 



■"Boaco, Feb. 4/10, via Bluefields. 
Saenz Guatemala. 
Triunfando. 

Antonio Mendez M." (General Guatemalteco.) 

"Bluefields, Marzo 7/10. 

Saenz Guatemala. (Estrada Cabrera.) 
Asuntos de Estado en actualidad. Paz esta enteramente en sus 
manos. Washington TANZIMAT sin consultar a Ud. en materia. 

"Bluefields, Nov. 8 

Aramburu New York. 
Pregunta Castrillo cual es la opinion en Washington referents 
a la nueva Repiiblica. Salio vapor? si no, cual es la causa? 
Cuando saldra? Conteste inmediatamente por clave Western 
Union. Diaz." 

"Washington, D. C, Enero 13. 
Estrada Bluefields. 
Aconsejan no escuchar Kimball. 

Castrillo." 

"Washington, D. C, Enero 14. 
Estrada Bluefields. 
Departamento no autoriza Kimball. 

Castrillo. " 

'"Washington, D. C, Enero 14. 
Estrada Bluefields. 
Departamento informa Madriz debilisimo. 

Castrillo." 



Anexo E 

"Washington, Feb. 12/10. 
Estrada Bluefields. 
Departamento procedera favor nuestro. 

Castrillo." 



68 

"Bluefields, Feb. 11/10. 

Castrillo Washington. 
Sabemos positivamente Madriz no tiene elementos guerra y 
trata consegnirlos Costa Pica, Honduras. Nuestras operacione? 
continuan fuertemente. Ejercito Chamorro cada dia mas fuerte. 
Corea alienta Madriz. Continue lucha pretendiendo apoyo moral 
armada americana Corinto y gabinete Washington influencia Me- 
xico. 

Estrada." 
minefields, Feb. 9/10. 

Chamorro Panama. 
Quiero saber cuantos americanos puede Ud. alistar inmediata- 
mente. Puedo mandar vapor Senator. Depende de su contesta- 
cion. '. * l!Wj 

Diaz." 

"Colon, Feb. 14/10. 

Diaz Bluefields. 
Puedo alistar no menos de 25 americanos. Si puede mandar 
vapor avise que dia llegara con seguridad al puerto de embarque. 

Qhamorro." 



AKEXO F 

Fragmento del Mensaje que el Presidente Madriz de Nica- 
ragua Escribio de su PropiaLetra Para ser Presentado al 
Coxgreso Nacional sin Tener Tiempo de Hacerlo. 



Sin embargo no puedo dejar de referirme a la principal de ellas, 
por que es la que explica la transicion politica que acabo de 
comunicaros. Me refiero a la intervencion de los Estados Unidos 
en nuestra contienda domestica. 

Esa intervencion ya la conoceis por el mensajc cablegrafico que 
sobre el particular dirigi al Presidente Taft. Suscintaniente os 
dare una idea de ella. 

Frustradas las negociaciones de paz que bubo a mediados de 
Marzo ultimo, entre este Gobierno y la faccion de Bluefields por 
baber pretendido el General Estrada establecer condiciones que yo 



69 



juzgue incompatibles con la dignidad de la Eepiiblica, fue preciso, 
para tratar de definir la situation, continua'r nuestras operaciones 
militares sobre al campo enemigo. Al efecto se enviaron por la via 
de tierra dos ejercitos : uno sobre Bluefields a las ordenes del General 
Don Paulino Godoy y otro sobre Eama a las del General Don Benito 
Chavarria. Por mar se despacharon de San Juan del Norte dos 
barcos armados en guerra, el Maximo Jerez, antes Venus, y el San 
Jacinto, bajo el mando del Delegado del .Ejecutivo, Dr. Julian 
Irias y el Jefe Expedicionario General Fernando M. Eivas. Las 
naves llevaban fuerzas suficientes de desembarco para asaltar El 
Bluff y atacar a Bluefields, en tanto que la columna del General 
Godoy empenase combate con las fuerzas revolucionarias que se 
hallaban fortificadas fuero de la ciudad. Los barcos debian desde 
luego establecer el bloque de Bluefields y cerrarlo por completo al 
comercio exterior para privar a los revolucionarios de los refuerzos 
y auxilios que les llegaban de New Orleans. La combination de 
estas operaciones debia dar por resultado la caida de Bluefields, que 
habia quedado sin defensa, y la derrota 6 el sometimiento de la 
revolution, privada por el bloqueo de toda cooperation exterior, sin 
la cual no podia subsistir. 

En la brillante Jornada del 27 de Junio las tropas del Maximo 
Jerez tomaron por asalto El Bluff, que se creia inexpugnable. Su 
posesion ponia en nuestras manos a Bluefields. El ejercito del 
General Godoy emperio contra las posiciones enemigas formidables 
y sangrientos combates que habrian sido coronados por la victoria 
si nuestras fuerzas del Bluff hubieran podido despojar al enemigo 
de su base de operaciones y atacarle por la retaguardia. La 
columna del General Chavarria derroto a los revolucionarios en 
El Toyal, cerca de Eama, y si nuestras fuerzas hubiesen vencido en 
Bluefields, Eama habria caido necesariamente. 

Pero en el momento decisivo, cuando todo el pais contemplaba 
con satisfaction el advenimiento de la paz, el poder de los Estados 
Uhidos se cruzo en nuestro camino, impidio nuestra victoria, y 
condenso de nnevo esa nube de sangre y de muerte que con dolor 
vemos toda via flotar en el horizonte de la patria. 

El Comandante' del crucero americano Paducah, estacionado en 
aguas de Bluefields, aduciendo razones inconsistentes a la luz del 
•derecho, intervino directamente en la contienda, protegiendo a los 
rebeldes, coartando la accion de nuestras armas y frustrando el 



70 

resultado de nuestros sacrificios y de nuestra victoria en El Bluff. 
Al efecto desembarco marinos para proteger a Bluefields e impedir 
el ataque de nuestras fuerzas a la ciudad rebelde, y segiin el relato 
de americanos imparciales, cuyos informes ha publicado la preiisa 
de los Estados Unidos, los marinos americanos han ido a reforzar 
las posiciones del ejercito de Estrada, desempenando el oficio de 
soldados de la revolucion. Esta pudo sacar de la ciudad todas sus 
fuerzas y llevarlas a combatir contra las nuestras, segura de que 
su base estaba invenciblemente defendida por los marinos ameri- 
canos. No se justifica esa conducta con la proteccion debida a los 
intereses extranjeros y principalmente a los americanos radicados 
en Bluefields. 

El Derecho International no autoriza esa excepcion a, los incon- 
testables fueros de la soberania y de la beligerancia. Como soberanos 
podiamos imponer nuestra autoridad en una ciudad nicaraguense : 
como beligerantes podiamos atacar y destruir al enemigo en 
cualquiera parte que no fuese territorio ageno. Bluefields era la 
cuna y el asiento de la revolucion; alii estaba su Gobierno, alii el 
deposito de sus recursos, provisiones y armas. Tomarla 6 rendirla 
era destruir la base de la revolucion. En cuanto al peligro de los 
intereses americanos, la ley internacional establece que los 
extranjeros residentes en un lugar estan sujetos a todas las 
contingencias de las operaciones de guerra ejecutadas legitimamente 
por un beligerante. Esta tesis, indiscutible en principio, fue 
sostenida por el Gobierno americano cuando el bombardeo de San 
Juan del Norte, ciudad abierta, desarmada, puramente comercial, 
por el buque Cyane, de la marina de guerra de los Estados Unidos 
el ano de 1854. 

Hay mas : este Gobierno compro en New Orleans el buque Venus, 
de la marina mercante inglesa. Antes de zarpar el buque con destino 
a San Juan del Norte, los agentes de la revolucion en New Orleans 
trataron de impedir su salida por medio de las autoridades de aquel 
puerto, alegando violacion de las leyes de los Estados Unidos. Las 
autoridades examinaron cuidadosamente el caso, inspeccionaron la 
nave, oyeron las pruebas producidas por una y otra parte y con 
consu'lta de los Departamentos de Justicia y Comercin del Gobierno 
Americano, resolvieron que el viaje de la nave no podia impedirae 
conforme a las leyes de los Estados Unidos. El Venus train a bordo 
armas destinadas al Goliiernn tie Nicaragua en San Jnan del Norte,. 



71 

pero en los Estados Unidos el comercio de armas es libre, salvo el 
derecho del beligerante' para confiscarlas como contrabando de 
guerra. 

El Venus salio de New Orleans llevando sus papeles en regla y 
el zarpe de las autoridades del. puerto. La licencia que se le habia 
otorgado a lo sumo obligaba a la nave a guardar neutralidad 
durante el viaje. No podia extenderse a mas, sobre todo no siendo 
amerieana la bandera del buque. El Venus guardo las condiciones 
del zarpe hasta el puerto de su destino y llego desarmado a San 
Juan del Norte. Alii se verifico a presencia y con intervention del 
senor Consul Britanico el cambio de la bandera inglesa por la 
nicaragiiense, despues de lo cual se armo la nave en guerra y se la 
destino a operar contra los rebeldes de Bluefields. Nada hubo en 
todo eso que lesionara las leyes de los Estados Unidos, ni la ley 
internacional. Con todo, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos ha 
declarado que el Venus no puede ejercer contra el comercio ameri- 
cano el derecho de registro en alta mar ni el de bloqueo, so pretexto 
de que habia salido de New Orleans enganando a las autoridades de 
los Estados Unidos. 

Con eso quedaron abiertas para la revolucion todas las fuentes 
exteriores de que habia venido alimentandose, en especial la de 
New Orleans, de donde han salido ultimamente considerables 
remesas de pertrechos de guerra con destino a la revolucion. Este- 
hecho explica claramente el empeno que ha habido en impedir el 
bloqueo. 

En El Bluff se hallaba establecida la aduana principal de la costa, 
por una ley anterior a la revolucion. La posesion de este puerto nos 
dio el dominio de la aduana y el derecho de hacer nuestro el pro- 
ducto de la renta. El Gobierno americano declaro que ese product© 
correspondia a la faccion de Estrada y dispuso que el comercio 
americano lo pagase a la revolucion en una nueva aduana que esta 
ha creado en Schooner — Key, sobre el rio Escondido. 

Estando nosotros en posesion del Bluff podiamos todavia impedir 
la entrada al rio a todas las embarcaciones que intentasen penetrar 
hasta la aduana revolucionaria. Los Comandantes del Paducah y 
del Dubuque amenazaron con el fuego de sus canones al Jefe de 
nuestras fuerzas en El Bluff, si intentaba interceptar el comercio 
americano. Un disparo, le dijeron, hecho contra una embarcacion 
que lleve bandera amerieana sera considerado como una declaracion 
de guerra contra los Estados Unidos. 



72 

Para asegurar la inipimidad del transito de las naves por delante 
del Bluff, los Comandantes notificaron que pondrian siempre a 
bordo de aquellas una guardia de marinos americanos, y eso han 
hecho invariablemente. Hoy, par virtud de aquella intimation, 
pasan frente al Bluff con la bandera americana toda clase de 
embarcaciones, inclusive goletas de San Andres y Providencia, 
cargadas de provisiones para Bluefields. Mas aun, hasta un re- 
molcador empleado por el enemigo en operacoines de guerra y que 
una vez hizo fuego sobre una lancha que llevaba gente nuestra, pasa 
frente al Bluff protegido por la bandera americana. 

Cuando nuestras fuerzas hubieron ocupado toda la costa, desde 
San Juan del Norte hasta el Cabo de G-racias, el Delegado del Poder 
Ejecutivo mando establecer una aduana en Laguna de Perlas para 
el cobro de derechos sobre la importation y exportation de los 
distritos sujetos a nuestra autoridad. El Comandante del Dubuque 
contesto a la notification que se le hizo de este aeuerdo, imponiendo 
restricciones que practicamente equivalian a dejar siempre en manos 
de la faction de Estrada las rentas de la Costa. En fin, no obstante 
la ocupacion de Bluefields por los marinos americanos y la neu- 
tralidad en que se aparentaba mantenerla, s#preparo alii un ataque 
sobre nuestra position de Laguna de Perlas, sin que nos haya sido 
posible prevenir el intento del enemigo llevando antes nuestras 
armas al centro de sus maquinaciones. 

Como algunos de los buques que navegan entre los puertos de 
los Estados Unidos y Bluefields son de nacionalidad noruega, este 
Gobierno gestiono ante el de Noruega para que hiciese respetar 
por su bandera la clausura del puerto de Bluefields. Ese Gobierno, 
que habia reconocido la legitimidad del mio, se creyo en el deber 
de deferir a la petition y al efecto dio sus instrucciones en ese 
sentido a sus legaciones en Washington y l'a Habana, y al Vice- 
consul noruego en Bluefields. El Gobierno americano intervino 
oficiosamente con una comunicacion dirigida al Ministro noruego 
en Washington, objetando aquella -orden so pretexto de que el 
bloqueo de Bluefields era imperfecto y que perjudicaba los intereses 
del cnmercio americano. 

Habiendo llegado ;i Bluefields el vapor noruego I'lstein. del que 
teniamos aviso que era portador de elementos de guerra para la 
pevoluci6n, so le dirigio un oficio por nuestro Comandante en El 
Bluff previniendole In entrega del contrabando de guerra que trajese 



73 

a bordo. El Capitan del Ulstein se nego a recibir la comunicacion, 
y contraviniendo a nuestras ordenes y a las de su propio Soberano; 
entro a continuacion en el puerto custodiado por los marinos del 
Dubuque. 

Con motive- de haber contestado el Comandante del Bluff al fuego 
de artilleria que le han hecho los revolucionarios estacionadas en 
Halfway — Key, y de que uno de sus proyectiles cayo cerca de Blue- 
fields, el Comandante del Dubuque le comunico que la repeticion 
de ese hecho seria considerado como bombardeo a Bluefields. . . . 



AKEXO "G." 

Depositado en Managua a las 11 p. m. del 14 de Setbre. 1912. 
Eecibido en Bluefields a las 12 m. del 15. 

Behoves Jefes PoUUcos, Gooernador e Intendente y Comandantes 
de Armass 

Trascribo a Ud. la siguiente comunicacion que con fecha 13 del 
corriente dirigio a esta Secretaria el Exelentisimo Sehor Ministro 
de los EE. UU. George F. Weitzel, a fin de que se sirva darle la 
mayor publicidad : 

"Legation de los EE. TJU. de America, Managua 13 de Setiembre 
de 1912. — Excelencia. — Tengo la honra de informar a V. E. 
que el Departamento de Estado me ha dado instrucciones por cable 
•de trascribir al G-obierno de V. E. y de modo no oficial a los jefes 
rebeldes, asi como hacer publica la siguiente declaracion autorizada 
de la politica de los EE. UU. en los presentes disturbios. La poli- 
tica del G-obierno de EE. UU. en los presentes disturbios de Nica- 
ragua, es tomar las medietas necesarias para una proteccion adecua- 
da de la Legacion de Managua, mantener abiertas las comunica- 
ciones, protejer la vida y la propiedad americana. Al desconocer a, 
Zelaya a cuyo regimen de barbarie y currupcion puso termino la 
ISTacion Mcaragiiense despues de una sangrienta guerra, el gobierno 
de Estados Unidos condeno no solo al individuo sino el sistema y 
este gobierno no podria tolerar ningun movimiento para restablecer 
el mismo regimen destrucfivo. El gobierno de Estados Unidos en 
consecuencia se opondra a ciialquier restauracion del Zelayismo y 
prestara su eficaz apoyo moral a, la causa del buen gobierno legal- 



74 



mente constituido para beneficio del pueblo de Nicaragua a quien ha 
4xatado de ayudar hace largo tiempo en sit justa aspiracion hacia 
la paz j prosperidad bajo un gobierno constitucional y de orden. 

Un grupo como de 125 plantadores americanos residentes en una 
region de Nicaragua, han pedido proteccion. Como dos docenas 
de casas americanas que hacen negocios en aquel pais han pedido pro- 
teccion, los bancos americanos que han hecho inversiones de fondos 
en ferrocarriles y vapores en Nicaragua como parte de un plan para 
el alivio de la angustiosa situacion financiera de aquel, han pedido 
proteccion. Los ciudadanos americanos que estan ahora en servicio 
del gobierno de Nicaragua y hasta la propia Legation se han visto 
expuestos a peligro inmediato durante los fuegos. Dos ciudadanog 
americanos se dice que han sido barbaramente asesinados: ademas 
del recla,mo Emery, dedido a ciudadanos americanos, y de la indem- 
nizacion por la muerte de Cannon y G-roce durante la guerra de 
Zelaya, hay varias reclamaciones de americanos e intereses origina- 
dos por concesiones en Washington. Los Estados Unidos tienen el 
compromiso de ejercer su influencia para el mantenimiento de la 
paz general que esta seriamente amenazada por el presente levanta- 
miento y en este sentido hacer cumplir .extrictamente las conven- 
ciones de Washington y prestar debido apoyo a sus designios y pro- 
positos. Todas las repiiblicas Centro Americanas pueden contar 
con poderosos medios de cooperation. He aqui los importantes 
intereses morales, politicos y materiales que requieren proteccion. 

Cuando el ministro americano pidio al gobierno de Nicaragua 
que protegiera la vida y propiedades americanas, ei ministro de 
Relaciones Exteriores respondio que las tropas del gobierno debian 
ocuparse en debelar la rebelion, agregando en consecuencia : "Mi 
gobierno desea que el gobierno de Estados Unidos garantice con 
sus propias fuerzas la seguridad y la prosperidad de los ciudadanos 
americanos en Nicaragua y que haga extensiva la proteccion a todos 
los habitantes de la Eepublica." En esta situacion la politica do 
los Estados Unidos sera protejer la vida y propiedad de sus ciuda- 
danos rle manera indieada. para protejer al gobierno legal y organin 
zado de tal manera que Nicaragua puede reanudar sn programa 
do roforma, libre del obstaculo pnesto por los viciosos elementos qua 
qnerian restaurar los modos.de Zelaya, incitando al General Mena 
a rebelarse con flagrante violacion de sus promosas dadas a sit 



75 

propio gobierno y al ministro americano y Pacto Dawson, por el 
ciial estaba solemnemente obligado, y su tentativa para derroear al 
gobierno de su propio pais con miras exclusivamente egoistas y sin 
tener siquiera la pretension de luchar por un principio, hacen que 
la presente rebelion sea desde su origen la mas inexcusable en los 
anales de Centro America. La indole de los actuales disturbios y 
los procedimientos empleados imprimen a esos disturbios el oaracter 
de una anarquia mas bien que el de una revolucion ordinaria. 

La condicion moral recomendable de aquellos que inmediatamente 
hicieron causa comun con Mena asi como su conducta incivilizada 
y salvage al romper un armisticio, maltratar mujeres, violar su 
palabra de honor, torturar a ciudadanos pacificos,, exigir contribu- 
ciones y sobre todo el bombardear barbaramente la ciudad de Mana- 
gua con destruecion deliberada de vidas inocentes y de propiedades 
y la muerte de mujeres, ninos y enfermos en el Hospital, los crueles 
y barbaros asesinatos por centenares que se refieren de Leon identi- 
fican a la rebelion de Mena con el aborrecible e intolerable regimen 
de Zelaya. 

Acepte V. E. las renovadas seguridades de mi estima y mas 
distinguida consideracion. 

George F. Weitzel, 

Ministro Americano. 

A. S. E. 

DOisr Diego Manuel Chamoreo, 

Ministro de E. R. E. E." 

De Ud. Atto. S.S. 

Diego M. Chamorro, 

Ministro de B. R. E;E. 



Anexo "H." 

Decreto del Dictador Diaz. 



"El Presidente de la Eepublica, Considerando : que la Asamblea. 
Nacional Constituyente convocada por decreto de 5 de abril de 
1911 se extralimito en el ejercicio de su mandato: por tanto, y en 
consejo de Ministros,-Descreta : 



76 

Art. 1°. Mientras la Asamblea National Constltyente que ense- 
guida se convocara, no disponga otra eosa, la constitution actual 
solo queda vigente en cuanto determine las atribuciones del Poder 
Ejecutivo y del Poder Judicial — El Poder Ejecutivo asume el 
Poder Legislativo. 

Art. 2°. — Declaranse concluidas las funciones de la Asamblea Na- 
tional Constituyente convocada por decreto de 5 de abril de 1911. 

Art. 3°. — Convocase a los pueblos a elecciones para diputados a 
una Asamblea Constitutional que reformara definitivamente la 
'Constitucion, y leyes constitutivas ; al propio tiempo que ejercera 
las funciones de Legislativa. 

Dado en' Managua, en la Casa Presidential el dia 18 de Octubre 
de 1912.- — Adolfo Diaz. — El Ministro de la Gobernacion — Miguel 
Cardenas — Ministro de Hacienda — Pedro Eafael Cuadra — El 
Ministro de EE. EE. e II. PP.— Diego M. Chamorro— El Sub-Srio, 
de Guerra y Marina — Benjamin Cuadra — El Ministro de Fomento 
v Obras Publicas — Elsias Pallais. 



Anex6 H. 

Peotesta, Parte Fixal. 



!Nosotros, ciudadanos nicaragtienses, amantes de la soberania y 
dignidad de la Eepublica, enemigos de toda intervention extraui 
en nuestro suelo, sin connivencia alguna con los habitantes del 
interior, cuya actitud no conocemos hasta hoy por la falta de comu- 
nicaciones y la premura del tiempo, resolvemos unanimenente : 

1°. Abstenernos de tomar ninguna participation en las elec- 
ciones de que habla el decreto mencionado. 

2°. Protestar con todo el vigor de uuestras almas contra el 
proceder infame y agresivo que el Gobierno americano ha observado 
cou nuestra querida Nicaragua; y 

3°. Condenar la conducta bochornosa dc los nicaragiienses que 
est&B traicionando a la Patria y maucillando el honor de la raza 
indo-espanola. 

Bluefields, Nic. C. A.. Octubre dc 1912. 

Rosendo Argiiello, Jacob Jaen, Manuel H. Giron, Jose M. Zacarias 
G., Juan Ignacio Rivas, J. Ramon Cisneros, Ciriaco Pineda G., A. 



77 

Hunter, Pio E. Guzman, Salvador Lejarza, Juan Davila K, J. P. 
Chevez, J. P. Delgadillo, Guillermo Childres Eaudales, Gustavo 
Cortes, Samuel Gutierrez, M. Ig. Arguello, P. B, Baldovinos, Carlos 
A. Espinosa B., E. Castrillo Z., Eduardo Delgadillo, J. M. Araica, 
Carlos Alberto Castro,Jesus Sierra, T. Narciso Bermudez, Ignacio 
Dinarte, Patricio Soils, B. Herrera, Franco Aviles. 



Anexo "P 

San Salvador, 26 de Agosto de 1912, 

A Presidente Taft, Washington. 

La situation de Nicaragua se agrava de dia en dia y temo serias 
complicaciones si las tropas americanas penetran en territorio ni- 
caragiiense. En Leon el pueblo se amotino a la llegada de los 
marinos, y a, no haber si do por la inter vencion del Ministro de El 
Salvador tendriamos ahora que lamentar graves consecuencias, 
Bespetuosamente ruego a Ud. insinuar al Presidente Diaz, que 
entre en algun arreglo de paz, aceptando una tercera persona. Hago 
esta manifestacion movido por mi ardiente deseo de paz en Centro^ 
America y mi sincera amistad al Gobiernb y pueblo Americanos. 

Presidente Akaujo, 



Anexo "P 

Washington, 5 de Setiembre de 1912. A Legacion Americana. 
San Salvador. El serior Presidente desea que usted solicite una. 
audiencia con el Presidente Araujo y ponga en sus propias manos, 
iextualmente, la siguiente comunicacion, en respuesta: "Su Exce- 
lencia, el Presidente de EE. TJU. estima en alto grando la se-. 
guridad del ardiente deseo de usted por la paz de Centro- America 
y en las protestas de su sincera amistad. Estos motivos induda-^ 
blemente garantizaran una estrieta adhesion y una forzoza obe- 
diencia a las estipulaciones de la Convencion de Washington en 
la parte que pueda corresponder al Gobierno salvadoreno e induda^ 
blemente garantizara el cumplimiento por parte del Gobierno del 
Salvador, de las medidas que para afianzamiento de la paz en 
la America Central esta tomando el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, 
apoyado en lo que estatuye la Convencion de Washington por ser 



78 

quien mejor puede hacerlo, a causa de su completa neutralidad en 
las conveniencias locales, las cuales pudieran inclinarse a neutralizar 
6 frnstrar las propuestas de una cualquiera de las Eepiiblicas de 
Centro America. Opino como usted en que la situacion en Nica- 
ragua ha llegado a ser muy grave. 

El Gobierno de los Estados TJnidos no ha tenido la intencion de 
dejar su Legacion y las vidas e intereses de sus ciudadanos en Ni- 
caragua a la merced de una rebelion sin fundamento y que por 
sus acciones hace pensar en la epoca de Zelaya, cometiendo los- 
atropellos mas flagrantes a los principios del honor, de la huniani- 
dad, del orden y de la civilizacion, como Yuestra Excelencia me lo 
indica. No temo de Nicaragua cualquier arreglo con las personas 
que han demostrado que no cumplen los compromisos contraidos 
con las autoridades locales, representados legalmente y en el ejerci- 
cio de sus derechos. En vista de todas estas circunstancias y para 
hacer mas prontamente eficaz el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones. 
el Gobierno de los Estados TJnidos se propone, de conformidad con 
lo solicitado por el Gobierno de Nicaragua, tomar las medidas mas 
convenientes para proteger sus intereses y el afianzamiento de la 
paz y tomando en cuenta que cada una de las republican centroa- 
merioanas se ha comprometido solemnemente ante este Gobierno a 
mantener la Convencion de Washington, ha tenido la pena de 
saber, annque no le he dado credito, que la presente revolucion da 
Nicaragua esta recibiendo auxilios de territorio salvadorefio. No 
• ereo necesario manifestar a Yuestra Excelencia que la vindication 
de la politica salvadorena encontrara una oportunidad en la Con- 
vencion de Washington. 

William H. Taft." 



Anexo "I." 

Cablegrams del Presidente Aranjo a la Legacion salvadorena 
en Washi no-ton. 



"San Salvador, 23 de Septiembre de 1012. Legacion Salvador. 
Washington. — Sirvaso. en conferencia verbal, entregar al senor 
Subsoorriario Wilson, copia textual de este despacho. rogandole 
elevarlo al eonocimiento del Exrolenh'simo Senor Presidente Taft, 
pnrn quien va dirigido. El despacho es el siguiente: 



79 

"Se supone aqui, que las fuerzas navales que ocupan territorio 
nicaragiiense, han entrado en accion belica contra los revolutionaries 
que ocupan Granada. Tan grave acontecimiento compromete 
seriamente la. responsabilidad de los demas Jefes de Estado eentroa- 
mericanos. Para resguardar la mia, y cumpliendo altos deberes de 
h'umanidad, que estoy seguro hallaran eco generoso en el Presi- 
dente, sirvase insinuarle la conveniencia de que para evitar mayor 
derramamiento de sangre de un pueblo hermano del nuestro, se 
presenta al Gobierno americano oportunidad propicia de prestar 
altos oficios de humanidad, coadyuvando con mi Gobierno, en accion 
eonjunta 6 separada, para que don Salavdor Caleron se haga 
cargo provisionalmente del Mando Supremo de Nicaragua, mien- 
tras se restablece el orden constitutional, por vias pacificas y legales,. 
El senor Calderon es persona de antecedentes intachables, ilustrado 
y probo, persona tambien grata al Gobierno americano y amigo del 
Presidente Diaz, quien ha manifestado a mi Gobierno que lo acepta- 
ria en tal caracter. Mi Gobierno se compromete a ejercer presion 
moral sobre cabecillas rebeldes para la aceptacion del senor Calderon, 
de acuerdo con ese Gobierno, que prestaria asi servicio imborrable 
en la memoria del pueblo centroamericano, evitando la conmocion 
profunda que ha causado en este pais la gravedad de los sucesos, 
que tambien repercutiran hondamente en la opinion moral de 
todo el Continente." 

"Explique ITd. al Presidente la rectitud de mis intentos en esta 
grave emergencia, que yo no esperaba, porque el Departamento de 
Estado habia deferentemente manifestado a Ud. que la accion naval 
americana se limitaria a garantizar vidas y propiedades extran- 
]eras y resguardiar la Legacion y Consulado americanos en aquel 
pais; manifestacion que recibimos con la mas grata complacencia, 
tanto mas cuanto que fue confirmada por el Ministro Weitzel a 
nuestro Ministro en Managua." 

"No pueden escapar a la elevada penetracion del Presidente las 
consecuencias indeclinables que para Centro America traeria la con- 
tinuacion de esa luoha ineficaz en la forma y caracter con que hoy 
se presenta., y haga Ud. un esfuerzo mas en el sentido propuesto, 
interesando vivamente los sentimientos humanitarios del Jefe de 
ese Gobierno." 

"Veo con pena que los compromisos contraidos en Washington, 



80 



por los Delegados centroamericanos, bajo la simple accion de buenos 
oficios y hospitalidad generosa que les presto el ex-Presidente Eoose- 
velt, parecen invocarse en favor de la actitud ultimamente asumida. 
Siendo El Salvador parte contratante, juzga eomo deber indeclinabla 
suyo, deber que se convierte en un derecho cuando se trata de inter- 
pretar pactos que le afectan vivamente, declarar ante el senor Prsi- 
dente Taft, en la forma mas franca y respetuosa, que los buenos 
oficios que Estados Unidos y Mexico prestaron a los plenipoten- 
ciarios centroamericanos, son siempre recordados con agradecimien- 
to; pero que deben limitarse a lo que lealmente significan. Las 
firmes relaciones de cordial amistad que vinculan a El Salvador 
con el Gobierno Americano, me autorizan para ejercitar este dere- 
cho en la forma mas cortes y bien intencionada." 

Puede Ud. agregar explicaciones pertinentes sobre contenido de 
estas instrucciones al Secretario de Estado, apelando a su amistosa 
cortesia, para que lo eleve a su alto destinatario. 

Manuel E. Araupo. 




DR. JOSE MADRIZ, 
Ex-President de Nicaragua. 



83 



EL DOCTOK MADRIZ. 

Nacio Jose Madriz en la ciudad de Leon, Nicaragua, Centro 
America, el dia 21 de Febrero de 1866. 

Fueron sus padres, pobres y honorables. A pesar de su pobreza, 
resolvieron darle una carrera literaria. Recibio su instruction 
elemental, secundaria y profesional sin salir de la ciudad que 
le sirvio de cuna; y las cleficiencias que por la escasez de elementos 
para la enseiiansa b'abia, fueron suplidas por el despejado talento que 
desde nino mostro, y por su absoluta dedication al estudio. 

Tuvo la suerte de desarrollar su inteligencia a la luz de las ideas 
en aquel entonces ya propagadas por el gran patriota, y a la vez 
gran jurisconsulato y filosofo, Maximo Jerez. 

Corono con lucimiento su carrera de abogado, y la ejercio con 
provecho por varios afios, hasta que en 1893, cuando solo contaba 
vientisiete anos, fue llamado por el Presidente Zelaya a desempenar 
la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (Secretaria de Estado), que 
sirvio con brillantez por algun tiempo. 

En esa epoca fue a la costa Atlantica de Nicaragua como Dele- 
gado del Poder Ejecutivo, para arreglar las dificultades existentes 
en el territorio conocido entonces con el nombre de Mosquitia, con 
motivo de la especie de protectorado que ejercia en el el Gobierno de 
Su Majestad Britanica. Su inteligente labor contribuyo eficazmente 
al resultado de reincorporar definitivamente a Nicaragua toda 
aquella costa, que desde ese hecho ha venido desarrollandose de 
manera asombrosa. Por eso el Doctor Madriz vio con mayor mo- 
tivo que cualquiera otro, con tanto dolor como indignation, el 
criminal proyecto que tuvieron los revolutionaries del 1909, de 
proclamar en aquel territorio una Republica, al parecer indepen- 
diente, pero en realidad para someterla al protectorado extranjero. 

Por razones de politica interior, el senor Madriz quedo separado 
del alto empleo que ejercia 1895, aunque volvio a desempenarlo como 
base de una transaction entre el Presidente Zelaya y los liberales 
de Leon, a fin de evitar la guerra civil que estaba para estallar, la 
que desgratiadamente no se contuvo. 

Mientras Madriz sirvio a Zelaya pudo tenerlo a honra, porque 
en aquella epoca este era un gobernante de los mejores; honrado, 
r-espetuoso a hs \eyes y pr&ciicamente liberal. 



84 

Al estallar esa revolucion, Madriz figuro en sus filas. Fue ven- 
eida, y Madriz emigro a la Republica dc El Salvador, donde re&i- 
dio hasta 1907. Alii contrajo matrimonio con la hondurena Doiia 
Hortensia Cobos. De su matrimonio tuvo cuatro hijos : dos varones, 
Ricardo y Jose, y dos mujeres, Hortensia y Mercedes. Vivio del 
ejercicio de su prof esion ; y, aunque no pudo acumular una f ortuna, 
sostuvo su familia con el mayor decoro, alternando en la mas alta 
sociedad. 

Madriz en el Salvador, como en su tierra natal Nicaragua, o 
en Honduras y Guatemala, donde estuvo por cortas temporadas, 
supo captarse las generales simpatias, por su exquisita amabilidad, 
su cultura, y, principalmente, por sus dotes intelectuales y su amena 
conversacion. Al hablar Madriz se imaginaban sus oyentes que eran 
sus voces las de una nrasica deliciosa. 

En 1907, no obstante su enemistad politica con Zeleya. al ver 
la conflagracion de los otros Presidentes de Centro America contra 
el Partido Liberal nicaragiiense, resolvio volver a Nicaragua para 
cooperar a la defensa contra la invasion, que se habia h'eclio inevi- 
table. Nos consta que Madriz, como otros patriotas que entonces 
ayudaban a Zelaya, fueron impulsados por elevados moviles y 
perseguian altos ideales. Creyeron que de aquella conflagracion 
habia de resultar la union de Centro America, o por lo menos la 
de Ins tres Republicas del Centro que hicieron la ultima tentativa 
en pro de esa causa. Grande fue la decepcion de Madriz cuando 
vio que Zelaya se quedo muv por bajo del gran papel a que en- 
tonces estaba llamado, y se eonformo con un cambio de Gobierno 
en Honduras, el cual no dio ningiin provecho al mismo pais ni a 
Nicaragua, por graves errores que cometio Zelaya. dobidos a estre- 
cbas miras person ales. 
Decepcionado Madriz, volvio a salir do Nicaragua, aunqne sin 
renovar la ruptura con Zelaya. Su trnslado a Honduras donde pro- 
yectaba arraigarse. Sus propositos fueron oontrariados por las 
circunstaneias sobrevinientes. 

So acepto por los Gobiemos la idea dc la reunion de la Con- 
ferenoia Centroamericana do Paz on Washington, y fue Madriz 
nombrado Jefe de la P>oleiracinn por Nicaragua. En esa conferencia, 
de acnerdo con los Delegados de Honduras, abogo por la realiza- 
tion del ideal de \r resrauracion de la antigua patria, ideal que 



85 

cultivaba con entusiasmo, que rayaba en adoracion. Esos esfuerzos 
fueron imitiles, y la labor de la conferencia resulto improlifica. 

Annque representaba al Gobierno presidido por Zelaya, Madriz 
siempre hizo iniciativas, o acogio las que se hicieron, con el fin de 
asegurar en los paises del istmo el imperio de las leyes ; y debemos 
reconocer que, al ser consultado por Madriz, Zelaya siempre aprobo 
todas las proposiciones tendentes al bien de los pueblos, aunque 
fuesen en perjuicio del poder absoluto de los gobernantes. Por 
desgracia, la mayor parte de las tentativas hechas en ese sentido 
fracasaron. 

Resulto de aquella Conferencia la creacion de la Corte de Justicia 
Centroamericana, que debia residir en Cartago, Costarica, y el 
Doctor Madriz fue nombrado Magistrado por el Congreso de Nic- 
aragua. A su regreso de Washington, quedo en Costarica ejerciendo 
aquel cargo, hasta que en Diciembre de 1909 fue llamado pot el 
Congreso nicaragiiense al ejercicio de la Presidencia, a virtud de 
la renuncia que de ella hizo el General Zelaya. 

Era de esperarse que la Presidencia del Dr. fuese para Nicaragua 
simbolo de Paz, porque habia merecido la confianza del Gobierno 
de Zelaya, y debia merecer la de los revolucionarios, ya que Madriz 
habia sido durante muchos anos un companero de expatriacion y 
un adversario decidido de la Administracion de aquel; pero las 
rencillas locales y otras circunstancias, que no es del caso expresar, 
causaron la continuacion de la guerra mas desastrosa que ha tenido 
aquel pais. 

Los que conociamos intimamente a Madriz, al ver que la paz no 
se restablecia, hubieramos deseado que dejase el poder, porque no 
era el el hombre a proposito para aquella situacion. Madriz en 
plena paz habria sido uno de los mejores Presidentes de la America 
Latina. Para la guerra no era su caracter ni su educacion. Hombre 
de corazon era incapaz de causar dano a sus enemigos, aunque a las 
claras estuviesen conspirando,. como sucedio; y por eso tomaron 
mayor aliento para la lucha. No tenian miedo al Presidente, 
Madriz no era hombre de los que, por conservar el poder, no vacilan 
en banarse en la sangre de sus hermanos. Lo que decimos no es 
una censura. Hizo bien, pues queria legar a sus hijos un nombre 
inmaculado; pero habria sido mas conveniente que el hombre se 
reservarse para mejores tiempos. 

Abrumado el Gobierno de Madriz por el peso de un poder 



86 

extranjero in contras table, comprendio que la continuacion de la 
lucha seria esteril. Creyo haber ya defendido suficientemente el 
honor nacional, y resolvio retirarse del poder. Salio del pais y se 
dirigio a Mexico, donde tenia numerosos amigos, desde la epoca en 
que estuvo alii eomo Delegado por la Conferencia de Paz de Wash- 
ington para dar las gracias al Presidente Diaz por sus buenos oficios 
en favor de la paz de Centro America. 

Tenia el proposito de . establecer alii su residencia ejerciendo 
su profesion, para gozar de tranquilidad, que en ningun parte de 
la America Central podria disfrutar; pero la muerte estorbo todos 
sus planes. 

Una enfermedad repentina le tuvo postrado durante pocos dias 
en el lecho, y desaparecio para siempre el 14 de Mayo de 1911 aun- 
que no de la memoria de los buenos centroamericanos. En Nicara- 
gua, especialmente, lleno de duelo la mayor parte de los hogares; 
y sus mismos enemigos politicos, que en vida le habian atacado rn- 
damente, llegando hasta la calumnia, ante su tumba depusieron 
sus odios. La Asamblea conservadora le dec'reto honores, declaran- 
dole BENEMEEITO DE LA PATTIA. Esa declaracion es la 
mejor prueba de que Madriz representaba la causa nacional. Sirva 
al menos para satisfaccion de su familia y de los que tuvimos la 
honra de llamarnos sus amigos; y sirva tambien para que la ju- 
ventud centroamericana busque un ejemplo que imitar en la vida 
del patriota que en tan temprana edad abandono el mundo de los 

vivOS. P. BONVILLA. 

Nueva Orleans, Octubre. 1912. 



(B 32 82 






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